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The fundamental objective of this dissertation is to explore whether and how 
“Europeanization” is an effective Conflict Resolution mechanism to produce sustainable 
solutions to cross-border ethno-nationalist conflicts at the periphery of the European 
Union, namely the Western Balkans. Accepting “Europeanization” as “an analytical 
concept used to examine the changes in domestic structures and policies that occur in 
response to policies and practices institutionalized at the European level” three levels of 
analysis will be explored: (a) the protection of minorities in the domestic legislative 
level, and (b) the resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts as a result of this democratization; 
and (c) whether this “Europeanization” at domestic level, namely adopting the norms of 
minority protection in the domestic level fosters a cooperation between the host-state 
and the neighbouring kin state as the neo-functional theories on European integration 
proposed.  In other words, would “internal Europeanization” foster “external 
Europeanization” in the Western Balkans? 
In order to assess the impact of “Europeanization” and evaluate the efficiency of 
these policies on the resolution of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts which lie at the 
core of the antagonisms in this region of Western Balkans, three cases will be analysed 
all of which are centered on the question of “external minority”, that is “an ethnic group 
that, while residing in one state (the host-state) is related through shared cultural, 
religious or linguistic characteristics, which it wishes to preserve, and through kinship to 
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the titular nation of another, often neighbouring state (the kin-state). These are the 
Albanian question in Western Macedonia; the Serbian question in Eastern Slavonia, 
Croatia; and the Hungarian Question in Vojvodina, Serbia and Montenegro.   
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ÖZET 
“AVRUPALILAŞMA” VE ETNO-TERRİTORYEL SINIR AŞIRI UYUŞMAZLIKLARIN 
ÇÖZÜMÜ -BATI BALKANLAR ÖRNEĞİ- 
Önder Çetin 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans Programı, 2005 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. A.Betül Çelik 
“Avrupalılaşma”, Avrupa Birliği, üçüncü tarafların müdahalesi, Batı Balkanlar, 
etno-territoryel sınır aşırı uyuşmazlıklar, Azınlık Haklarının Korunmasına Dair Çerçeve 
Sözleşmesi 
 
Bu tezin temel amacı “Avrupalılaşma”nın/AB perspektifinin Avrupa Birliği’nin 
çevre bölgelerinden olan Batı Balkanlardaki sınırlar-aşırı etno-territoryel uyuşmazlıklar 
için sürdürülebilir çözümler sunabilecek bir uyuşmazlık çözümü mekanizması olma 
imkanının araştırılmasıdır. “Avrupalılaşma”/AB perspektifi, “Avrupa düzleminde 
kurumsallaşmış siyasal tutum ve uygulamalara mukabil yerel yapı ve siyasal tutumlarda 
meydana gelen değişiklikleri incelemede kullanılan analitik bir kavram olarak kabul 
edilerek üç analiz düzlemi araştırılmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi, yerel hukuksal 
düzlemde azınlıkların korunması, ikincisi bu demokratikleşmenin sonucu olarak etnik 
topluluklararası uyuşmazlıkların çözümü, üçüncüsü ise yerel düzlemdeki bu 
“Avrupalılaşma’nın , yani azınlık haklarının korunmasına dair normların adapte 
edilmesinin, Avrupa bütünleşmesi üzerine yürütülen neo-fonksiyonel teorilerin 
öngördüğü şekilde yerleşik olunan devletle, azınlığın anavatanı olan komşu devletin 
işbirliğini teşvik etme durumudur. Bir başka ifadeyle “içteki Avrupalılaşma” “dışarıya 
karşı Avrupalılaşma”nın önünü açmakta mıdır? 
“Avrupalılaşma”nın tesirini değerlendirebilmek ve söz konusu siyasal tutumların 
sınır-aşırı etno-territoryel uyuşmazlıkların çözümü üzerindeki etkinliğini 
değerlendirebilmek amacıyla, Batı Balkanlar bölgesindeki husumetlerin odağında yer 
alan “dışsal azınlık” sorununun merkezinde yer aldığı üç örnek vaka incelenecektir. 
 vii
“Dışsal azınlık” kavramıyla ifadelendirilen, “bir devletin toprakları içerisinde yerleşik 
haldeyken muhafaza etmek istediği kültürel, dini ya da dilsel özellikleri ve kan bağı 
vasıtasıyla bir başka, ki çoğu zaman komşu, devlet olan vasi bir ulusa bağlılık duyan 
etnik topluluk” kastedilmektedir. Bunlar, Batı Makedonya’daki Arnavut sorunu, 
Hırvatistan’ın Doğu Slavonya bölgesindeki Sırp sorunu, ve Sırbistan’ın Voyvodina 
bölgesindeki Macar azınlık sorunudur.   
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The fundamental objective of this dissertation is to explore whether and how 
“Europeanization” is an effective Conflict Resolution mechanism to produce sustainable 
solutions to cross-border ethno-nationalist conflicts at the periphery of the European 
Union, namely the Western Balkans. Accepting “Europeanization” as “an analytical 
concept used to examine the changes in domestic structures and policies that occur in 
response to policies and practices institutionalized at the European level” three levels of 
analysis will be explored: (a) the protection of minorities in the domestic legislative 
level, and (b) the resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts as a result of this democratization; 
and (c) whether this “Europeanization” at domestic level, namely adopting the norms of 
minority protection in the domestic level fosters a cooperation between the host-state 
and the neighbouring kin state as the neo-functional theories on European integration 
proposed.  In other words, would “internal Europeanization” foster “external 
Europeanization” in the Western Balkans? 
In order to assess the impact of “Europeanization” and evaluate the efficiency of 
these policies on the resolution of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts which lie at the 
core of the antagonisms in this region of Western Balkans, three cases will be analysed 
all of which are centered on the question of “external minority”, that is “an ethnic group 
that, while residing in one state (the host-state) is related through shared cultural, 
religious or linguistic characteristics, which it wishes to preserve, and through kinship to 
the titular nation of another, often neighbouring state (the kin-state). These are the 
Albanian question in Western Macedonia; the Serbian question in Eastern Slavonia, 
Croatia; and the Hungarian Question in Vojvodina, Serbia and Montenegro.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1950s, the link between intergovernmental organizations and the 
settlement of sustainable peace has been one of the prominent themes in international 
politics, generating an array of theoretical approaches and relevant empirical research. 
In this context, since Haas’ pioneering work on the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1958, the European integration as a model of international 
cooperation and peace has been presented in a sizeable body of work, in the liberal 
tradition of International Relations at particular (Lindberg 1963; Lindenberg & 
Scheingold 1972; Hodges 1972; Harrison 1978; Adler and Barnett 1998; Waever 1998). 
Following this prevailing approach, up to date research in the European integration 
literature has been developed on two basic frameworks. While a “bottom-up 
perspective” focusing on the effects of the Member States on the formation and the 
outcomes of European integration was dominant until the 1990s (Börzel 2002, 2003; 
Caporaso and Keeler 1993; Hoffman 1982; Taylor 1991; Moravcsik 1991, 1998; Haas 
1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bomberg and 
Peterson 2000; Wallace 1971; Héritier et al. 1994; as cited in Börzel 2003), since then, 
particularly inspired by the enlargement processes, the literature has mainly adopted a 
“top-down” account of “Europeanization” focusing on how the European processes and 
institutions affected and responded by the Member States (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 
1994; Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Kohler-Koch 1996; Rhodes 1996; 
Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Kohler-Koch 1999; Börzel and Risse 2000; Goetz and Hix 
2000; Radaelli 2000; Cowles, Bulmer and Burch 2001; Caporaso, and Risse 2001; 
Héritier et. al. 2001; Héritier and Knill 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; as cited in 
Börzel 2003 and Harcourt 2002; Beyers, Delreux and Steensels 2004)  
 
All of these theoretical approaches and the relevant empirical research, however, 
have not been applied to the specific role of the European Union as a third party actor in 
the resolution of the intra-state and/or inter-state conflicts. In this context, while one of 
the basic premises of the Conflict Resolution literature is the fact that a change in the 
intensity of the conflict requires a revision in third party roles and strategies (i.e. 
Kriesberg 1996; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987), the European Studies literature has 
 2 
been mainly drawn on the European Union’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach within the 
framework of structural prevention1.  
 
At this point, while the Conflict Resolution literature provides valuable insights 
on the role of regional organizations as a third party actor on intra-state and inter-state 
conflicts (Aal, Miltenberg and Weiss 2000; Chayes and Chayes 1996; Fortna 1993, 
2001; Peck 1998, 2001; Voronkov 1999; Wedgewood 1996), such as the works on the 
United Nations (i.e. Alden 1995; Anstee 1999; Bailey 1982; Berridge 1991; Bertram 
1995; Biermann and Vadset 1999; De Soto 1999; Doyle 2001; Doyle, Johnstone and Orr 
1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2004; Durch 1993, 1996; Ekeus 2001; Findlay 1996; Durch 
and Blechman 1992; Guilding 1993; Haas, Butterworth and Nye 1972; Haas 1986; 
Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel 1996; Paris 2002; Parsons 1995; Ratner 1995; Roberts 
1996; Sambanis 1999; Solomon 1999; Wedgewood 1996), OSCE (Hopmann 2000, 
2002; Troebst 1998; van der Stoel; Zellner 2002) and Organization of African Unity 
(Amoo and Zartman 1992; Muyangwa and Vogt 2000),  the conflict resolution potential 
of the European Union has not been yet sufficiently realized in the Conflict Resolution 
literature (Barnes 2002; Beriker and Eralp 2004, Debiel and Fischer 2000; Hill 2001; 
Jørgensen 1997; Kefford and Eavis 2002; Salmon 2002). However, synonymous to the 
EU’s first systematic formulations and the relevant implementation of conflict 
prevention mechanisms in the mid-1990s, a literature focusing on the conflict resolution 
capacity of the EU from the European Studies perspective has emerged in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s (Barbé and Johansson 2001; Brewin 2000; Cottey 1998, 2000; Deus 
Pinheiro 1998; Dosenrode and Stubkjær 2002; Landgraf 2000; Leonhardt 2000; Piening 
1997) Particularly with the debates on enlargement, these studies have been mainly 
represented in two main accounts. While the former mainly focuses on how the EU 
affects the transformation of border conflicts through its integration process (Diez 
2002a, 2002b, Diez 2003; Diez, Stetter and Albert 2004; Pace 2004; Prozorov 2003), the 
latter focuses on the potential of the EU, through the use of Europeanization 
mechanisms of conditionality and socialization to bring about the settlement of 
secessionist conflicts in its periphery. (Emerson 2004; Noutcheva et al. 2004; Tocci 
2004)  
 
                                                 
1
 For a critics of this approach on the EU’s Cyprus policy, see, Beriker and Eralp 2004. 
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Both of the two approaches offer valuable insight in the conflict resolution 
capability of the European Union. While the former proposes a theoretical framework of 
four paths of influence on the conflicting parties by the EU through its power of 
attraction, the latter offers a two-fold strategy, namely EU as an ‘actor’ directly 
intervening the conflicts as a mediator and indirectly by supporting these initiatives or 
by providing a ‘framework’ to be adopted for resolving these conflicts. However, while 
the former limits itself with inter-state border conflicts, the latter focuses only on 
secessionist conflicts. Furthermore, except the Serbia and Montenegro case (Noutcheva 
and Husseune 2004), these works do not include the cases in the Western Balkans, 
where the EU initiated various key post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention 
mechanisms since the Dayton Accord, namely the Royaumont Process (December 
1996), Regional Approach towards the Western Balkans (April 1997), the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP) (May 1999) and the adoption of the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe (June 1999).  
 
In addition, this dissertation is based on the premise that the protection of 
minority rights is a test-case of the transformation of identity-based ethno-political 
conflicts of the past, including not only the resolution of domestic inter-ethnic conflicts 
but also improvement of the relations between the kin-states and the host-states. In this 
context, the current literature on the impact of Europeanization also lacks that crucial 
aspect by focusing only on how the Europeanization process influenced domestic policy 
making by framing minority rights regimes in Central Europe and the Baltics (Brusis 
2001; Dobre 2003; Galbreath 2003; Judith 2003; Morris 2003; Pentassuglia 2001; Ram 
2003; Smith 2003; Vermeersch 2003). 
 
In light of these accounts, by accepting “Europeanization” as “an analytical 
concept used to examine the changes in domestic structures and policies that occur in 
response to policies and practices institutionalized at the European level” (Noutcheva et. 
al, 2004: 6), the fundamental objective of this dissertation is to explore whether and how 
“Europeanization” both at the domestic2 and regional level3 could lead sustainable 
                                                 
2
 In the Copenhagen EC Presidency Conclusions, of June 21-22, 1993, it was stated that 
“membership  requires  that  the  candidate  country  has achieved  stability  of  
institutions  guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
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solutions to ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts in Western Balkans as a conflict 
prevention strategy proposed by the EU. In this context, drawing on the necessity of 
building trust among all the parties to the conflict for a sustainable peace4, in order to be 
successful in its objective of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the Europeanization 
policy should address three specific levels of these conflicts, namely the conflict 
between the host-state and the external minority,5 the conflict between host-nation and 
the external minority, and the conflict between the host-state and the kin-state. In this 
context, I accept the conceptual framework offered by Wolff, who defines the external 
minority as “an ethnic group that while residing in one state (the host-state) is related 
through shared cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics, which it wishes to 
preserve, and through kinship to the titular nation of another, often neighbouring state 
(the kin-state)” (2003: 3) Taking these into consideration, fundamental research 
questions of this dissertation can be listed as follows:     
                                                                                                                                                        
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the  Union.  
Membership presupposes  the  candidate’s ability  to  take  on  the  obligations  of  
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.” See, part 7 on “Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, A. 
iii., p. 13.   
 
3
 In the same Report, in p. 11, it was stated that these countries should “demonstrate that 
they are willing and able to interact with their neigbours as EU Member States do.” 
 
4
 Stedman (1997) and Stern and Druckman (2000: 44) for instance conceives success of 
third party intervention as “the weakening of actors opposed to the peace process vis-à-
vis those engaged in it”. In this context, Väyrynen (2000:165-166) underlines that either 
drawing on a constructivist approch, emphasizing the role of common values, identities 
and meanings in forming a collective identity that would be kept alive in the mutual 
responsiveness of the members, or a rationalist approach grounding the definition of 
community on the concept of interest leading transactions that would eventually create a 
community, what could integrate values, meanings and interests is to rely on the concept 
of “trust”, and which could provide predictability of mutual behaviour and assurance to 
reduce the possibility of an unexpected action. Although Deutsch (1957) does not 
explicitly use the concept of trust in his construction of “security community”, but as an 
aspect of predictability of behaviour, for Adler and Barnett (1998b, 38) mutual trust and 
collective identity are regarded as necessary conditions of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change, and, thus, of security community. Cited in Väyrynen (2000: 167); for a 
detailed assessment of the relation between trust and community, see, Väyrynen (2000: 
164-169). 
 
5
 Wolff defines external minority as “an ethnic group that, while residing in one state 
(the host-state) is related through shared cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics, 
which it wishes to preserve, and through kinship to the titular nation of another, often 
neighbouring state (the kin-state)” (2003: 3). 
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1. How does the “Europeanization” of the domestic policy-making in the 
Western Balkan   countries, proposed as a form of structural prevention, affect the 
relevant state policies towards national minorities, external minorities at particular?  
 
2. How does it help the resolution of the conflict between the host-nation and the 
external minority? 
 
3. How does adopting the norms of minority protection in the domestic level 
foster cooperation between the kin-state and the host-state within the broader framework 
of regional cooperation? In other words, does “internal Europeanization” foster 
“external Europeanization” in the Western Balkans? 
 
Within this framework, three cases, all centered on the question of “external 
minority”, will be analyzed. These are the Albanian question in Macedonia, the Serbian 
Question in Croatia, and the Hungarian question in Serbia, SaM. 
After a relatively peaceful era since the independence of Macedonia, although 
Kosovo6 crisis in 1999 and the subsequent riots of ethnic Albanians in 2001 placed 
considerable strain on relations between the Macedonian government and Macedonia’s 
Albanian minority, the democratization process after Ohrid Agreement (2001) has 
brought some improvements regarding the conditions of ethnic Albanians. However, the 
resentments of ethnic Macedonians stand as a threat to the resolution of  inter-ethnic 
conflicts and make it as a test-case for the model offered by the EU to the Western 
Balkans. 
In the second case, the Blitzkrieg of the Croatian Army in 1995 to recapture the 
Serb-populated “UN Protected Areas” under the authority of self-proclaimed “Republic 
of Serbian Krajina”, produced Serbian refugees whose member range between 300.000-
350.000. Subsequent to the signing of the Erdut Agreement in November 1995, the 
Croatian Government regained the control of Eastern Slavonia after the expiration of the 
                                                 
6
 There is an ongoing dispute between the Serbs and the Albanians on the spelling of the 
name “Kosovo’. While the Albanians use Kosova, the Serbs prefer Kosovo, or Kosovo 
and Metohija or Kosmet. In this dissertation, Kosovo will be used, just for the fact that it 
is the most common spelling used in the English-speaking world.  
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UNTAES mandate in the region in January 1998, in accordance with this Agreement. 
However, today beside the issue of the return of the refugees, the discriminatory 
processes encountered by the ethnic Serbs like property repossession, reconstruction of 
damaged houses or re-holding tenancy rights is not just as a problem for the resolution 
of inter-ethnic conflicts, but also determines the settlement of good-neighbourly 
relations, which affects the Croatia’s pace on EU membership.  
Different from the previous issues, Vojvodina achieved the status of an 
autonomous region in 1974. However, although the SaM government claims that the 
general conditions are satisfying, particularly due to the influx of Serbian refugees in the 
region, majority-minority relations have changed in many areas of the region to the 
disadvantage of the Hungarian minority. Furthermore incidents against the ethnic 
minorities, ethnic Hungarians at particular, have not only violate the relatively peaceful 
inter-ethnic accommodation in this northern part of Serbia but also led tensions in the 
traditional good-neighbourhood relations between Serbia and Hungary. 
What is common to all three cases is that all these countries are on different 
points of the general pace to the EU membership, thus subjected to the criteria of 
conditionality which requires the adoption of the recognized and required norms of the 
EU. Thus, they are expected to be “Europeanized” in domestic affairs, namely 
“guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities”.7 Furthermore, the cases are not just a reflection of the issue of 
democratization but by the fact that the aforementioned minority groups are linked to a 
kin-state which is the neigbouring state in all cases, they are good cases for an analysis 
of whether democratization in the sense of the protection of minorities as a presented 
value of Europeanization will lead another value, namely regional governance in the 
form of good neighbourhood. This is especially important when it is considered that the 
sustainable settlement of an ethno-political conflict with four actors, namely the host- 
and kin-states and the host-nation and the external minority, could only be achieved by 
building ‘trust’ among all of the parties. In this context, taking the minorities and the 
relaxation of their position in host-states in the form of democratization as a reference 
                                                 
7
 See, part 7 on “Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe” in the 
Copenhagen EC Presidency Conclusions, of June 21-22, 1993, the, A. iii., p. 13.   
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point for the intensification of good-neighbourhood will be a real assurance for it by 
addressing directly to the potential root causes a conflict in the future. 8  
Within this framework, for the first part, I will make use of an archival and 
documentary research under two categories: for the analysis of the legal situation I will 
draw mainly on the provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, the Constitution of 
Croatia, the Federal Constitution of Serbia-and-Montenegro and the Constitution of 
Serbia and the relevant laws of these states on national minority rights.  
When assessing the issue of the protection of minorities in the candidate 
countries, the European Commission’s Opinions contained in Agenda 2000 often refers 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities, Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and, occasionally, to some relevant 
bilateral treaties (e.g. the 1995 and 1996 good-neighbourliness treaties of Hungary 
between Slovakia and Romania respectively). However, ECHR does not include specific 
minority provisions and a bilateral treaty is not a common future for all the cases. Thus, 
although it may be criticized as having vague and weak provisions or lack of hard 
enforcement mechanisms, for the first part of the dissertation, the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities9 will be drawn on as 
the basis for the assessment of the legal structure for the protection of national 
minorities.10 In this context, as Hofmann and Friberg pointed out, “the explicit 
references to the FCNM that the European Commission has made in its Regular 
Reports, including quotes from the Advisory Committee opinions, demonstrate that the 
EU considered candidate countries’ implementation of the FCNM an important element 
in the accession criteria of minority protection” (2004: 139). In this context, I will 
analyze each case in the light of nine main categories provisioned in the Framework 
Convention. These are 
                                                 
8
 See, Kleiboer (1996: 382) 
 
9
 Which is the first legally binding international instrument devoted to minority 
protection in general. 
 
10
 For the assessment of the FCNM see, Weller (ed.) (2005), Estébanez and Gál (1999), 
Gál (2000), Philips (2002). 
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1. International cooperation in the context of human rights protection 
(Art.1): The main purpose of Article 1 is to specify that the protection of national 
minorities is the reserved domain of the whole internationally community.  
2. Recognition of a definition of minority and the respect for individual’s 
right to be treated as a member of minority or not (Art.3): This article guarantees every 
person belonging to a national minority11 the freedom to choose to be treated as a 
member of national minority, thus to come under the provisions, or not to be treated as 
such. Furthermore it recognizes that these rights may be exercised individually or in 
community with the other members.  
3. General Provisions on the rights to non-discrimination, to equality and 
to cultural identity (Art. 4-6): The purpose of these articles is to ensure the applicability 
of the general principles of equality and non-discrimination for persons belonging to 
national minorities. 
4. Territorial Provisions such as the prohibition of altering the proportions 
of the population (Art. 16). This article aims to protect the members of national 
minorities against measures aimed to change the proportion of the population in areas 
inhabited by them. 
5. Political Participation such as the rights to assembly and association 
(Art. 7) and rights to cross-border contact (Art. 17): The purpose of the Article 7 is to 
guarantee the right of every person belonging to a national minority the basic freedoms 
of assembly and association; expression, thought, conscience and religion. Furthermore, 
Article 17 recognizes their right to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts 
across frontiers; and participate in the activities of the NGOs.  
6. Linguistic Rights (Art. 10-11): These articles set down the provisions to 
recognize the rights of every person belonging to national minority to use his/her 
language freely and without interference, both in private and in public, including 
communication with administrative authorities. Furthermore, these rights are specified 
in usage regarding use of names and surnames, language signs and inscriptions, local 
names, street names and other topographical indications where national minority holds a 
substantial number in an area.  
                                                 
11
 The FCNM -and its signatories- does not recognise collective rights of national 
minorities, but the protection of rights of individuals belonging to a group of national 
minority. 
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7. Educational Rights (Art.12-14): Article 12 seeks the signatory States to 
promote knowledge regarding the culture, history, language and religion of both 
national minorities and the majority in an intercultural perspective and to promote equal 
opportunities for access to education. To specify, Article 13 obliges the signatories to 
recognize the right of persons belonging to national minorities to set up and manage 
their own private educational and training establishment, and Article 14 requires the 
parties to create the conditions for the learning of minority language.    
8. Rights to participation in cultural life (Art. 15) and the rights to access 
and use of media (Art. 9):  Article 15 requires the signatory states to create the 
conditions necessary for the effective participation of every person belonging to a 
national minority in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular 
those affecting them. Article 9 specifies this to the freedom of expression with reference 
to access to the media. 
9. Freedom of Religion (Art. 8): This article ensures the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities to manifest his/her religion or belief, and to establish 
religious institutions, organizations and associations.12 
After analyzing the de jure situation of minorities in light of the framework 
determined by the FCNM, by pointing on the role of the EU on state policies’ towards 
national, particularly, external minorities where appropriate, I will elucidate the de facto 
situation and provide an assessment of whether and how it helped the resolution of the 
conflict between the host-nation and the external minority. To this end, I will review two 
categories of reports: the former will be composed of mainly the documents of the 
monitoring process of the Framework Convention, namely the Opinions of the Advisory 
Committee, the reports of the visits of the AC to these countries, State Comments on 
Opinions and Committee of Ministers’ Resolution; the reports of the Special 
Rapporteurs/Reporters of the UN Commissions; the relevant statements and the reports 
the European Commission (Commission Reports), the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union (Council Presidency Conclusions), the General Annual 
Reports of the Stabilisation and Association Process Reports and the Annual SAP 
Report for each countries, the European Partnership documents for each state and the 
                                                 
12
 The explanations have been mainly derived from the original document of the Council 
of Europe. For a detailed account, see, Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and Explanatory Report, H(1995)010, Strasbourg, February 1995.  
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CARDS Regional and Country Strategy Reports. The second category will be the 
Annual Reports of the three eminent international NGOs, namely Amnesty 
International, Helsinki Committee, and Human Rights Watch. These will be supported 
by secondary data on the situation of external minorities and the course of ethnopolitical 
conflict in our cases including statements of the state officials and a number polls and 
surveys. 
Having analyzed the effectiveness of ‘internal Europeanisation’ as a form of 
structural prevention within the broader conflict prevention strategy of the EU with the 
aim of improving the status of external minorities and the resolution of the conflicts with 
the host-nation, the second part will be on an analysis of whether this will lead to the 
intensification of cooperation with the host-state and the kin-state of the external 
minority. Drawing on the fact that bilateral and regional cooperation is conditionality for 
further integration with the EU, a particular emphasis will be given on clarifying the 
reference points of cooperation between the two countries. This will provide whether 
there is a correlation between the two levels of Europeanization and it would offer the 
resolution of these ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts. To this end, besides 
reviewing the aforementioned documents to specify the provisions of the EU on the 
settlement of bilateral and regional cooperation as a part of its conditionality, I will 
conduct a secondary data analysis through the statements of top-officials of these 
countries on the enhancement of bilateral and regional cooperation. This analysis will be 
conducted through the media coverage from local news agencies, TV and radio stations, 
daily newspapers and weekly magazines provided by the BBC monitoring in the website 
of the Center for South East European Studies.13  
Finally, the cases will be evaluated in the light of the underlying problems and 
possible solutions by drawing on the conflict resolution strategies and mechanisms 
proposed in the Conflict Resolution literature.   
Within this framework, this dissertation will be composed of three chapters.  The 
first chapter will be devoted to the clarification of conceptual and analytical framework. 
Having clarified the characteristics and the dynamics of ethno-territorial cross-border 
conflicts, I will review the theoretical approaches on the third party intervention in 
                                                 
13
 http://www.csees.net/index.php. 
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Conflict Resolution literature. This will be followed by a second body of literature 
focusing on the role of the European Union as a third party intervener and its capacity 
on conflict resolution under two basic models, namely either as an actor intervening the 
resolution processes of these conflicts or standing as a model, namely a framework to be 
adopted for their resolution.  
Drawing on this body of literature on third party intervention, the second chapter 
will be devoted to the analysis of the three cases under four parts: the historical process, 
the evaluation of the normative framework and factual situation of national minorities 
from the perspective of the Framework Convention, the evaluation of the inter-ethnic 
relations and the relations between the kin-states and the host-states and the assessment 
of the EU impact on the course and the resolution processes of these conflicts. 
Finally, the last, concluding chapter will be devoted to a comparative analysis of 
“Europeanization” as a conflict resolution mechanism in the Western Balkans in the 
light of Conflict Resolution literature. 
To sum up, this dissertation will not just provide an assessment of the theoretical 
approaches proposing EU integration as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
‘framework’, in the form of a ‘security community’, but also provide up-to date 
empirical data to assess the impact of this process on minority rights policies in the 
Western Balkans as a form of conflict prevention strategy which has been neglected in 
European integration studies14. Furthermore, by adding the dimension of the relationship 
between the kin-state and the host-state, it will also provide an analysis of whether the 
aforementioned domestic level could facilitate bilateral cooperation and regional 
governance, which is an important factor for the realization of the integration and the 
prospect for a sustainable peace. In this context, by bridging the two fields of European 
Studies and Conflict Resolution through the analysis of the effects and the underlying 
problems of this policy and proposing strategies derived from the Conflict Resolution 
                                                 
14
 König wrote on the situation of minorities in FRY in light of the implementation of 
the FCNM. However, it lacks the two fundamental developments in the process, namely 
the formation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SAM) and the relevant 
legal modifications, particularly the adoption of the Law on Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities (February 2002) and the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and 
Civil Liberties (February 2003). Furhermore, it excludes the impact of European 
integration. See, König (2001). 
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literature to overcome these deficiencies, it will also contribute to the Conflict 
Resolution  literature for structuring the EU as a successful third party actor in the 
resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts in particular, and strengthening the role 
of intergovernmental and regional organizations in intra-state conflicts through their 
strategy of norm diffusion in general.15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 For the analysisof EU enlargement from a Conflict Resolution perspective, see, Celik 
and Rumelili (2004) 
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CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
A. Conceptual and Analytic Framework 
A. 1. Ethno-Territorial Cross-Border Conflicts: Peoples Against States? 
  
Bosnia. Rwanda. Nagorno-Karabakh. Chechnya.  In contrast to the optimism 
initially followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, events of the early 1990’s have 
presented a far more fragmented order than the Cold War era. In this “new world 
disorder” (Lake & Rothchild 1998: 3), ethno-nationalisms sweeping across the world 
from Yugoslavia to Africa, constitute a dominant and increasing threat not just to the 
political stability of states but also to the international system. Taking it into 
consideration that conflicts over ‘identity’ led to the outburst of more than 70% of the 
civil wars in the last four decades of the 20th century (Sambanis 2001), ethnic identities 
are to a great extent perceived either accounting for or furthering violent conflicts. The 
empirical data also support these arguments. The Minorities at Risk Project (2002) 
reveals that between 1955 and 1996, there were 239 wars, regime transitions, and 
genocides in which inter-ethnic conflicts were the determinant factors. (Harff and Gurr 
1997: 5) Furthermore, by one account, The United Nations delineated ethnic conflicts 
within and between neigbouring countries as the predominant form of warfare that will 
occur in the 21th century. (UNHCR 2002, cited in Dunaway 2003:4)  
 
Ethnicity and the characteristics of an ethnic group per se are not the essential 
concern of this dissertation, but what is sought is to clarify the ethno-territorial cross-
border conflicts in which these groups are a stakeholder in conflicts either against the 
state/s, or against other political actors, which are mostly the host-nation. However, 
such an analysis requires the clarification of the essence of ethnicity and how it leads to 
a conflict.   
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Within such a broad spectrum of the theories of ethnicity16, what is common to 
all is that each ethnicity/ethnic group has distinguishing aspects, which are tangible and 
intangible. As a “self-defined” community, Anthony Smith indicates these 
distinguishing factors as a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared 
historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, the 
association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of 
the population.” (Smith 1991: 21; cited in Wolff 2003: 4) Formulating these 
characteristics under the framework of a common, corporate identity, these bodies 
“manifest themselves as barricaded (social) entities whose primary imperative is 
‘absolute’ separation from what are seen as contaminating others.” (Douglas 1966; 
cited in Jowitt 2002: 28).17 This links ethnicity to the phenomenon of power. That is to 
say, in their actions to “preserve, express, and develop their respective ethnic identities, 
all (...) groups perceive threats and opportunities.” (Wolff 2003: 6) As Wolff identified,  
 
“the political implication of this connection between ethnicity/nation and 
power is that any ethno-national group that is consciousness of its uniqueness and 
wishes to preserve it is involved in a struggle for political power -either retaining 
the measure of political power it possesses or striving to acquire the amount of 
power that it deems necessary to preserve its uniqueness as a distinct ethno-
national group, that is, to defeat the threats and seize the opportunities it faces.” 
(Wolff 2003: 6) 
 
                                                 
16
 There are three mainstream approaches on ethnicity, namely (1)primordialist 
approach which perceive ethnicity as fixed, determined characteristics of individuals 
and groups, (2) instrumentalist approach which understands ethnicity as not a given but 
a constructed phenomenon that can be manipulated by individuals, groups or elites; and 
(3) constructivist approach which argues an interplay between primordialist features and 
the contribution of ethnic groups on creating and shaping their own identities. For 
detailed accounts of these fundamental approaches,  see e.g. (1) Shills (1957, 1995), 
Geertz (1963), Kuper (1969), Smith (1974), Isaacs (1975), Van der Berghe (1978, 1981, 
1995), Horowitz (1985), Smith (1986), Kaplan (1993), Kaplan and Connor (1993, 
1994), Allahar (1996), (2) Bell (1975), Glazer and Moynihan (1975), Steinberg (1981), 
Banton (1983), Brass (1985), and Rothchild (1986b), and (3) Anderson (1993), 
Dominguez (1989), James (1989), Vail (1993), Young (1993), and Brubaker (1995). 
 
17
 In this sense, it would not be an overstatement to argue that, for an ethnic group, to 
know what they are not should take precedence of knowing what they are. (Connor 
1994: 103) 
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Whereas many ethnic groups live within the borders of a common state, such 
conceptualizations of ethno-national accounts motivated by threats and opportunities may 
direct itself toward the other ethnic groups or the state itself18. Generally built on an 
internationally legitimized basis, that is the right to national self-determination, these 
communal and/or intra-state tensions might be formulated as a state-minority conflict 
where the majority group holds the state apparatus and the minority group party to the 
conflict which is represented as the “national minority” in the sense of modern politics.19  
 
From this core understanding of “national minorities”, external minorities 
constitute the core of the debate in this dissertation. By external minority, I accept the 
conceptualization of Wolff, that is “an ethnic group that, while residing in one state (the 
host state) is related through shared cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics, 
which it wishes to preserve, and through kinship to the titular nation of another, often 
neigbouring, state (kin-state)” (Wolff, 2003: 3) According to Wolff, in its relationship 
with the host state, the external minority can have a broad range of opportunities from 
self-government to independent statehood or unification with the kin-state, but also it is 
under threat that could be manifested in various ways which could at its most extreme 
form an ethnic cleansing and genocide (Wolff, 2003: 7-8). It is frequent that whenever 
                                                 
18
 Wollf identifies these opportunuties and threats “positively and negatively related to 
the preservation, expression and development of a group’s ethnic identity and to the 
ability of the host state to preserve the integrity of the territorial or civic nation”. See, 
Wolff  (2003: 6-11). 
 
19
 The Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe in its Recommendation 1201 
(1993) proposes the following definition of “national minority”: “... the expression 
“national minority” refers to a group of persons in a State who: a) reside in the territory 
of that State and are citizens thereof, b) maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties 
with that state, c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics, d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the 
rest of population of the State or of a region of that State, and e) are motivated by a 
concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including 
their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.  However, in its basic 
form, similar to theoretical vagueness on a clear definition of ‘ethnicity’, there is not an 
all-agreed on definition of a minority; though, the well-known proposition of Capotorri 
is probably the most frequently cited one: “A group numerically inferior to the rest of 
the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members -being nationals 
of the State- possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those 
of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” (Capotorti 2001: 96; 
cited in Malanczuk 1997: 108).  
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the ethnic minority in a state makes political claims, it establishes a patron-client 
relationship with the kin-state. In contrast, the accommodation of the demands and thus, 
the interests of the minority group could lead to various kinds of conflict20. These may 
be in the form of:  
  
• Inter-ethnic conflict between (a) the host-nation and (b) the external minority 
where there is a resource competition between the two groups. (Wollf 2003: 9; Lake & 
Rotchild 1998: 9-11) 
• (a) Inter-ethnic or (b) state-group conflict where security dilemma is the main 
motivation for one of the parties. This is often the case where the so-called imperial 
regimes collapse. (Posen 1993: 103-124; Lake&Rotchild 1998: 17-18; Ayoub 1996: 37-
51; Katz 1996: 25-35.) 
• State-group conflict between (a) the host-state and (b) the host-nation where 
the host-nation is dissatisfied in terms of the accommodation of the interests of the 
minority and regards the politics toward accommodation as detrimental both to its own 
interests and the integrity of the state. (Wolff, 2003: 9) 
• Inter-state conflict, between (a) the host-state and (b) the kin-state where the 
secessionist movements of the external minority may be perceived as a threat to the 
security of the kin-state (Wollf, 2003: 11) 
• State-group conflict is also likely to develop between (a) the external minority 
and (b) the kin-state wherever the interests and thus the political agenda of the two 
parties do not coincide. (Wolff, 2003: 11) 
 
Regardless of the type of the conflict between the stakeholders, the existence of 
an external minority sets up a crucial relationship between the kin-state and the host-
state. Furthermore, this relationship is one of a distinct conflict, not just determined by 
ethnicity, but also the notion of territory. Despite the deterritorialization process of 
globalization, territory still plays a crucial role in many contemporary conflicts. That is 
to say, the boundaries separating the state actors of the international system are still 
                                                 
20
 In its basic form we accept the definition of conflict as “a situation of social tension in 
which two or more actors who interact with each other pursue incompatible goals, are 
aware of this incompatibility, and claim to be justified in the pursuit of their particular 
course of action to realise their goals. See, Wolff (2003: 8). 
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crucial signifiers of power and thus, sovereignty in the contemporary world21. In his 
innovative work on the politics of territorial organization, Soja determined three 
functional spheres of territorial organization: the control over the distribution of 
resources, the maintenance of order and authority, and the legitimization of order 
through societal integration (Soja 1971: 7).  This theoretical discussion was further 
elaborated by the succeeding works such as the ones of Gottman (1973) and Sack 
(1986). What they elaborated was to broaden the theory of the territory beyond the 
significance of the tangible aspects such as size, shape or existing resources to the 
intangible or symbolic level in which a crucial relation between national identity and 
territory is established.22 As Newman pointed out (2004: 14), despite the deterministic 
account of the previous approach that “ignored the essential symbolic dimensions of 
territorial attachment experienced by the residents of specific territories”, the territorial 
claims of the parties “are rooted in their perceptions of exclusive ancestral homelands, 
filled with sites, locations and myths which form an integral part of their national 
identity formation.” As territory becomes the focus of conflicting and thus competing 
claims by the majority and minority groups23, it also reflects power relations, indeed 
power hegemonies between majority and minority groups both in the sense of material 
and symbolic encounter over the disputed territory.24 Furthermore, aforementioned 
symbolic attachment to territory is not just a signifier of the conflict but also a 
determinant of the resolution. Literature on conflict resolution indicates that intangible 
factors are more difficult to resolve than material resources. Thus, as Wolff pointed out 
(2003: 12), “it requires specific conditions and/or mechanisms to detach conflicts 
involving external minorities from territorial dimension”. But, moreover, such a 
solution must go beyond the dimension of intra-territoriality and reframe the 
characterization of the relationship between the host-state and kin-state.  
                                                 
21
 For boundary narratives in the contemporary world politics, see, e.g. Newman & 
Paasi (1998). 
 
22
 For further elaborations, see, Murphy (1989); Agnew (1994); Knight (1994); Hooson 
(1994); Taylor (1994, 1995, 1996); Hall & Danta (1996); Herb & Kaplan (1999); 
Donnan & Wilson (1999); Newman (2004). 
 
23
 Where of course by including the kin-state. 
 
24
 For instance, Kosovo conflict is an ongoing debate where the parties do not just 
conflict over material resources on a territory, also attach symbolic significance as the 
cradle of their civilizations.  
 18 
 
In this context, due to the specificity of ethno-territorial cross-border conflicts, 
that is “interlinked ethnic and territorial claims and of the involvement (potential or 
actual) of kin-state and host-state, external minority and host-nation” (Wolff, 2003: 14), 
by focusing not just on the conflict between the majority holding the state apparatus 
and national minority, but also by emphasizing the reconciliation between the host-state 
and the kin-state in the form of good neighbourhood, Europeanization as a conflict 
prevention mechanism of the European Union on ethno-political conflicts may provide 
valuable insights for the constructive role of third of third parties in conflict resolution. 
But prior to the analysis of Europeanization as a conflict prevention mechanism, to 
clarify the significant differences, an analysis of the role of third parties in conflict 
resolution will be presented.  
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A. 2. Theoretical Approaches in the Conflict Resolution Field: The Role of 
Third Parties 
As a multidisciplinary discipline, the history of conflict resolution studies can be 
traced back to the preliminary researches of the 1950’s25. However, it is the current 
Post-Cold War period that a variety of conflict resolution theories and practices have 
become widely recognized in coping with various levels of conflicts from the individual 
to global. In fact the end of the Cold War did not only pose a threat to the political 
stability of the nation-states and the international system but also caused a shift in the 
traditional analysis of war and various forms of armed conflicts. Conflict monitoring 
projects such as SIPRI, led by Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1995) and PIOMM, led by 
Schmid and Longman indicated an escalatory trend in the emergence of violent 
conflicts. Wallensteen and Sollenberg noted that (1995) the world had witnessed ninety-
four armed conflicts between 1989 and 1994. Although the two researchers indicated 
that the number of armed conflicts had decreased slightly, the succeeding work of 
Longman revealed an unsettling increase in the number of violent conflicts. While there 
were 22 high-intensity conflicts in mid-1995, this rose to 25 by November 1999. The 
same trend could also be observed in the frequency of low-intensity conflicts. While 
there were 31 low- intensity conflicts in 1995, it was 77 in mid-1999 (Longman, cited in 
Porto 2003: 4). However, beside these terrifying numbers, the complexity of the 
conflicts had also shifted the nature of contemporary conflicts in conceptual terms. As 
Miall, Rambsbotham and Woodhouse pointed out, this confusion led to the following 
question:  
 “What are we to call these conflicts? Current terminology includes 
‘internal conflicts’ (Brown (ed), 1996), ‘new wars’ (Kaldor and Vashee (eds.), 
1997), ‘small wars’ (Harding, 1994), ‘civil wars’ (King, 1997), ‘ethnic conflicts’ 
(Stavenhagen, 1996), ‘conflict in post-colonial states’ (Van de Goor et. al. (eds.), 
1996), and so on, ...” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 66)    
 Despite this conceptual confusion, statistics reveal that identity politics has 
been at the center of most of these conflicts. Regehr indicated that nearly two-thirds of 
                                                 
25
 For a brief history of the development of the field, see, Kriesberg (1997a: 51-63) and 
Miall, Rambsbotham and Woodhouse (1999: 39-64). 
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the ongoing conflicts in 1993 could be defined as identity-based (1993; cited in 
Rasmussen 1997: 30). As quoted above, among these, inter-ethnic tensions were the 
determinant factor on these conflicts (Harff & Gurr 1997: 5) In this respect, as the 
ethno-political conflicts between nation-states and ethnic minorities are central to all 
four cases of this dissertation,26 I will approach the literature by the question of how 
this form of ethnopolitical conflicts and their resolution through third party intervention 
are examined in conflict resolution literature.  
Within the broader literature of third party intervention, few studies examine 
exclusively third party intervention on intrastate conflicts (i.e. Carment 1993; Carment 
and James 1995a, 1995b; Cooper and Berdal 1993; Licklider 1993, 1995; Ruggie 1993; 
Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002; Harvey 1998). Furthermore, 
these works represent a wide range of accounts. For instance, the focus of the studies of 
Carment (1993), Carment and James (1995a and 1995b) is the internalization of these 
conflicts, particularly the examination of the conditions under which third party 
interventions will lead to the internalizations of these conflicts; Cooper and Berdal 
(1993) focus on the motives and strategies of third party intervention, of which they 
argue that it is sui generis; Licklider (1993, 1995) focuses exclusively on how civil 
conflict could be brought to an end; Ruggie (1993) develops a theory focusing on the 
strategic dimension of third party intervention; similarly Mason & Fett (1996) assess 
rational choice approach on the resolution of civil wars; drawing on deterrence theory, 
Harvey (1998) examines third-party intervention in former Yugoslavia; by drawing on 
his own data set covering intra-state conflict since 1945, Regan (1996) figures out the 
conditions for a successful third party intervention, or the conditions under which third 
parties will intervene in an ongoing intrastate conflict (1998), in a more recent work, he 
focuses only on operational -military and economic- interventions (2001).  
Furthermore, there is not a common understanding of the distinctive 
characteristics of intra-state conflict. In this context, one of the most systematic 
analyses of intra-state conflicts, relevant to our cases, is Gurr’s survey on ethnopolitical 
conflicts. In his database entitled Minorities at Risk, Gurr defines ethno-political 
conflict as the conflicts in which “one or more contenders (...) defines itself using 
communal criteria and makes claims on behalf of the group’s collective interests 
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against the state, or against other communal actors.”(1994: 352). He identifies 233 
ethnocultural groups that are in conflict with more than 100 nation-state governments 
(1993: 3-27).27 In a more recent article (1995) he raises the number of “minorities at 
risk” to 292, and the number of nation- states that is in conflict with them to 120 (1995: 
212-213)28.  
However, some authors such as Rupesinghe, Small and Singer offer 
conceptualizations which are drawn on the fact that identifying all intrastate with an 
ethnic label will be too simplistic (Rupesinghe 1987; cited in Regan 1996a: 337). 
Accordingly, the most common characteristic that a consensus could be built on is the 
fact that they take place within the internal boundaries of a state. 
In addition to this primary conceptual ambiguity, what is likewise essential 
regarding our cases is the place of third party intervention in these ethnopolitical 
conflicts.29  To begin with, it must be underlined that the involvement of intermediaries 
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 Gurr et.al. (1993: 15) use some systematic distinctions among these politicized 
communal group, basicly between “national peoples” and “minority peoples”. While the 
former are “regionally concentrated groups that have lost their autonomy to expansionist 
states but still preserve some of their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and want to 
protect or reestablish some degree of politically seperate existence”, the latter are 
generally based on a “defined socioeconomic or political status within larger society (...) 
and are concerned about protecting or improving that status”. They also identifies 
differing sectors among these groups, namely the “ethnonationalist” and “indigeneous 
peoples” in the first category, and “ethnoclasses”, “militant sects” and “communal 
contenders” in the latter. 
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 For a minority to be “at risk”, Gurr et al. examines whether (1) the group suffers 
“discrimination” relative to other groups in the country, (2) the group is “disadvantaged 
from past discrimination,” (3) the group is an advantaged minority being challenged,” or 
(4) the group is “mobilized,” meaning that “the group (in whole or part) supports one or 
more political organizations that advocates greater group rights, priveleges, or 
autonomy”. See, Gurr, et. al (1993: 34-60). 
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 See, for instance, Small and Singer (1982), Regan (1996: 338). Small and Singer 
identifies intra-state conflicts as to be based on three main criteria: (1) they take place 
within internal borders of a state; (2) one of the combatants is the government in power; 
(3) the opposition partyhas the resources for resistance. They identify the internal 
conflicts that do not meet this criteria as communal violence and regional internal wars 
(1982: 216). In a similar, but one modified with a statiscal criterion, Regan defines 
intrastate conflict as armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in 
which there are at least 200 fatalities, not as an annual like the criteron of 1000 battle 
deaths per year proposed in the Correlates of War project, but rather an aggregate total. 
(1996a: 338; 2001: 3)    
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in the settling of disputes has a universal history throughout ages, both in Western and 
non-Western cultures (Gulliver 1979). Where the parties to a conflict become so 
tangled that they are not able to find any practical solution to their conflict, third parties 
can hold a creative position to generate a constructive effect leading a mutually 
agreeable settlement. Either individuals/group of individuals or governmental/non-
governmental institutions who are not directly involved in the conflict,30 in a large body 
of theoretical approaches, third parties are regarded as crucial factors in escalating or 
settling disputes.31 Ranging from pacific mediation to the implementation of coercive 
diplomacy through use of force, in its basic form intervention can be defined as “any 
action taken by an actor that is not direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or 
remove one or more of the problems of bargaining relationship and, therefore, to 
facilitate the termination of the crisis itself” (Young 1967: 34). 
 However, although third party intervention has a long history, there is not an 
all-agreed unified, systematic consideration on third party intervention in intrastate 
conflicts.  Moreover the present literature is not free from conceptual confusions. 
Today, the issue of third party intervention in conflict resolution is evaluated by a 
variety of approaches in many disciplines. However, prior to all, even lack of an all-
agreed notion of intervention leads a fundamental confusion. Although seems to be in a 
immature phase when compared with the present developments in the field of third 
party intervention, in his classic 1969 work focusing on this conceptual ambiguity, 
James Roseneau pointed out the difficulty of developing a systematic body of 
knowledge “on conditions under which interventionary behavior is initiated, sustained 
and abandoned” (1989: 149; cited in Butler 2003: 228). This ambiguity reflected in a 
variety of approaches in the existing body of literature “is pervaded with discussions of 
military interventions, propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic 
interventions, and ideological interventions, not to mention customs interventions and 
other highly specific actions through which one state experiences the impact of 
another” (Roseneau 1969: 344-345; cited in Rioux 2003: 4). In search of a literature on 
third party intervention which has been sophisticated particularly with the last quarter 
of the twentieth century, one could witness the same ambiguity today. Rephrasing 
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 See, Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994: 196-223). 
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 For an overview of third party intervention, see, Fisher (2001). 
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Roseneau’s concern on this conceptual ambiguity, Kegley and Hermann (1997, 1996) 
drew attention to the fact that due to different indices, the same pattern of intervention 
can be classified as military intervention, another form of intervention and even non-
intervention (Butler 2003: 229). For instance, G.C. Huffbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott 
(1983) and  J. Butler (2003) consider it in terms of military intervention; Alastair Smith 
regards third party intervention in the context of alliances (1996); Thomas G. Weiss 
focuses exclusively on UN-sanctioned humanitarian interventions (1999); Paul Diehl 
focuses particularly on UN peacekeeping interventions (1989, 2000). 
In this context, the only systematic survey on third party intervention in 
intrastate conflicts is Regan’s dataset identifying third party intervention in intrastate 
conflicts since the end of the Second World War and 1994.32 By adopting James 
Roseneau’s two criteria of intervention, namely convention breaking and authority-
targeted (1968: 167), Patrick Regan identifies third party intervention in intra-state 
conflicts as “convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal 
affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with 
the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and the opposition 
forces” (2001: 6).     
Although the literature emphasizes different kinds of agencies that address 
different groups or institutions through strategies with differing purposes varying in 
form and duration, the common point is the necessity of third party intervention. Taking 
this fact as a point as a premise, the present literature focuses on four basic questions:  
(1) WHETHER and WHY to intervene? : The motives of third party 
intervention. 
(2) WHEN to intervene?: The timing of intervention. 
(3) HOW to intervene? : Third party roles; levels of intervention; the methods 
used. 
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 The statics in this primary work (1996a, 1996b) had further been extended to the 
period between 1945 and 1999. In a amore recent work (2001), Regan identifies a total 
of 1043 individual interventions carried out by 74 different third party actos into 101 
conflicts.   
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(4) HOW TO DETERMINE SUCCESS? : The criteria to determine the 
effectiveness of third party intervention.  
The question of whether a third party should intervene into a conflict is mostly 
evaluated in terms of the intervention of a state. In this context, it can be argued that the 
role of the third party in the literature is not just to intervene into the conflict as a 
neutral third party to facilitate or impose a settlement but also a party involving an 
already ongoing conflict.  As a vague question, this has been answered by a collection 
of literature implementing differing internal and external variables: international 
politics and the superpower rivalry (Bull 1984; Morganthau 1967; Fetse 1992); the 
patterns of internal conflict (Pearson 1974a; Khosla 1999; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 
1997); geographical proximity (Pearson 1974b, 1984; Heraclides 1990; Khosla 1999); 
crossnational, transactional and affective linkages (Mitchell 1970; Heraclides 1990); 
ethnic affinity between the intervening states and the targeted country (Carment and 
James 1995, 1996; Carment, James and Rowlands 1995; Davis and Moore, 1997; 
Saideman 1997, 2001); humanitarian considerations (Heraclides 1990; Regan 2000); 
moral commitments (Blechman 1995); doctrinal policies and bureaucratic struggle 
(Scott 1996); the effect of refugee flows (Dowty and Louscher 1996); alliance 
membership (Smith 1996; Levy 1981; Siverson and Starr 1991; Siverson and King 
1979); decision-making process of the intervener (Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Blechman 
1995; Daalder 1996; Kanter and Brooks 1994; Daalder 1996; Vertzberger 1993; Regan 
1996a, 1996b, 1998); nature of the international system (Heraclides 1990; Regan 2000). 
Although these are among the factors that are regarded to be influential on whether an 
intervention will occur or not, as Regan states (1998: 756) “(We) do not have a set of 
logically consistent and empirically verified conditions that increase the likehood that 
outside actors will intervene in internal conflicts”. However, what is shared by a 
significant amount of theoretical approaches is the position of third parties as important 
factors on settling or escalating the conflicts. Therefore, taking this fact as a premise, 
the subsequent part will focus on the questions of when and how the third party 
intervenes to the conflict. 
When considered with aforementioned body of research on the factors affecting 
on the decision to intervene, a less systematic analysis exists on the factors that affect 
the timing of the intervention.  
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 One of the primary works in conflict resolution discipline constructing a 
model of successful third party intervention is Zartman’s strategic assessment of 
“hurting stalemate” (1989). Zartman claims that in case of a “ripe moment” that is 
when unilateral solution among the parties are blocked and it is recognized by both 
parties that this mutually hurting stalemate will hurt all parties, a third party 
intervention may only be effective. In this context, by creating hurting stalemates to 
provoke ripe moments third parties could bring the parties to the table.  
 Holding the same logic with Zartman on the interplay between the timing and 
the success of third party intervention, a richer literature of phase-based approaches on 
third party intervention was produced such as the works of Brecher (1994), Bercovitch 
(1996) Dixon (1996), Lund (1996), Creative Associaties (1997) Kriesberg (1997) 
(Carment & Rowlands 1999). What these works emphasized was the correlation 
between the stage of the conflict and the right strategy to be chosen for a successful 
intervention. Drawing on the earlier theoretical accumulation on the timing of third 
party intervention, one of the major works is the “contingency model” of Fisher and 
Keashly (1991) which seeks to match the initial third party intervention to the stage of 
conflict escalation. Drawing on the works of previous theories such as the works of 
Friedrich Glasl’s (1982) and Hugo Prein’s (1984) works at the organizational level; 
they put forward a four-stage model of conflict escalation: (1) discussion, (2) 
polarization, (3) segregation, (4) destruction. Accordingly, the intensity of the conflict 
should require a specific strategy of initial intervention. Namely, due to the level of the 
relation between the parties to the conflict, third party should hold the position of 
conciliation; consultation; arbitration or power mediation; or forms of peacekeeping, 
respectively.33 A similar approach is emphasized by Regan (1996), Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld (1997). Examining the relation between the level of violence and the 
probability of third party intervention, they find that the higher level of violence will 
lead to a higher probability for a third party involvement. According to Regan, 
escalation is a way to make resistance to a third party intervener costly (1996; cited in 
Carment and Rowlands 1998: 575). Motivated by the same perception of “ripe 
moments”, this model has been elaborated and sometimes modified by other scholars 
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and policy makers such as Daniel Druckman (1986) and Christopher Mitchell (1995)34. 
A literature contrary to this approach arguing that timing and the type of the 
intervention are not determined by identical factors has also developed in recent years 
(Rasler 1983; Ayres and Saideman, 200035; Regan 2001; Pence 2003).36  
Fisher and Keashly assumed that “properly structured, lead interventions would 
achieve initial effects, and could then be followed by further interventions designed to 
de-escalate the conflict to the point at which parties could manage it themselves” (2001: 
12). This increases the importance of the question of how third party intervention will 
be shaped. 
Depending on the specific nature of the conflict or the parties, the role and the 
function of the third party may vary significantly, which makes the offer of ideal-
typical forms difficult. Thus, the answer to the question of how third party intervention 
will be shaped will not be a uni-dimensional one, but rather involves elements of a 
multi-lateral strategy; namely, the actors of the intervention; the role of the third party 
determining the core of the intervention strategy; the level of third party intervention 
and finally, the subject of the intervention, that is the actors within the conflicting 
parties.  
Regarding the type of third party intervention, the first dimension is the question 
of who will intervene as the third party, an individual? A group of individuals? An 
institution or a group of institutional? Or a state or group of states? An additional 
question if third party is to be an institution, then a subsequent question will be whether 
it would a governmental institution or an institution of civil society? These questions 
were initially developed in Joseph Montville’s original distinction between Track I and 
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 For some critics of the “ripe moment” theories, see, Stedman (1991), Licklider 
(1993); Hampson 1996.  
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 Ayres and Saideman (2000) analyses to test which factors influence the timing of 
third party intervention. They assume that the level of violence, the type of the 
intervention, ethnic ties, strategic interests and colonial relationships as the significant 
factors on the timing of the intervention, namely by leading to an earlier involvement.  
Though not exclusively focusing on the timing factor, data on timing as a variable of 
third party intervention can be found at the dataset on civil wars produced by Regan 
(1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2001, 2002) and Lemka and Regan (2003). 
 
36
 Another important dimension of studies on timing of the intervention is the interplay 
between timing of the intervention and the duration of the conflicts.  
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Track II diplomacy (1991), namely traditional diplomatic activities and unofficial, non-
governmental initiatives, respectively (1991: 262). Drawing on the original model of 
Montville, John McDonald and Louise Diamond (1991) expanded the model to a nine-
track framework, named by the two authors as “multi-track diplomacy”.37 This 
approach has also been maintained by Rupesinghe by assuming that in case of relying 
on interventions by different actors at different levels, a “multi-track approach” may be 
necessary (1996) 
 As the relevance of civil actors gained more supremacy, the sophistication of 
the third party roles has also developed. This makes it difficult to propose a unique, 
standard scheme of third party intervention strategies. To some extent, this is also due 
to the dominance of original features in a conflict, than commonalities38. The current 
literature on third party intervention can be analyzed under two broad categories, 
namely some focus on the roles; others focus on the strategies of third parties. For 
instance, Pruitt and Rubin offer a dichotomous scheme of third party roles: formal vs. 
informal roles; individual vs. representative roles; invited vs. non-invited roles; 
impartial vs. partial roles; advisory vs. directive roles; inter-personal vs. intergroup 
roles; and content-oriented vs. process-oriented goals (1986). Stulberg offers the 
following roles: catalyst, educator, translator, resource-expander, bearer of bad news, 
agent of reality, and scapegoat (1987). Linking differing roles of third parties to the 
appropriate stages of the conflict, more dynamic schemes have been offered by some 
authors like Kriesberg (1996); Susskind and Cruikshank (1987). Kriesberg, for example 
proposes third party roles as from preparing to de-escalate, initiating negotiations, 
conducting negotiations and eventually implementing agreements. These require, 
according to Kriesberg different third party roles such as formal mediator, informal 
third parties or quasi-mediators (Kriesberg 1996; cited in Fisher 2001: 14-15). This 
contingency approach can also be observed in the work of Susskind and Cruikshank 
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 In this developed version of a five-track model proposed by McDonald in 1989, these 
actors are: (1) government; (2) professional conflict resolution; (3) business; (4) private 
citizens; (5) research, training and education; (6) activism; (7) religious; (8) funding; 
and (9) public opinion/communication. 
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 Cooper and Berdal, for example, argue that third-party intervention is sui-generis 
(1993). In this regard, as Carment and Rowlands pointed out, “despite the plea for 
increased doctrinal clarity, there remain few systematic and theoretical studies of third-
party intervention in intrastate disputes (Carment and Rowlands, 1998: 574) 
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who propose that a change in the intensity of the conflict is also going to be reflected in 
third party roles and strategies (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; cited in Baechler 1999) 
Depending on their roles, third parties intervene in a conflict at three basic 
levels: on the level of the relationship between parties; on the level of the conflict 
process; on the level of the content (Baecher 1999). Trying to change the dynamics of 
the conflict for a mutually agreeable point of settlement, third parties may engage in 
various strategies from low-intensity interventions with the aim of forming a common 
ground for understanding among parties to high-intensity intervention such as shaping 
and imposing agreements to the parties even in the form of militarily-based strategies of 
peacekeeping. For instance Fisher offers a six-fold typology of pacific interventions 
directed at international level: conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power 
mediation, arbitration, and peacekeeping (2001: 11)39 Similarly Rioux indicates varying 
levels and forms ranging from “discussion of the problem in international or bilateral 
fora” to peacekeeping or military intervention, namely, discussion, fact-finding, good 
offices, condemnation, a ‘call for action’, mediation or conciliation, arbitration, 
sanctions, and eventually peacekeeping or military intervention (2003: 6-7); Ropers 
differentiates three basic roles: directive facilitation, non-directive mediation and 
directive mediation (1995: 44-49); in a more recent study, he distinguishes basic forms 
of intervention as good offices, facilitation and mediation, formal and informal 
arbitration/litigation, and power mediation (1997: 5-7). Beside these issue-based 
intervention roles, Ropers also assumes that a relation-based approach of consultation 
could constructively transform conflict, by combined with others forms of constructive 
actions such as “traning sessions in methods of communication, negotiation and 
mediation; the organizations of programmes of encounter and exchange; the initiation 
of bi- or multi-ethnic projects designed to improve shared living conditions, and so on” 
(Ropers 1997: 8-11). Similar comprehensive typologies of conflict management 
principles were also provided by Haas (1983), Esman (1995) and Dixon (1996). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I prefer an adoption of a four-fold typology 
of Roper which would indicate the level or the content of the third party intervention 
and the actors that are subject to third party intervention, namely process 
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 For a full description of this taxonomy of third party intervention, see, Fisher and 
Keashly (1990: 211-238). 
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oriented/micro-level approaches or structure-related/macro-level approaches; and realm 
of states or the realms of societies, respectively. These can be displayed in such a 
scheme:  
Table 1. Approaches to Constructive Conflict Intervention in the World of States and 
the Societal World. 
Source: Ropers 1997: 16. 
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By altering the two-fold classical actor and/or process categorization (Ropers 
1995: 30), this categorization provides a multilateral framework. To begin with, micro-
activities in the realm of states indicate generally the initiatives of negotiations, mostly 
undertaken when the conflict has reached its ripe moment so that there occurs urgent 
need for finding compromises through third party intervention. The strategy generally 
employed at this point is crisis management. However, when the causes of the conflict 
are grounded on deep historical conflict and/or socio-psychological sentiments, it may 
not be possible to resolve the conflict with ad hoc interventions. In this regard, the third 
party intervention may resort to structural management directly targeted to state 
structure. The main mechanisms proposed are: secession/partition; power sharing; 
 
         World/Realm of States Societal World/Realm of 
Societies 
Process-
oriented/ 
micro-level 
approaches 
Crisis management 
Mediation (Track 1) 
Peace-making 
Peace-keeping 
Ad hoc regulations for the 
protection of minorities 
Peace-building 
Consultation (Track 2) 
Civilian Peace-keeping 
 
Structure-
related/ 
macro-level 
approaches 
Legal embodiment of protection 
of minorities 
Regime-formation for the 
protection of minorities 
Power sharing 
Autonomy 
Federalism  
Macro-political peace 
building: 
Creation of “peace 
constituencies and a “culture 
of peace” 
Promotion of multi-ethnic 
structures and loyalties 
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federalism and autonomy. It must be underlined that such power sharing arrangements 
can also be based on non-territorial principles.   
 In search for a more viable settlement, the essential question is whether these 
interventions directed to state and/or ethnopolitical leadership could offer a lasting, 
constructive solution, which would transform the latent or potential causes of the 
conflict. In this context, regarding micro-activities in ethnopolitical conflict regulation 
targeted at the realm of societies, Ropers indicates the two fundamental arguments: 
“first, the observation that ethnopolitical conflicts are not conducted only at the 
leadership level, but are interwoven with social structures in many diverse ways and 
thus affect the most desperate kinds of social actors; secondly, the thesis that the 
successful handling of such conflicts calls for concepts and strategies which state actors 
cannot develop or implement on their own.” (1995: 34-35) In this regard, the third party 
intervention initiatives are targeted at the actors within the realm of society, namely 
through Track-II diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1993). These may be realized 
under two frameworks: either micro-activities/process-oriented approach or macro-
activities/structure-related approaches. The main strategy used in this level is peace-
building which predicts a long-lasting process of accommodation between the sectors 
within the societies. However, when it is considered that the potential ethno-political 
conflicts presented challenges to the varied segments of the society as a whole, the 
micro-level initiatives needs to be improved and cover a broader time zone.  
Accordingly, the last position that has been categorized as macro activities in the realm 
of societies predicts the overcoming of differences of opinion, so that both parties 
would “win” with that culture of compromise.40 
This figure is also not free from deficiencies in explaining the complexity of 
third party interventions on the ground. However, it provides us a basic distinction 
between interventions directed at the process of a conflict which is generally ad hoc 
responses to conflicts and structure-related approaches which aim to re-structure the 
dynamics of the conflict for a durable settlement of the conflict. A remarkable 
distinction also emerges when the aforementioned approaches on third party 
intervention on conflict resolution is examined. It is considerable that most of the 
literature focuses on process-oriented/micro-level approaches. This fact also identifies 
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 See, Rubin (1994: 33-45), and Fisher and Ury (1991; cited in Ropers 1995: 40). 
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the framework of the next section, namely the conflict resolution perspective of the 
European Union on the Western Balkans, which are exclusively motivated by a 
structure-related approach. 
 Finally, under these conditions, the question of the effectiveness emerges as 
another dimension reflecting the complexity of the issue of third party intervention. In 
case of an armed conflict, the secession of violence has often been referred as an 
indicator of a successful third party intervention. For instance, adopting the same 
framework of reference for the termination of armed conflict within the Correlates of 
War Data (Bremer, Jones and Singer 1997) and Diehl’s (1993) criteria of successful 
peacekeeping interventions, Regan conceived success with the criteria of the cessation 
of armed conflicts at least for a period of six months” (Regan 2000) He argues that  
“while stopping the fighting for this relatively short period of time would 
rarely even approach a resolution of the underlying issues at stake, six months 
without military hostilities can a) give policymakers a cause to claim success with 
their policy, and b) give a sufficient break in the fighting to initiate meaningful 
dialogue in an effort to resolve the underlying causes of the causes of the 
conflict.” (Regan 2000)   
 
 Following the same approach, Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996; cited in 
Rioux 2003: 12) propose a ten-year principle to evaluate the effect of UN interventions 
in Latin America. However, Hampson (1996) argues that the criteria for success should 
not only be the cessation of violence for a determined period but also the parties’ 
satisfaction and hence respect of the outcome of which proposes a mutual gain (cited in 
Rioux 2003: 13). This approach favoring success in terms of specific improvements 
“toward a negotiated settlement or a lasting peace” was advocated by some analysts, 
(Stern and Druckman 2000: 44). For example, Fisher offers a number of indicators to 
evaluate the effectiveness of third-party mediation, such as the rate of settlement, 
satisfaction of parties, change in attitudes and relationship between the conflicting 
parties, and, compliance with agreement (Fisher 2001: 21)41. Holding a similar logic, 
Stedman (1997; Stern and Druckman 2000: 44) conceives success as “the weakening of 
actors opposed to the peace process vis-à-vis those engaged in it”.  In this regard, as 
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Rioux identified, by holding different approaches42, we can outline several ways to 
measure success or failure of third party intervention. In this regard the correlation 
between the third party roles and the strategies used is an important variable to 
determine success. In elucidating this contingency approach, Fisher, for instance, 
argues that “one should not criticize mediation because the underlying attitudes of the 
parties remain unchanged, or consultation because it does not lead directly to the 
settlement of the dispute” (Fisher 2001: 21). To conclude, the degree of success may 
depend a variety of results ranging from the ones indicating “negative peace” in the 
form of the reduction or termination of  violence, to the “positive peace”, that is the 
transformation of attitudes and relationship between the conflicting parties (Galtung 
1969; cited in Stern and Druckman 2000: 44). 
 In the following chapters, these theoretical frameworks on third party 
intervention will be analyzed in the context of the European Union to evaluate how 
these are applied in theory and in practice in specific case studies and identify the 
degree of success.  
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 Such as “bureaucratic process” approach, “humanitarian approach”, “utilitarian 
approach”, “protracted conflict management approach”, and a “problemsolving 
approach”; cited in Rioux (2003: 13).   
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A.3. European Integration Studies 
   
Within the realm of International Relations and Political Science, one can 
witness a considerable literature on the relationship between integration and peace. In 
the course of decades the international integration theory has passed through various 
phases. In its pioneering work, the Uniting of Europe (1958), Ernst Haas wrote the 
European Coal and Steel Community. Followed by his subsequent works43, Haas’ 
account of neo-functionalism was based on two fundamentals: the concept of spill-over 
and the self interest of political elites as the driving force of integration. According to 
this early account of integration, “rather than relying upon a scheme of integration 
which posits ‘altruistic’ motives as the conditioners of conduct, it seems more 
reasonable to focus on the interests and values defended by them as far too complex to 
be described in such simple terms as “the desire of Franco-German peace” or “the will 
to a United Europe”’ (Haas 1958: 13; Haas 1991: 23). Initiated by these goal- or 
interest-oriented actors, integration would “spill-over” quasi-automatically (Haas 1991: 
23). As a process driven both by these interest-oriented acts of political elites and the 
impact epistemic communities drawing on a high level of technical expertise44, the 
theory starts with the presupposition of a distinction between high politics and low 
politics, the former referring to the questions of national defense and security (Hodges 
1972: 24), and the latter referring to economic aspects of policy making. According to 
this approach, functional economic cooperation in areas where there is little conflict 
would spillover to political coo-operation. Thus, economics would permeate political 
realms and the distinction between high and low-politics would become blurred 
(Tannam 2004: 4). To sum up, led by an interest-based account, the hypothesis was that 
common economic interests would lead to economic cross-border co-operation, and 
eventually political cross-border co-operation.  
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 See for instance,  Haas (1961, 1967, 1976, 1991), cited in T. Christiansen, K.E. 
Jǿrgensen and A. Wienner (eds), The Social Construction of Europe, Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications, pp. 22-31.; Haas, E.B. and Schimitter, P.C. (1964) ‘Economics and 
differential patterns of political integration’, International Organization 18(4): 705-37. 
 
44
 Haas defines epistemic communities as “associations of professional experts in a 
particular field who, because of the knowledge they have, have an unusual influence on 
politicians and bureaucracts, and are, therefore, able to penetrate government 
departments and make their ideas part of policy”. (2000: 10). 
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Following this line of thinking, Lindberg studied on the EEC (196345), in which 
he also applied the concept of spill-over and expansive logic of integration. The same 
account has also been applied by the representatives of this neo-functionalist approach 
to the emergence of European integration (Lindenberg and Scheingold 1972; Harrison 
1978; Hodges 1972). However, in contrast to that neo-functionalist account based on a 
functionalist spill-over, Karl Deutsch introduced a transactionalist account on attitudes 
and behaviour leading a “sense of community” among the parties.  Deutsch et al. 
defined this “sense of community” as “a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalty; of 
‘we-feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration of partial identification in terms of semi-
images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of 
cooperative action in accordance with it.” (1957: 36) This emphasis on the role of the 
intensification of communication networks as a precondition to the formation of security 
communities have been recently adopted by the constructivist scholars Adler and 
Barnett,46 who put the construction of “cognitive regions” at the center of security 
communities. 
 
As Celik and Rumelili pointed out, the integration experience of the European 
Union has been recognized in almost all theories of international peace and cooperation: 
“the integration theories of the 1960s and 70s emphasizing transaction density (e.g. 
Haas, 1958; Nye, 1971), the institutionalist theories of the 1970s and 80s, focusing on 
issue linkage, and finally, the constructivist theories of the 1990s, underlying the 
importance of shared norms and collective identity for stable peace (e.g. Wæver, 1998)” 
(Celik and Rumelili 2004: 2-3).    
 
Although in this sense the European Union was often regarded as a successful 
example of conflict transformation (Wallensteen 2002), the promise that integration 
would ensure peace (Higashino 2003) was going to be approached from different 
theoretical accounts from the 1960s onwards.  The early functionalist integration studies 
of the 1960s have viewed the forging of a security community by underlying a 
geographical growth (Deutsch 1970: 4, 43-44; Haas 1968: 313-17; Schmitter 1969: 165; 
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 Lindberg, Leon N. (1963),  The Political Dynamics of European Economic 
Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
46
 See, Adler and Barnett (1996: 63-72), Adler and Barnett (1998b), and Adler (1997 b); 
cited in Väyrynen (2000: 172-173). 
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cited in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 501). However, the following debate of 
the 1970s was rather going to focus further on the political framework of this territorial 
integration, that is the “constitutional debate” of the emerging European Union with a 
more state-centered focus (Friedrich 1969; cited in Pace and Stetter 2003: 13; 17). This 
also marked the the construction of a polity-building issue which was going to be 
elaborated in the 1980s and early 1990s liberal inter-governmentalist/supranationalist 
approaches focusing exclusively upon issues of ‘deepening’ the integration through 
policy making acts such as the Single European Act (1986) and the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). As a response to political realities of post-Cold War period, 
these studies were further elaborated by a constructivist approach such as the dynamic 
model offered by Adler and Barnett (1998). According to these two authors, in world 
where interests, borders and identities are constantly shaped and reshaped within further 
future inter/-trans- actions, identifying the factors that led the formation of the (Western) 
European security community could provide the transfer of models of political 
organizations. This could lead a new way of thinking about global security in both 
theory and practice (Adler and Barnett 1998; cited in Pace and Shetter 2003: 14). 
Elaborating the debate on the formation of security communities in a sociological 
framework, in his “seduction model of security” McSweeney asserted that these security 
communities would be “partly unintended product of reflexive agents” (1999: 170; cited 
in Pace and Shetter 2003: 15) when the parties realize their security and interests are 
attainable in these communities. However, the aforementioned theoretical approach tried 
to construct the emergence of such security communities, they did not particularly 
analyze how such bodies of transnational organizations could prevent the emergence of 
conflicts or the management of conflicts at present.  
 
In this regard, although he did not propose a systematic analysis of conflict 
resolution possibilities of the European Union, Ole Wæver offers a novel conceptual 
ground on the relationship between integration and peace. By recognizing (Western) 
European integration as a mechanism of desecuritisation, Wæver signifies the power of 
the European Union in reducing the security problems between previous conflicting 
parties to  mere economic issues which could be resolved by cooperation (2003: 13). 
 
The conditions under which EU could transform border conflicts has been 
recently developed by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2004) through a theoretical framework 
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of four courses of influence by the European Union on conflicting parties. In their 
framework proposing four paths of influence, the authors argue that the European Union 
could have an impact on the resolution of such conflicts both within its territory through 
the mechanisms of integration and beyond its borders through association agreements. 
In the first path, relevant to an actor-driven framework, the EU employs direct 
intervention of carrot or stick policy of granting or withdrawing membership 
negotiations leading to integration with the EU (compulsory effect).47 Path two relates to 
provision of a common reference point for primarily political leadership through the 
structural and discursive framework of the EU (particularly through acquis 
communautaire) (enabling impact). While these two paths refer primarily to political 
leadership, path three is directed principally towards wider societal level which involves 
direct support activities of civil society actors, financially or organizationally, by the EU 
(connective impact). Simultaneously, this is considered to lead to path four, which is the 
creation of a new discursive identity structures at the societal level (constructive 
impact).48 (see Table 2) 
 
Table 2: Pathways of EU impact 
Source: Diez, T., Stetter, S., Albert, M. 2004: 20 
 
Approach by EU 
  Actor-driven Structural 
primarily political 
leadership 
(1)compulsory 
impact (3)enabling impact 
principally wider 
societal level 
(2)connective 
impact 
(4)constructive 
impact 
 
      
Unlike the previous approaches which sees the European integration as a process 
that would enable cooperation between partners and reduce conflict, the groundbreaking 
aspect of this work was that it also included the strategies for the EU to act as an actor in 
resolving conflicts. However, in practice, membership conditionality as a structural form 
                                                 
47
 What must be underlined here is that this carrot or stick policy is exclusively 
employed for non-member countries, but not preferably for member-countries.   
 
48
 For the implementation of the theoretical framework of Diez, Stetter and Albert 
(2004) on both the cases within the EU and beyond its borders, see Pace (2004). 
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of prevention of the EU is still motivated by one-size fits-all approach. In this regard, 
further elaborations of the neo-functionalist approach (Lindenberg and Scheingold 1972; 
Harrison 1978; Hodges 1972) which call for the overcome of national divisions in 
Europe that would eventually provide its member with a common identity (Wæver 
1998; Wallace 1999; Diez 2004) is the prevailing approach in the studies of European 
integration. However, the inflexible nature of conflict zones in the periphery of the EU 
risks the relevancy of mere structural configurations for attaining peace among previous 
adversaries. This challenge will further be elaborated in the cases of this dissertation. 
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A. 4. The Conflict Resolution Perspective of the European Union: Actor or 
Framework? 
 
The European Union is one of the leading, but ironically also a latecomer, 
international bodies acknowledging the importance of conflict prevention and improving 
its capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building. The Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was an initiative established to transform patterns of conflict between two 
historical adversaries to a culture of cooperation through peaceful resolution of conflicts 
among them. Until the 1990s the EU’s -then European Community’s- ‘traditional’ 
instruments to prevent possible conflicts were rather economic incentives and regional 
integration, such as its common trade policy, terminating association and cooperation 
accords, provision of humanitarian and economic development assistance and 
undertaking programs for economic and technical cooperation. During the 1970s these 
initiatives were further improved by the framework of the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The same decade had also witnessed the specific 
experiences of conflict prevention initiatives, like Euro-Arab dialogue and specific 
initiatives in Africa such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia etc. (Barbé 
and Johansson 2001)49. Yet these were not covered within a systematic framework of 
conflict prevention.  
 
Following the fall of Berlin Wall, a post-bipolar international system urged the 
construction of a new security structure for Europe as the rest of the world. These 
debates were covered in concrete forms in the Lisbon Summit of the European Council 
in 1992 which would provide the EU with the conceptual tools of its novel conflict 
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 In the period of 1995-1998 the European Union was going to adopt several documents 
of peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution focusing exclusively on African 
conflicts such as the December 4, 1995 conclusions of the Council on “Preventive 
Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa”; March 6, 1996 
Commission communication on “The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in 
Africa: Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Beyond”; the  June 2, 1997 Common 
Position on “Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; the June 5, 1997 Council 
Resolution on “Coherence”, and the Council’s Resolution of November 28, 1998 
entitled “The Role of Development Co-operation in Strengthening Peace-building, 
Conflict Prevention and Resolution”. This document was decisive that it emphasized the 
need for the resolution approved so far relevant ro the African continent could be 
extended to all developing countries, in addition its binding feature in future EU 
member-state policies.     
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prevention strategy by the mission “to promote democratic principles, respect for human 
rights and minorities and furthering of cooperation at regional and international level” 
(Barbé and Johansson 2001). These were the nucleus of Copenhagen criteria (1993) that 
were going to be among the fundamental mechanisms of the Union in creating a 
common framework for the ‘common house of Europe’. In this sense, these regulations 
were one of the fundamental pillars of ‘Europeanization’, which would be an aspect of 
structural prevention initiatives of the European Union. Prior to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) by which the EU developed formal instruments for conflict 
prevention50, the crisis of the early 1990s such as genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda and 
the alarming security threats to the international community underlined the need for a 
holistic approach “addressing the social, economic and political circumstances 
underpinning conflicts, namely their root causes”51. This led the implementation of the 
conceptual framework of “structural stability” as the objective of the conflict prevention 
initiatives of the Union52, that is the sustainable economic development, democracy and 
respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social 
conditions with the capacity to manage change without resorting to conflict.53   
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam elucidated the EU’s mandate in terms of conflict 
prevention and ordered the use of Special Representatives. The established means of 
conflict prevention were: 
 
• Development cooperation and external assistance 
• Trade policy initiatives 
• Humanitarian aid 
• Social and environmental policies 
• Diplomatic instruments and political dialogue 
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 See, International Crisis Group Report No.2, 6. 
 
51
 European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Briefing Note 1/2001, 
(March 2001):2.  
 
52
 The concept was coined by the Commission in its 1996 Commission on Conflict 
Prevention. 
 
53
 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on Conflict 
Prevention,” (COM (2001) 211 final) (11 April 2001) 
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• Cooperation with international partners and NGO’s 
• New crisis management instruments.54 
 
Furthermore the Treaty included the humanitarian missions and rescue, missions 
of peacekeeping and missions in which combat forces may intervene for crisis 
management, including peace making missions (Petersberg Tasks) as the focus for the 
Union’s evolving security and defense policy (Barbé and Johansson, 2001). 
 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, numerous developments in the field of conflict 
prevention have emerged both in the legal and institutional level. In 1997, the Conflict 
Prevention Network (CPN), the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and 
Transformation, the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), the CFSP 
information network COREU and the Electronic Bulletin Board were created to 
exchange information on crisis developments and formulate political measures by 
providing policy oriented analyses in cooperation with civil society actors, NGO’s 
(Debiel and Fischer 2000: 6-7)  
In Cologne (June 3-4, 1999), the European Union expressed its commitment on 
strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence by emphasizing 
that “the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict 
prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the 
“Petersberg tasks”. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions 
by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace 
and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”55. This emphasis on 
military capability was further elaborated in the Helsinki European Council in 1999 
(December, 10-11). In Helsinki, it was committed that “to assume their responsibilities 
across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the 
EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have decided to develop more 
effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for 
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 See, Barnes (2002: 1). 
 
55 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999. Annex III, 
Article I. 
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these tasks. In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous 
capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and 
then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” It was 
also proposed that “the Union will improve and make more effective use of resources in 
civilian crisis management”.56  
 
Furthermore, at the Göteborg European Council in 2001 (June, 15-16), in terms 
of strengthening conflict prevention capability, the Council approved the creation of the 
‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’, “which will improve the 
Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action. Conflict 
prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be 
integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence 
Policy, development cooperation and trade. Future Presidencies, the Commission and 
the Secretary-General/High Representative are invited to promote the implementation of 
the programmes and to make recommendations for its further development. The 
European Council welcomes Swedish readiness to host a regional meeting with 
organizations involved in conflict prevention in Europe.”57 
 
Although it seems that decisive initiatives had been taken to strengthen the 
conflict prevention capability of the European Union from the early 1990s to 2000s, it 
must be underlined that conflict prevention is only one of the three main tasks of the 
CFSP, which is aimed to produce a common the foreign policy, beside military crisis 
management and civilian crisis management. In this context, the main conflict 
prevention mechanisms are political dialogue, appointment of Special Representatives, 
civilian crisis management instruments, early-warning mechanisms and inter-
institutional cooperations and finally military instruments.58 While such mechanisms 
have been employed with functional motivations, with non-candidate countries such as 
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 See, Barbé and Johansson (2001: 4-5). 
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Lomé-Cotonou Accords, MERCOSUR, ECOWAS, ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
Northern Dimension and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barbé and Johansson, 2001: 
2), as elaborated by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2004), the acknowledgment of 
membership has been the fundamental instrument of the EU in near-periphery regions, 
which was tried to be implemented through the process of ‘Europeanization’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
A. 5. Europeanization as a Method of Conflict Resolution 
 
Europeanization is a popular, but a contested conceptual arena. The scholarly 
interest on using it as an analytical concept has come to the fore particularly over the 
last decade. However, a common definition could not be agreed on yet. This conceptual 
confusion has even led for some authors to argue that as the term itself does not have a 
single precise or stable meaning, it is so unwieldy that it is futile to use it as an 
organizing concept (Kassim 2000: 238; cited in Olsen, 2002).  
 
Then, what is Europeanization? Goetz and Hix proposed that Europeanization 
literature differed from the preceding studies on European integration by its analytical 
focus (2001: 1-2). Taken this conceptual base as a premise, scholars of European 
studies have proposed different definitions of the concept.59 However, what is common 
to all is the process of domestic change, due to a twofold interaction between the 
European and domestic levels.60 
 
Taking this crucial element of change as a premise, in its basic form 
Europeanization can be conceptualized as “a process of change at the national level in 
which member states adapt their domestic structures to the new practices, norms, rules, 
and procedures of the European system of governance” (Dobre 2003: 57). Considering 
the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the individual states, 
Europeanization can also be recognized as a foreign policy instrument of the Union. 
(Noutcheva et. al. 2004: 7). Although the impact of the EU strategies could vary from 
case to case in theory, the impact of EU institutions and policies on the individual states 
at the periphery of the Union, which are generally potential candidates of membership, 
can be observed in three main levels: “(1) the legal and administrative structures of 
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 For different conceptualizations of Europeanization, see, Ladrech (1994), Meny, 
Muller and Quermonne (1996),  Olsen (2002), Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001), 
Radaelli (2003), Dobre (2003), Winn and Harris (2003). 
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 In this context Noutcheva et.al differentiates Europeanization exclusively in the EU 
context and Europeanization in the context of the EU’s periphery. While in the former 
the there is a two-way relationship betwen the structure, the EU, and the agency, 
member state, in which they shape each other’s course; in the latter relationship the 
agency, the non-member state is just bounded by the reguations taken by the 
mechanisms of the EU. See, Noutcheva et. al. (2004: 7).   
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domestic institutions; (2) domestic economic, social or security policies; and (3) social 
changes in general, including changes in political representation, the party system, 
interest groups, domestic discourses, identities and other subjective aspects of politics” 
(Noutcheva et. al. 2004: 7).   
 
In this context, although not always coincide with the distinction of policies 
applied to within and outside or periphery of Europe, a basic distinction has to be made 
in the conflict prevention style of EU. As elucidated in the aforementioned section, 
conflict prevention mechanism is divided into two broad frameworks as crisis 
management/preventive diplomacy and structural prevention. In parallel to this 
distinction it is central to our debate to distinguish between two conflict management 
style of the EU: ‘EU as an actor’, that is a third party to a conflict, and ‘EU as a 
framework’. 
 
In the first dimension EU enters the conflict situation as an active player and 
uses both official and non-official strategies61 to guide the parties to an agreement. 
Although the EU could use incentives or disincentives for the settlement of a long-term, 
durable solution, it has to be underlined that it enters the conflict cycle as an external 
actor. This includes operational prevention, that is the involvement of a third party to 
the conflict to create the necessary conditions for the parties to the conflict in which 
they could negotiate on the problems that led to the conflict.  
 
Contrary to the first dimension, in its role as a framework the EU provides 
additional constitutional and policy choices for the settlement of an institutional and 
constitutional structure that could provide the settlement of the conflict for a long-term 
agreement. The eventual aim in this process is the creation of a culture of prevention, 
which is covered in the conceptual framework of Europeanization within the context of 
EU’s policy towards its periphery.62 Relevant to our cases, over the last decade, 
particularly through its process of eastern enlargement, the EU developed 
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 For a more detailed explanation on the distinction between EU as an actor 
organization and EU as a framework, see, Hill (2001: 325), Noutcheva et. al. (2004: 9-
11) and Tocci (2004: 7-15).  
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‘conditionality’ as the main mechanism of Europeanization.63 By using carrot and 
sticks policy on the way to the EU membership uses various conditionality 
mechanisms. Heather Grabbe elucidates five mechanisms of conditionality: (1) 
provision of legislative and institutional templates; (2) money: aid and technical 
assistance; (3) benchmarking and monitoring; (4) advice and twinning; (5) gate 
keeping: access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process, as the most 
powerful conditionality instrument (2002: 9-11). According to Marino Cowles, James 
Caporaso and Thomas Risse, these adaptational mechanisms are likely to success due to 
the “goodness of fit” between domestic and EU practices (Cowles, Caparosa and Risse 
2001; cited in Noutcheva 2004: 13).64  
 
The next chapter will be on the analysis of the evolution of EU presence in the 
Western Balkans which indicates a clear progress from a role of a third party actor in 
the resolution of conflicts to a ‘model’ of the EU providing a ‘framework’ to be 
adopted for the prevention of further conflict as a ground for a stable peace.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63
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A. 6. EU Involvement in Western Balkans: From Stabilisation to Integration 
 
A. 6. 1. The EUropeans in the former Yugoslavia 
 
On June 28, 1991, Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s then-Foreign Minister was 
speaking to the press on leaving for the first EC ministerial mission to stop the war in 
Yugoslavia. One of his remarks became the sign of the irony of then the EC policies on 
the region: “This is the hour of Europe.”65 In fact, as pointed by Zucconi, “especially in 
the early phase of the conflict, the Community took up a broad commitment that went 
far beyond anything it had previously done in the global arena” (1996: 237). Indeed the 
EC already had the signs to be suspicious of its conflict prevention capability such as the 
lack of relevant institutions and strategies to formulate and implement the necessary 
steps.   
 
In fact, Yugoslavia’s break-up and the outburst of violence were not an 
unexpected or a sudden event. Rather, it revealed itself stage by stage following the 
walkout of the Slovenian delegation in January 1990 from the congress of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party. The subsequent multiparty elections in 1990, which brought the non-
Communist parties to power in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, made 
it clear that the Yugoslav republics are drifting apart and were ready to use force to 
achieve their political objectives.66 Furthermore, the political collapse was accelerated 
by the deep economic crisis and structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF. 
This further strengthened the decision of the richer northern republics of Slovenia and 
Croatia to abandon the FSRY (Silber and Little 1996: 196-201; cf. Väyrynen 199767). 
However, by the international community, it was regarded as a similar political crisis of 
the Eastern Europe. Thus, “its complexity and divergence from these patterns in Eastern 
Europe was, for the most part, ignored.” (Mahmutcehayić, 2001) Thus, while the 
conflict was escalating in April and May 1991, the EC had initially offered additional 
loans, credits and an association agreement with Yugoslavia as an incentive to keep the 
republics together. However, for the republican leaders who were already left their 
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66 See,Väyrynen 2000. 
 
67 Silber and Little (1996: 196-201).  
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vision of the Yugoslav federation68, these carrots without accompanying a 
comprehensive political strategy could not be regarded as a deterrent factor to prevent 
the conflict.  
 
At this point, it can be judged that the EC had already failed in the timing of 
third party intervention, when it is considered that the Croatia began its preparation for 
war by the formation of volunteer defense units (Croats Defence Forces, Hrvatske 
Obrambene Snage, HOS) mostly composed of the members of the Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ) which was transformed into the first brigades called Croatian National 
Guard (Zbor Narodne Garde, ZND) in the spring of 1991 (Goldstein 2001: 225). 
Subsequent to that, in March 1991, the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) was going to 
resort force to suppress the rebel of the local Serbs in Croatia on the side of the ethnic 
Serbs which was going to be followed by a ten-day war to reassert the control of the 
FSRY’s international border against Slovenia’s declaration of independence on 25 June 
(Lund 1996: 60; Goldstein 2001: 218-236; Judah 1997: 168-190). 
 
Having failed at preventing the outburst of the armed conflict, the initial 
international diplomacy entered Yugoslavia in May 1991, when the EC sent a mission to 
Yugoslavia, headed by Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer by the objective of promoting 
a peaceful settlement. After the JNA opted to use force to prevent the independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia, on July 5, the Community suspended all financial aid and banned 
arms exports to Yugoslavia to support its facilitation efforts at Brioni.69 Under the 
leadership of Hans van den Broek, EU mediated the signing of the Brioni Agreement on 
July 7, 199170. This “Common Declaration for a Peaceful Solution of the Yugoslav 
Crisis” aimed to freeze the independence declarations for three-months so that the 
parties could negotiate for a political solution. The EC also sent CSCE -sponsored 
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 Except the Macedonian and Bosnian leadership who was going to present their “four-
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missions to Slovenia and Croatia to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire. 
However, the Brioni agreement was harshly criticized mainly as it “left every important 
item of contention unresolved” (Silber & Little 1996: 166) Furthermore, as Woodward 
pointed out, the agreement provided the nationalist forces in Croatia, Serbia and 
Slovenia to recover their power, while weakening the position of the supporters of the 
federal structure in military and political platforms. (1995a: 168-170)  
 
While the EC adopted a facilitator role in Brioni Agreement, moved by the same 
principle of finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis, the EC convened the Hague 
Conference on September 7, 1991. At the Hague, the EC mediators proposed their own 
constitutional settlement to the parties. As Silber and Little cited, in a framework 
agreement entitled “Arrangements for a General Settlement”, the Chairman of the 
Conference, Lord Carrington proposed an “asymmetrical federation”, which recognized 
Serbia and Montenegro as a core region while enabling Slovenia to retain its de facto 
independence, establishing the ties with the Federation and Croatia through various 
inter-governmental agreements, and finally leaving the two republics Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia as constituent but semi-detached parts of the core of the 
Federation (Silber & Little 1996: 241-243). However, this con-federal arrangement 
failed due to Serbian veto.  While these diplomatic efforts marked the triumph of the 
mediation efforts of the EC, they also presented main points of failure in EU’s conflict 
prevention and crisis management policy at the outset of the war in Yugoslavia.  
 
First of all it highlighted lack of an internal agreement on the direction of 
pursuing a common strategy. For instance, even in August 1991, in the UN Security 
Council, France had opted to collaborate with Austria in search of new ways of political 
influence in the conflict (Väyrynen 1997). Furthermore, despite the suspension of all 
financial aids to Yugoslavia to enhance its enforcement capability in Brioni, it became 
obvious that stronger instruments are needed than preventive diplomacy.  Therefore, in 
August 1991, the military means started to be talked in the form of a ‘European’ 
“interposition force”, “to isolate the sources of the conflict” and to ensure an orderly 
process of change” (Zucconi 1996: 243)71 . However, while this possibility was 
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 Statement by the Secretary General of the then Western European Union (WEU), 
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(1996: 243).  
 49 
supported by France, German and the Netherlands, London strongly resisted it72. 
Finally, at its extra-ordinary session at London, on September 18-19, the WEU excluded 
this option from its agenda, although the EC foreign ministers asked the WEU to draw 
up a contingency plan for the potential use of military force (Väyrynen 1997) However, 
as Väyrynen cited although the WEU planners recommended the use of naval force in 
November 1991, due to British opposition (Väyrynen 1997). This revealed both lack of 
institutional capabilities and common interest for such a measure.  
 
What made the situation worse was the division within the Community, due to 
Germany’s intensifying insistence on the recognition of the declarations of 
independence by Croatia and Slovenia. In this regard, before all else, the fundamental 
failure was leaving the idea of a unified, even a con-federal Yugoslavia. However, as 
Zucconi cited the recognition as an option was gradually becoming favorable for the EU 
members “in the midst of persistent confusion about western European objectives, of 
ineffective intervention, of stalemate among the contending parties, and of continuing 
mixed signals from different western capitals.” (1996: 245). Thus to avoid a selective 
recognition, which would deteriorate the situation, and further divisions within the EC, 
the Community drew a timetable which offered recognition to all qualifying republics 
within a month.73 This formal acknowledgement of the recognition policy by the 
Arbitration Commission of the Hague Conference, chaired by Robert Badinter, was 
indeed added nothing to the peace table. As Väyryrnen pointed out, despite the 
collective decision held on December 16, even without waiting the Badinter 
Commission’s opinion, Germany’s recognition on December 23, “prevented neither 
Croatia nor Serbia from using military force to promote their political and territorial 
goals. In fact, it may even have encouraged their subsequent efforts to carve Bosnia 
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 Zucconi notes that, in the first place, such a force appeared totally unrealistic when 
the WEU has been considered regarding its lack of organizational and command 
structure and logistic capability. See, Zucconi, 1996, p. 243. Although German backed 
this idea, it was then restricted on uncapability of use of German forces outside NATO 
area due to its constitution.  
 
73
 The criteria for recognition were the inviolability of republican borders, a 
commitment to work for a comprehensive political settlement, and respect for human 
and minority rights. See, Woodward (1995: 183-189), Andersson (1995: 343-346), cited 
in Väyrynen (1997)  
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up.”74(Väyryrnen 1997). In his message to the meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers on 
December 15-16, 1991, Lord Carrington stated its effect on the negotiation table: “I said 
very strongly that I felt that the timing of this was wrong. I pointed out that early 
recognition would torpedo the (Hague) conference. There was no way in which the 
conference would continue after that”75  
 
Since September 1991, the EC Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ECCY), 
chaired by Lord Carrington, held thirteen plenary sessions in Brussels between 
September 1991 and August 1992. Although a “Statement of Principles” was put on the 
table and agreed by the parties, it was later rejected by the Bosnian government. This 
EU-led peace initiatives under the ECCY have been launched by the EC’s chief 
mediator, Jose Cutiliero and Lord Carrington. The fundamental point was to bring the 
parties to the table and as Beriker pointed out, to “clarify the main points of 
agreements.” (Beriker 1995: 190). However, what their plan proposed was not more 
than confirming the reality realized on the ground by the parties. The plan envisaged an 
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet proposed its partition along three ethnic lines. The 
idea that the conflict is ethnically based and thus requires territorial partition did not 
contribute to facilitate the solution, but rather led the parties to undertake their own 
ethnic cleansing. As one diplomat emphasized, “without significant ethnic cleansing it 
will be impossible to draw boundaries that will give any coherence to three primarily 
ethnically based regions.”76 As Greenberg and McGuinness underlined, the failure of the 
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 In his interview with Washington Post, Slobodan Miloševiĉ said that he saw this 
recognition as the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia: “They started with 
Slovenia’ and on the independence of Croatia he said: ‘Germany practically helped this 
to happen’, the premature recognition of independence was ‘a tragic mistake’.” 
Interview of Slobodan Milosovic to the Washington Post, reprinted in Ministry of 
Information, Serbia in the World, Special Supplement, November 1998, p. 48 and p. 28; 
cited in Deckers (2002: 164). 
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 Quoted in Silber & Little (1996: 199-200).; cited in Väyrynen (1997) also, .The 
former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman also pointed out the failure 
by the European governments to abide by the principle established by UN Special 
Envoys Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington in the summer of 1991 not to grant 
diplomatic recognition to any Yugoslav republic until all agreed on their mutual 
relationship: “If this simple principle had been maintained, Zimmerman said, less blood 
would have been shed in Bosnia.” (Jentleson 1996: 10)   
 
76
 PI 4/10/92: Constitutional Options. ICFY Working Paper on Constitutional Options, 
in Balkan Odysses CD-Rom; cited in Campbell (1999) 
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Lisbon Agreement, also known as Cutiliero Plan, “to push for constitutional protection 
minorities and creative governing arrangements to mitigate the heat of ethnic conflict 
was a critical early failure.”(2000: 45) Consequently, this led the only original EC plan 
to fail. What’s more, it led the EU to yield UN authority to enter the peace process. 
 
The ECCY was followed by the UN-EC International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY), established in August 1992 at the London Conference. Run by two 
mediators, Cyrus Vance, as the representative of the United Nations, and Lord Owen, 
EC’s chief negotiator on the Balkans, EC-UN initiative introduced three main plans: 
‘Vance-Owen Peace Plan’, in a January 1993; the ‘Union of Three Republics Plan’ in 
September 199377; and the ‘European Union Action Plan’ in November-December 
1993. Rather than giving the details of the plan, what must be emphasized here is the 
strategy behind these plans which led their failure. From the beginning of the EC peace 
initiatives, the fundamental assumption lying behind the logic of the proposed plan was 
the ‘inevitability’ of partition among ethnic lines in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the 
omitted fact in these initiatives was that an ethnically homogeneous geography78 such a 
plan could easily lead the parties to resort the strategy of creating their own ethnically 
pure regions to gain the control. For instance, in Herzeg, subsequent to the Vance-Owen 
plan, proposing a Bosnia-Herzegovina composed of cantons formed on the principle of 
the majority of one ethnic group, the Croats started their own ethnic cleansing in the 
Herzeg region of Bosnia-Herzegovina.79 Furthermore, beside the supporters of the thesis 
of  ‘all-warring parties’80, although the aggression was clear to all, what the peace plans 
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 Cyrus Vance was replaced by Thorvold Stoltenberg in May 1993. 
 
78
 Especially Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
79
 See, Sells (1996: 100-113). 
 
80
 The exaggeration of the myth of ‘ancient hatred’ which caused the reluctance of the 
European actors to intervene the conflict by the claim that the conflict in the Balkans, 
and Yugoslavia in this specific case, is based on ancient hatreds that has its roots in their 
history and no one can not anything for them until all the warring parties stop fighting. 
This approach of “warrying parties” was also going to run specifically against the 
Bosnian Muslims. That is to say, while the Serbs could use the logistics of JNA- the 
army of the former Yugoslavia- Bosnia could not get military assets due to the arms 
embargo. What the main argument against its halting was that all the parties were 
warring, so it will cause a worse catstrophy to halt embargo, omitting the fact that the 
one who could get the arms were called as the perpetuator while the hands of the victim 
was tied.  
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mostly recognized and even committed, in Owen’s own phrase was “the reality on the 
ground.81 However, as he pointed out, despite this reality all the proposed plans were 
“basically of the same family.”82 (1995: 190) 
 
To conclude, the war in Yugoslavia indicated a significant failure of the EC both 
in light of conflict prevention and crisis management. The emergence and the escalation 
of the conflict evidently reflected that the EU lacked the unity and the required 
instruments to deal with such an armed conflict. 
 
 Before all else, the initial failure was a warning-response-gap (George and Holl, 
2000), which was not a failure only for the EC but also for the other international actors. 
Although the early warning signals had emerged in the late 1980s both in political and 
economic sphere, they could not prevent the outburst of the conflict while it was still 
possible within the political framework. However, beside neglecting the opposition in 
favor of a federal solution in these countries, through the economic adjustment 
programmes they even widened the gap between the richer northern republics and rest in 
the south which further mobilized the former to abandon the federation. 
 
Although failed in preventing the conflict, the EC had actively involved in the 
later stages of the conflict in the name of conflict prevention and crisis management 
efforts by using a multilateral framework: Political tools involving statements and 
declarations; initiatives of preventive diplomacy both in the form of facilitation during 
                                                                                                                                                        
The policy of the European powers not to intervene directly in a conflict in Europe was 
going to be identified by some specialist such as George F. Kennan and Ivo Banac, 
directly with this mentality based on cultural bias. In his response to the question of 
“What should be done?”, Kennan was going to conclude that nothing can be done by an 
outsider, even it should not be expected to do so. See, Kennan (1993: 14), cited in 
Todorova (2003: 367.)  
This policy was going to be changed by the US’ entrance to the process.  See, Kaplan 
(1993), Alcock (2000). 
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 Cited in Sells (1996: 100). 
 
82
 Within the framework of the “London Conference on former Yugoslavia”(after 
changed its name into the “International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia”) a 
series of conferences were held by which several peace proposals were prepared such as 
the October 1992 “Precursor to the ‘Vance-Owen Plan”, January 1993 “Vance- Owen 
Plan”, September 1993 “Invincible Plan”, and November 1993 “European Union Plan”. 
For the peace plans, see, Silber and Little (1995) and  Szasz (1995: 363- 407). 
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the negotiations of the Brioni Agreement and mediation in the latter initiatives such as 
the Hague Conference which was also supported by legal frameworks such as the 
recommendations of the Badinter Commission; economic sanctions and initiatives; the 
deployment of observer missions to support the implementation the ceasefires; and 
finally humanitarian aid.  However, although used a series of instruments, it could not 
prevent the strategies of the EC to fail. This was mainly due to 4 main factors: 
 
1)  Due to the lack of a comprehensive strategy for the Balkans, in the early 
phase of the conflict the “EC initiatives in Yugoslavia were largely reactive” where 
“anticipatory and proactive measures were neglected.” (Lucarelli 1995: 9) Especially, in 
the latter phases of the conflict this made impossible to deal with the parties with 
different priorities. 
2) Due to different priorities of the Member States, it could not propose a 
coherent and coordinated policy both implementing political and military measures. 
3) It did not have the necessary legal and political instruments to formulate and 
implement such a unified policy. Thus due to the lack of coordination of both 
instruments and policies, it became much harder to deal with the indirect effects of 
individually held initiatives.    
4) It mostly implemented ‘soft’ preventive diplomacy where it is requires a 
‘stronger’ deterrence factor. 
 
As a result of this legal and institutional restrictions fueled by internal divisions, 
the EU lost its prominent position to UN and NATO within this framework, and finally 
US which brought the conflict to an end in 1995 by heading the political and military 
leadership through the use of “coercive diplomacy”. It was only the subsequent 
developments of the Dayton Plan that EU could re-emerge as an active player in the 
lands of former Yugoslavia in the name of economic and political post-conflict 
reconstruction of the region mainly through offering economic aid programmes and 
even security forces as observed in Bosnia. .     
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A. 6. 2. Post-Dayton Experiences: 1995-1999 
 
While the policies of the EU on Yugoslavia were mainly characterized by the 
mentioned incoherence or fluctuations, which are generally due to the lack of 
institutional basis of the EU for an effective collective mechanism of conflict prevention 
and different priorities of its members on the newly emergent political agenda; 
following the signing of Dayton Accords in November 1995, the EU started to voice the 
initial regional initiatives focusing on the South-East “European” region. In fact, as 
Ginsberg argues, the European Union has often been regarded as a “symbol of structural 
peace and reconciliation among ancient enemies”83 By the introduction of this policy, 
beside its previous conflict management policies and active participation as a third party 
actor in the Balkan conflicts, the EU initiated its structural prevention policy by 
proposing itself as a model for regional integration as a means of conflict prevention by 
the establishment of a security regime. Drawing on the insight of Schuman and Monnet 
that the European Coal and Steel Community was likely to make a Franco-German war 
not only unthinkable but materially impossible84, it has been motivated by the premise 
that closer regional integration would reduce, if not eliminate at all, security crisis 
among the previously hostile neigbours and promote stability.     
  
The First EU attempt was the Royaumont Process for Stability and Good 
Neighbourliness in Southeast Europe, launched in December 1996 with the aim to 
support the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements. It focused mainly on 
stabilizing the region by promoting regional projects in the field of civil society, culture 
and human rights.85 Following its first initiative to stabilize the region via promoting 
regional cooperation, the EU General Affairs Council adopted the “Regional Approach” 
towards the “Western Balkans” in 1997, “aimed at the implementation of the Dayton 
and the Paris Peace Agreements, advocating political and economic cooperation among 
these countries, the establishment of good neighbourly relations regarding the free 
                                                 
83 Ginsberg, cited in Lily Gardner Feldman, ‘Reconciliation and legitimacy: Foreign 
Relations and the Enlargement of the EU’, in Banchoff and Mitchell (1999: 78). 
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 Cited in Schiff and Winters (1997: 5) 
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 The Royaumont Project is now responsible for inter-parliamentary relations under the 
Stability Pact. 
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movement of goods, services and people and the development of projects of common 
interest”86  However, in the words of Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, “a long list of 
conditions of democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, economic reform, 
regional cooperation and additional compliance with obligations under the peace treaties 
made it even more difficult for aid and agreements to come through” (2002: 22). In this 
context, the countries of the Balkans could achieve little progress under the Regional 
Approach of the EU.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86
 Cited in Anastasakis and Bojicic- Dzelilovic (2002: 22). 
 
87
 See, Anastasakis and Bojicic- Dzelilovic (2002: 22). 
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A. 6. 3. Post-1999 Period of the European Vision: the Stabilisation and 
Association Process and the Stability Pact 
 
 The Kosovo crisis which forced the EU for a critical self-assessment resulted 
with the re-consideration of its previous strategies and tools. This paved the way for a 
set of strategies for the new era: “a) the re-organisation of the regional policies, b) the 
offer of a more committed and long-term bilateral framework of relations with the EU, 
c) the Unification of financial assistance to the Western Balkan region, and d) a more 
balanced application of positive and negative conditionality.” (Anastasakis and Bojicic- 
Dzelilovic 2002: 23) The modified strategy has been drawn on three significant 
institutional and infrastructural basis: (a) the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
based on a regional approach (June 1999); (b) the Stabilisation and Association Process, 
motivated by the enhancement of bi-lateral relations (May 1999); and finally (c) the 
financial assistance programme of CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development, and Stabilisation (December 2000).     
 
The Stability Pact was the first and the most comprehensive initiative for the 
Balkans, with much wider aims and a more integral approach than earlier initiatives 
such as the previous European Agreements. As Altmann pointed out, “the pact has made 
clear that regional co-operation represents an indispensable component and a 
precondition for the so much desired integration into EU and EU-Atlantic 
structures”(2003: 142). Indeed, the strict conditionality could have already been heard 
from the top officials of the EU, such as the then Enlargement Commissioner 
Verheugen: “if countries want to join the European Union then they must prove that 
they can develop regional co-operation and resolve their co-operation with their 
neighbours”.88 Modeling Deutsch’s “security community” (1957: 5) in the Western 
Balkans, the main political goals of the Pact were declared to be: maintenance of peace 
in the region, and promotion of its stability and prosperity on the basis of the 
development of good-neighbourliness, and respect of democracy, human rights and 
minority rights. The Pact organized itself through three main structures (“Tables”) 
which would provide the platforms for dialogue and coordination of specific projects 
and activities under the broader “Regional Table”:  Working Table 1, on 
                                                 
88
 Cited in Altmann (2003: 142). 
 57 
democratization and human rights; Working Table 2 on economic reconstruction, co-
operation and development; and Working Table 3 on security issues with two sub-tables 
of security and defense, and justice and home affairs (Stability Pact 2002: 2)  
 
While the Stability Pact essentially focused on supporting greater regional 
cooperation, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) as the eventual step 
of the SAP were rather offering a new kind of contractual relationship between the 
countries of the Western Balkans and the EU, namely for the first time a clear prospect 
of integration into the EU mechanisms. The SAP has six fundamental targets: 
1. Development of existing economic and trade relations with and 
within the region; 
2. Development and partial redirection of existing economic and 
financial assistance; 
3. Increased assistance for democratisation, civil society, education 
and institution- building; 
4. Co-operation in the area of justice and home affairs; 
5. Development of political dialogue, including at regional level; 
6. Development of Stabilisation and Association Agreements.89 
 
The objectives and the mechanisms of this initiative has been planned to be 
supported with financial assistance under the CARDS assistance program for 2001-2006 
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilisation), which 
foresees approximately 4,65 billion € for the region by replacing the previous PHARE90 
(1989), ECHO91 (1996) and OBNOVA92 (1996) programs93.  
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 Cited in “Joint Report to the Helsinki Council on EU Action in Support of the 
Stability Pact and South-Eastern Europe”, presented to the Helsinki European Council, 
10-11 December 1999 by the Finnish Presidency and the European Commission, in 
CEPS (ed.), Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 6, Brussels, December 1999. Available at 
http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/SEEMonitor/Monitor6.htm 
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 Assistance programme for Central Europe targeted at cross-border cooperation 
programmes. In 1997, PHARE has been extended to the SEE.  
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 ECHO provided humanitarian aid through emergenct supplies, technical assistance 
and related support. 
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 EC emergemcy support programme to assist in the implementation of the Dayton and 
Erdut Agreements and the restoration of stability in the Western Balkans, by Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1628/96 as last amended by (EC) No 2454/99.  
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What the CARDS programme envisioned was the fact that as each country 
moves deeper into that process, the assistance will focus increasingly on support for the 
reforms and institution building necessary to implement the obligations in the SAAs, 
which marked a transition from post-conflict reconstruction to stabilisation and 
association. It has four main objectives:  
 
(1) Reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, reconciliation and the return 
of refugees,  
(2) Institutional and legislative development, including harmonization with 
EU norms and approaches, to underpin democracy and the rule of law, human 
rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free market economy,  
(3) Sustainable economic and social development, including structural 
reform,  
(4) Promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among SAp 
countries and between them, the EU, and the candidate countries of central 
Europe.94 
 
In its Article 5 of the CARDS Regulation (Council Regulation 2666/2000 of 5 
December 2000), the conditionality for receiving assistance under CARDS was declared 
to be “respect for the principles of democracy and the rule of law and for human and 
minority rights and fundamental freedoms”, adding that “(i)f these principles are not 
respected, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, 
may take appropriate measures.”95 
  
By the Feira Council of the European Council in June 2000, the European 
Council recognized “all” the countries of the Western Balkans as “potential candidates” 
for EU membership and confirmed that “its objective remains the fullest possible 
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 Cited in http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news 
 
94
 CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans, Regional Strategy Paper 
2002-2006, p. 3. 
 
95
 In the second item of Article 5, it is stated that “(c)ommunity assistance shall also be 
subject to the conditions defined by the Council in its Conclusions of 29 April 1997, in 
particular as regards the recipients’ undertaking to carry out democratic, economic and 
institutional reforms.”  
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integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of 
Europe through the Stabilisation and Association Process political dialogue, 
liberalization of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.”96 Furthermore, it 
was declared that “The European Council encourages the States of the region to increase 
their regional cooperation, including through regional trade arrangements.”97   
 
By the EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit on 24 November 2000, the EU has 
underlined its approach towards “‘all’ the countries in the region as potential candidates 
for Union membership”.98  In the words of the President of the European Commission, 
Romano Prodi, what EU will undertake was “to help them walk that ‘road to Europe”.99 
In the Final Declaration of the Summit, it was underlined that “the stability and 
association process is at the heart of the Union’s policy towards five countries 
concerned”.100 Based on the “account of the situation of each country and (…) on 
respect for the conditions defined by the Council on 29 April 1997 concerning 
democratic, economic and institutional reforms”101, while each of these countries are 
presented with the vision of moving closer to the European Union within the framework 
of Stability and Association Process, it was underlined that this process would “go hand 
in hand with (the) process of developing regional cooperation”, as a “matter of 
priority”102 The interplay between these two process was explicitly defined to “form a 
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 The European Council, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, V. External Relations, 
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 See, message by Romano Prodi, 24.11.2000. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/zagreb_article.htm.   
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 See, message by Romano Prodi, 24.11.2000. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/zagreb_article.htm.   
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 Article 4 of the Zagreb Summit Final Declaration, 24 November 2000; available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sum_11_00/statement.htm 
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 Article 4 of the Zagreb Summit Final Declaration, 24 November 2000; available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sum_11_00/statement.htm 
 
102Article 3 of the Zagreb Summit Final Declaration, 24 November 2000; available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sum_11_00/statement.htm. In the 
Article 3 of the Zagreb Summit’s Final Declaration, the boundaries of this framework 
was mainly drawn as to “establish between their countries regional cooperation 
conventions providing for a political dialogue, a regional free trade area and close 
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whole”103 In this framework, the major incentives of the EU were the programmes for 
the reconstruction and economic development (nearly € 5 billion since 1991), the 
deployment of EU security forces, the introduction of the Stabilisation and Association 
process, emergency package in response to the democratic change in FRY (€200 
million), the establishment of the European Reconstruction Agency in Kosovo, the 
introduction of duty free access to the EU market for 95 % of the good of the SEE, the  
introduction of the new assistance programme of CARDS”104,. In this regard, the course 
of the EU assistance was declared by Romano Prodi as a transition “from a policy 
largely driven by crisis management to the one that allows us to build a better and 
lasting future. A future rooted in democracy, the rule of law and justice.”105 In other 
words, the Zagreb Summit marked the initiation of the “compulsory impact” of the EU 
through a ‘carrot-and-stick policy’ with the final goal of the EU membership through the 
fundamental principle of conditionality.106 While EU was determined to act as an actor 
in this path, it was aimed to be backed up by the initiatives of the parties themselves in 
the form of their domestic and foreign policy fundamentals, namely in the sphere of 
regional cooperation, that is an “enabling impact” in the words of Diez, Stetter and 
Albert (2004). By this Summit, the first Stabilisation and Association Agreement was 
                                                                                                                                                        
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, in  particular for the reinforcement 
of justice and the independence thereof, for combating organized crime, corruption, 
money laundering, illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and all other forms 
of trafficking. These conventions will be incorporated in the stabilization and 
association agreements as they are concluded with the European Union.”102 Also it was 
stated by Prodi Prodi that “First of all, the Balkan countries should sign regional 
conventions among themselves (...) (which will) clarify and spell out the regional 
dimension of the Stabilisation and Association agreements.” See, m essage by Romano 
Prodi, 24.11.2000. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/zagreb_article.htm.   
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initialed with Macedonia, decided to start negotiations with Croatia, and an invitation 
drawn on the prospect of the Stability and Association Agreement to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was issued by the Council on 9 October 2000.107 These 
developments marked that, in the words of van Meurs and Yannis, the EU perspective 
has been steadily emerging as “the Archimedean point of the entire process of 
stabilisation and development” for the Western Balkans.” (Meurs and Yannis 2002).  
 The Copenhagen European Council on 12-13 November 2002 reaffirmed the 
perspective proposed for the Western Balkans with its determination “to support their 
efforts to move closer to the EU” in accordance with the criteria defined at the 
Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 and the decision stipulated by the Feira 
European Council.108 Furthermore, a Summit between EU Member States and countries 
of the SAP was decided to be organized on 21 June in Thessaloniki under Greek 
Presidency. Before this Summit, in Brussels European Council in 20-21 March 2003, 
the European Council explicitly stated that “the future of the Western Balkans is within 
the EU”109 and invited the Council and the Commission “to examine ways and means, 
based also on the experience of the enlargement process, to further strengthen the 
Union’s stabilisation and association policy towards the region.”110     
 
Following the Treaty of Athens in April 2003, which paved the way to the 
accession the ten Member States, the Thessaloniki Summit on 21 June 2003, which was 
a follow-up to the first EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb, provided an opportunity 
for the EU to present the last enlargement as a ‘success story’ to the Western Balkans, 
which they could achieve if they had fulfilled the criteria, while for its part, revealing 
that it is ready to undertake the commitments support and assistance for the realization 
of the membership. The European Council emphasized the position of the SEE countries 
as “potential candidates”111 and acknowledged that “the Stabilisation and Association 
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process (SAP) will remain the framework for the European course of the Western 
Balkan countries”112, while “rapprochement with the EU will go hand in hand with the 
development of regional co-operation.”113 In the Summit Declaration, these areas were 
mainly delineated as “the areas of regional free trade, visa-free movement within the 
region, collection of small arms, creation of regional markets for electricity and gas, 
development of transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructures, environment 
and water management, research technology and development, cross-border co-
operation and parliamentary co-operation.”114 
 
In the “Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, it was explicitly stated 
that “the pace of further movement of the Western Balkan countries towards the EU lies 
in their own hands and will depend on each country’s performance in implementing 
reforms, thus respecting the criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 
and the SAP conditionality.”115 The SAP was composed of three major mechanisms:  
 
1. Stabilisation and Association Agreements: By the signing of an SAA, it is 
assigned to adopt the EU legislation in a number of areas including a free trade area with 
the EU or co-operation with the EU in other issues such as justice, visa, border control, 
illegal immigration, money laundering, transport, energy etc.  
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Commission will do all we can to help you succeed. But membership must be earned. It 
will take the sheer hard work and applied political will of those in power in the region. 
How far you proceed along the road towards European Integration, and how fast, will be 
up to you.” Available at, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sum_06_03/index.htm 
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2. Autonomous trade measures: It was stated that 80% of all goods from the 
region to enter Europe without any customs restrictions. 
3. Financial assistance: Since 1991, the EU introduced various aid programmes 
that amounts to more than €7 billion from humanitarian aid during the war to 
reconstruction and recently aids aimed at institution building. Since 2000, by the 
introduction of CARDS these were coordinated from a single mechanism, which 
amounts to € 4.65 billion. 116  
Furthermore, it was decided to be enriched with certain elements of pre-
accession strategy drawn on the previous enlargement process:  
 
1. European Integration Partnership, as the Balkans-version of the 
Accession Partnerships with the countries of CEE,  which was designed to be in the 
form of a road map and or “check-list” which sets down the short and medium-term 
priorities and obligations that has to be fulfilled as an additional means to intensify the 
SAP117. For the implementation of these requirements stipulated in the Annual Reports, 
each country should draw up and follow a national action plan with a timetable and 
details of how they plan to address the Partnership’s priorities. 
2. Strengthened political co-operation in the area of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy; Beside launching a high-level political forum, the EU-Western Balkans 
Forum, the countries are expected to adopt their policies in accordance with the CFSP. 
3. Enhanced support for institution building, including the instrument of 
twinning118, technical assistance by the Technical Assistance Information Exchange 
Office (TAIEX) and the establishment of a regional School for Higher Education on 
Public Administration Reform. 
                                                 
116
 For details, see Thessaloniki Agenda for Western Balkans, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/gacthess.htm; and EU-Western Balkans 
Thessaloniki Summit Declaration, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sum_06_03/decl.htm. 
 
117
 In its Regulation No 533/2004 the Council (EC) stated that the follow up of the 
implementation of the European Partnerships will be ensured through the mechanisms 
established under the Stabilisation and Association process, notably the Annual Reports. 
 
118
 With the aim of transferring administrative skills to the SAP countries, since October 
2002 under the CARDS programme, it supports the secondment of civil servants from 
the EU member states to work as advisers to the beneficiary institutions. 
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4. Promoting economic development, which is “essential for long-term 
stability in the region”. These includes initiatives such as close-co-operation with the 
relevant international financial institutions, developing modern networks and 
infrastructures in energy, transport and telecommunications, some of which is already 
under practice within the framework of the Regional Balkans Infrastructure Study 
(REBIS) and the European Charter for Small Enterprises introducing further measures 
for the liberalization of trade.  
5. Participation of the Western Balkans in Community programmes, 
drawn on the experiences of the RTD 6th Framework and the TEMPUS programme, 
particularly for the areas of “education and traning, culture, research, energy, 
environment, civil society, SME support and anti-fraud co-ordination.” 119  
 
Beside these mechanisms, the other elements of the pre-accession period were 
specified as “supporting the rule of law”, “responding to new needs- financial support”, 
“enhancing regional cooperation”, “efforts to strengthen democracy- parliamentary co-
operation”, “improving political co-operation”.120 The aim of this overall agenda was to 
respond “the new challenges, as the countries move from stabilisation and 
reconstruction to sustainable development, association and integration into European 
structures.”121  
 
In the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, organized crime and 
corruption were declared to be the “real obstacles to democratic stability, sound and 
accountable institutions, the rule of law, and economic development in the Western 
Balkans and a source of grave concern to the EU”, adding that “(c)ombating them must 
constitute a key priority for the governments of the region. Particular focus should be 
placed upon fighting all forms of trafficking.”122 Another issue standing as an obstacle 
                                                 
119
 For details, see the Thessaloniki Agenda for Western Balkans (2003), EU-Western 
Balkans Thessaloniki Summit Declaration (2003) and The Western Balkans and 
European Integration”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Brussels, 21.05.2003, COM (2003) 285 final. 
 
120
 For details, see ibid.   
 
121
 Cited in In the Thessaloniki Agenda for Western Balkans. 
 
122
 “3. Fighting organised crime. Co-operation in other Justice and Home Affairs 
matters”, as cited in ibid. 
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to normalization and the aimed democratic development was reconciliation including 
the issue of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and the promotion of 
reconciliation through education, social development and culture such as the 
introduction of bilateral agreements on cultural issues, the issue of the restoration of 
cultural and religious monuments and revising history textbooks.123 
 
To sum up, the European Union has been one of the main active this party actors 
in the lands of former Yugoslavia since the beginning of its collapse. Starting from an 
economic diplomacy strategy to prevent the collapse in late 1980s, it implemented a 
multilateral strategy of conflict management and resolution tools during the conflict and 
post-conflict mechanisms up to 1999 in the post-Dayton process. However, in 1999, it 
added a new dimension to its role of a third party ‘actor’. As stated in the first paragraph 
of the first Annual Report of the SAP in 2002: “EU leaders decided that a policy of 
emergency reconstruction, containment and stabilisation was not, in itself, enough to 
bring lasting peace and stability to the Balkans: only the real prospect of integration into 
European structures would achieve that.”124 In terms of CR literature, this revealed EU’s 
transition in its role as a third party actor aimed at peacemaking and post-conflict 
reconstruction to a broader ideal of conflict prevention and peacebuilding tied strongly 
to being a part of a general framework identical to  Deutsch’s ‘security community’. In 
this context, the EU presented itself as a model ‘framework’ to be adopted through the 
acquis by the implementation of the requirements of the SAP. In this context, it avoided 
a direct involvement in the conflicts between the actors of the conflict, but rather uses 
positive or negative conditionality towards the governments, which is a conflicting party 
in this ethno-political conflict, for persuading it to come to an agreement. This put 
‘Europeanization’ at the center of CR perspective of the EU as a conflict prevention 
mechanism.125  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
123
 “5. Reconciling for the Future and Enhancing Regional Cooperation”, See, ibid. 
 
124
 See, the Report from the Commission, the Stabilisation and Association Process for 
South East Europe First Annual Report, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM(2002) 285 final, 
p. 4. 
 
125
 This reality was stipulated by Mungiu-Pippidi in a stricter/Assertive phrase that 
“there is no alternative project, neither on the table, nor in the social imagination.” See, 
Alina Mingiu-Pippidi (2004)  
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CHAPTER 2: CASES 
 
A. The Albanian Question in Macedonia 
A. 1. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia: Historical Background 
  
Founded by Josip Broz Tito in 1946 as the “Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia” and renamed as the “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) in 
1963, Tito’s Yugoslavia offered a two-fold solution to the nationalities problem: firstly, 
the construction of “Yugoslavhood” as a supranational identity by the motto of 
“Brotherhood and Unity”, and secondly, the establishment of a constitutional system 
securing equal representation and power-sharing of all nations (narodi) and 
nationalities (narodnosti) of Yugoslavia.126  In its Constitution of 1974, Yugoslavia was 
defined as “a socialist self-management democratic community of working people and 
citizens of nations and nationalities having equal rights”.127 This system of 
representation and power-sharing was based on a two-fold framework, namely the 
principle of territoriality in the form of the representation of “nations” (narods) in 
“their” republics; and the principle of personality, in the form of the individual’s self-
declaration as a member of either a “nation” (narod) or “nationality” (narodnost) in a 
federal framework” (König 2002: 6-7). While the Republic enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy in domestic affairs and equal representation in federal organs, all “nations” 
and “nationalities” were granted equal rights (Article 245) and enjoyed a significant 
cultural autonomy such as using their own languages in administration, education and 
media (Article 246-248) (König 2002: 7).   
 
During the Federation, the legal base for inter-ethnic relations within the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia has been shaped under the three Constitutions of 
                                                 
126
 In addition to these two broad categories, the constitutional system has also 
acknowledged the rights of “Other Nationalities and Ethnic Groups” as the the left small 
minority groups. For the nationality question in Tito’s Yugoslavia, see, Banac (1988), 
Paunoviæ (1997: 145-165), Poulton (1993: 5-13). 
 
127
 Documented in Trifunovska, Snezana (ed.) 1994, Yugoslavia Through Documents. 
From its Creation to its Dissolution, Dordrecht et al.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
pp.224-233; cited in König (2001: 6). 
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Yugoslavia (1946, 1963, and 1974). While the first Constitution of 1946 was promising 
to respect and protect the cultural rights and liberties of the minorities (Milosavlevski 
and Tomovski, 1997: 15; cited in. Koinova 2002), the subsequent Constitution of 1963 
and several amendments to it expressed more concrete provisions on inter-ethnic 
relations. It did not just confirm the equality of ethnic groups in Macedonia, but also 
promised the use of minority language both in daily activities like education and media 
“in areas where nationalities live” and in the “realization of the [community] rights and 
obligations, as well as in the procedure before state organs and organizations” 
(Milosavlevski and Tomovski 1997:20; cited in Koinova 2002). Finally, the 1974 
Constitution was the most constructive legal framework for the establishment of a 
multi-national state: It confirmed the equality before law, recognized the Albanian 
language and alphabet as equal to Macedonian and protected and encouraged the 
development of Albanian culture. The implementation of these policies was regulated 
and monitored by the Commission on Inter-ethnic Relations comprised of “an equal 
number of members from the Macedonian nation, of the Albanian, and Turkish 
nationalities” (Milosavlevski and Tomovski, 1997:24; cf. Koinova, 2002). Above all, it 
defined the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as “a state of the Macedonian people and 
the Albanian and Turkish minorities” (Rosůlek 2001: 44). 
 
However, contrary to this legal framework, in reality the promised legal 
provisions were not fully implemented. To begin with, although the Albanians 
outnumbered other “nations”(see Table 3), as they had an external home state, they 
were not considered as a “nation” but a “nationality”. As mentioned above, although 
the legal framework guaranteed equal representation for these “nationalities” like the 
“nations” of Yugoslavia, they could not have the chance to obtain the considerable 
power that the nations hold within federal organs.128   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 For example, in 1981 Albanians comprised 5.5 percent of the League of Communists 
membership, although they were 21.36 percent of the population. Quoted in Poulton 
(1995:78). 
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Table 3: National Composition of the SFRJ, 1961-1991 (in percent) 
Source: Official censuses quoted in Woodward 1995, p.32; cf. König, p.8. 
 
National Group 1961 1971 1981 1991 
Serbs 42.0 39.7 36.3 36.2 
Croats 12.1 22.1 19.8 19.7 
Slovenes 8.5             8.2            7.8            7.5 
Macedonians 5.6             5.8            6.0            5.8 
Montenegrins 2.8             2.5            2.6            2.3 
Muslims 5.2             8.4            8.9 10.0 
Albanians 5.0             6.4            7.7            9.3 
Yugoslavs 1.7             1.3            5.4            3.0 
Other 6.1             5.6            5.5            6.2 
Total (absolute) 18,549,291 20,522,972 22,427,585 23,528,230 
 
Discrepancies between the idealized legal framework and practice can also be 
observed in the socio-economic data on ethnic minorities in Macedonia. For instance, 
according to the statistical data for 1992, the lowest social product per capital is present 
in the ethnically mixed municipalities, particularly western Macedonia where the 
majority of the Albanian population resides; while 30.2% of the Albanians and 43.9% 
of the Turks live in urban areas, this is 64.3% for the Macedonians; the discrepancy is 
more evident in the ratios of the employees: while 85% of the ethnically Macedonian 
citizens work in public, mixed and cooperative sectors, this is 7% for the Albanians and 
not more than 2,4 percent for the other ethnic minorities.129 
 
In addition to these socio-economic discrepancies, the ethnic tensions between 
ethnic Albanians and Macedonian authorities date back to the 1980’s, parallel to the 
repressive policies of Milosevic towards the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. The 
then Communist authorities of Macedonia took similar measures towards their own 
ethnic-Albanian citizens. As delineated in an ICG report, any initiative in the name of 
                                                 
129
 For details, see, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Republic of 
Macedonia, Report on Minority Rights in the Republic of Macedonia, September 1999.  
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expression of identity was repressed as displaying Albanian nationalism: “the use of the 
Albanian language in education was curtailed, and numerous ethnic Albanian teachers 
who resisted the new curriculum were sacked; the ministry of the interior continued to 
enforce the policy of denying the right to give certain names, considered nationalist, to 
ethnic Albanian babies until 1992; and traditional walls surrounding Albanian homes 
(used for protection against intruders, to keep women out of sight and to dry tobacco 
leaves) were destroyed.”130 
 
Although Macedonia, with its heterogeneous population (see Table 4), managed 
to be far away from any serious ethnic conflicts, the negative balance between the 
Macedonian authorities and the ethnic Albanians was further affirmed in 1989 when the 
Constitution was amended to redefine Macedonia as “a nation state of Macedonian 
people” by replacing the previous statement as “a state of the Macedonian people and 
the Albanian and Turkish minorities”(Rosůlek 2001: 44; Poulton 1995: 133). 
 
Inter-ethnic tensions came to the surface when the Macedonian authorities 
decided to declare independence. With the declaration of Macedonian independence in 
September 1991, concern over inter-ethnic relations revived. The national plebiscite for 
the declaration of independence in September 1991 was boycotted by the Albanian and 
Serbian minority.131 Indeed, having its roots in the late 1980’s, the struggle between 
Macedonian authorities and ethnic Albanians was not over rights but rather on power. 
As Engström pointed out the source of contention between the Macedonian state and 
the Albanian population was “about who controls the state and what kind of state 
Macedonia should be” (Engström 2002: 6).  
 
                                                 
130
 See, ICG Balkan Report No. 138, 11 August 1998: 2. See also Helsinki Committee 
for Human Rights in the Republic of Macedonia, Report on Minority Rights in the 
Republic of Macedonia, September 1999. 
 
131
 Of the 72% of the eligible voters who voted in this referendum, including ethnic 
Albanians living abroad, 95% voted for independence. Cited in Lund (2001: 176). 
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The Albanians in Macedonia, mostly concentrated in the western part of the 
country, constitute approximately 23% of the population (see, Table 4).132 According to 
data from previous censuses, the ratio of the Albanian population has grown constantly 
since 1953, primarily due to their significantly higher birth rate. They comprised 13% 
in 1961; 17% in 1971; 19.7% in 1981; and 21% in 1991.  
 
Table 4: Structure of the population in Macedonia regarding ethnic belonging 
Source: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Republic of Macedonia,  
Report on Minority Rights in the Republic of Macedonia, p.1-2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
132
 For the Albanian nationalists the population counts up to 40%. However, when the 
refugee flaw and the procedures of the registration for citizenship is considered, simply 
it can be estimated that they consist of 1/3 of the Macedonian population.  
 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 1994 
TOTAL 1,304,514 
100,0 
1,406,003 
100,0 
1,647,308 
100,0 
1,909,136 
100,0 
2,033,964 
100,0 
1,936,877 
100,00 
Macedonian 860,699 
66,0 
1,000,854 
71,2 
1,142,375 
69,3 
1,279,323 
67,0 
1,328,187 
65,3 
1,288,330 
66,5 
Albanian 162,524 
12,5 
183,108 
13,0 
279,871 
17,0 
377,208 
19,8 
441,987 
21,7 
442,914 
22,9 
Turks 203,938 
15,6 
131,484 
9,3 
108,552 
6,6 
86,591 
4,5 
77,080 
3,8 
77,252 
4,0 
Roma 20,462 
1,5 
20,606 
1,5 
24,505 
1,6 
43,125 
2,3 
52,103 
2,6 
43,732 
2,3 
Vlach 8,668 
0,7 
8,046 
0,6 
7,190 
0,4 
6,384 
0,3 
7,764 
0,4 
8,467 
0,4 
Serbs 35,112 
2,7 
42,728 
3,0 
46,465 
2,8 
44,468 
2,3 
42,775 
2,1 
39,260 
2,0 
Rest 13,111 
1,0 
19,177 
1,4 
38,350 
0,3 
72,037 
3,8 
84,068 
4,1 
36,922 
1,9 
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With such a significant population, the Albanian political leaders rejected to 
participate to the 1991 referendum on Macedonia’s independence fundamentally due to 
the adoption of the new constitution. To the Albanians, the Macedonian Constitution of 
1991 proposed a relegation of their legal status. As Engström pointed out, the self-
perception of the Albanian community was not that they constituted a minority group, 
but rather, that they are another majority in Macedonia (Engström 2002:4). However, 
the proposed Constitution was evidently based on a wording emphasizing the 
ownership of the Macedonian state by the ethnic Macedonians, the preamble at 
particular. It was stated in the preamble that “Macedonia is established as a national 
state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent 
coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, 
Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia …”133 This 
phrase was interpreted by the ethnic Albanians as the status of a second-class 
citizenship. Implicit emphasis on the Macedonian “ownership” of the state was also 
implied in some of articles of the constitution, such as Article 7, indicating that “the 
Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language of the 
Republic of Macedonia…”; Article 19 on religious freedom, which explicitly refers 
only to the Macedonian Orthodox Church.134     
  
The ethnic Albanians boycotted the referendum held on 8 September 1991 and 
instead held their own referendum on political and cultural autonomy in January 1991. 
Accordingly, of over 90% of ethnic Albanians who participated in the referendum (90 
%) declared to be in favor of autonomy.  
 
Actually, the Constitution granted full equality to all “nationalities” as citizens 
of the Republic of Macedonia135. Besides, while it recognized the free expression of 
national identity as one of the fundamental values of the constitutional order (Article 8), 
                                                 
133
 Preamble to the Macedonian Constitution adopted by the Assembly on 17 November 
1991. 
 
134
 Macedonian Constitution, http://www.president.gov.mk 
 
135
 Article 9: Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are equal in their freedoms and 
rights, regardless of sex, race,color of skin, national and social origin, poliitcal and 
religious beliefs, property and social status. All citizens are equal before the Constitution 
and law. 
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the “nationalities” were also granted specific cultural rights. For instance, in Article 7 it 
was assured that “in the units of local-self government where the majority of the 
inhabitants belong to a nationality, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic 
alphabet, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in a manner determined by 
law”. Also in Article 48, it was explicitly guaranteed that: 
  
“Members of nationalities have a right freely to express, foster and 
develop their identity and national attributes. The Republic guarantees the 
protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the 
nationalities. Members of nationalities have the right to establish 
institutions for culture and art, as well as scholarly and other associations 
for the expression, fostering and development of their identity. Members 
of the nationalities have the right to instruction of their language in 
primary and secondary education, as determined by law. In schools where 
education is carried out in the language of a nationality, the Macedonian 
language is also studied.”  
 
These provisions were also elaborated in specific laws in the areas of education, 
language, media and local-self-government.136 Beside these legal provisions, the 
Constitution established a Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations, which “considers issues 
of inter-ethnic relations in the republic and makes appraisals and proposals for their 
solution.” (Article 78)137 
 
In addition to domestic judicial regulations, Macedonia has also signed and 
ratified several international conventions related to the protection of minority rights. On 
20 September 1993, Macedonia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) (IHF Annual Report for 1996, 1997: 121) which guarantees 
cultural, linguistic and religious rights to ethnic, national and religious minorities 
(Burgenthal, et al. 1997:34; cited in Koinova 2002). Also as a member of the Council 
of Europe since 9 November 1995, Macedonia has also been a party to the Framework 
                                                 
136
 For a detailed information on special laws regarding the minority rights and 
expression of national identities, see the minority report of Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee, and Mario Koinova’s report on Albanians of Macedonia. 
 
137
 In the same Article, it is ordained that it consists of the President of the Assembly as 
the President of the council and two members each from the ranks of the Macedonians, 
Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies, as well as two members from the ranks of 
other nationalities in Macedonia.    
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Convention for the Protection of National Minorities138. On 25 July 1996 Macedonia 
signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1992, but has not ratified yet. (Deftary, 2001:9). Besides, its 
respect to all relevant documents of the OSCE in line with the 1990 Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities 
has also been declared (Copenhagen CSCE Document) (MFA, March, 1999). The other 
ratified significant documents relevant to minority rights are: The Convention on the 
Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, etc. 
(Frckoski 1998: 92-94; cited in Koinova 2002). 
 
Under this legal framework provided by domestic and international judicial 
regulations, it is evident that the ethnic Albanians enjoyed considerable civil and 
political rights. One comparing their political and economic situations with their kin in 
both Albania and Kosovo would generally witness much better conditions. However, 
these could not prevent the emergence of periodic problems and inter-ethnic tensions. 
 
Since 1991, ethnic Albanian population’s interests have been represented at the 
political level by several ethnically based parties, most influential of which are the 
Democratic Party of Albanians (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare, PDSH) and the Party of 
Democratic Prosperity (Partia p’r Prosperitet Demokratik/PPD), the Party for 
Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (Partia p’r Demokratik e Shqiptar’ve n’ 
Maqedoni/PPDSh) and the Democratic Union for Integration (Demokratska Unija za 
Integracije/ DUI). However, as pointed out in a report by the International Crisis Group 
(1998: 6), the parties are divided over the means of raising the status of Macedonia’s 
ethnic Albanians, which also determines the popularity for the ethnic Albanian 
population as the voters to these parties. Periodically, the policies of these parties aimed 
at the realization of the demands they believe that they ‘deserved’: In 1992, some 
Albanian politicians radicalized their demands for territorial autonomy in what they 
                                                 
138
 Opened for signature on February 1, 1995 and entered into force on February 1, 1998 
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called as Illyrida in Western Macedonia139; the formation of a secret paramilitary 
organization, called the All-Albanian Army within the Army of the Republic of 
Macedonia in early November 1993140; the creation of parallel authorities alike the 
institutions in Kosovo, such as establishing the unofficial, private Albanian-language 
university in Tetovo by the municipal councils of Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar in 1994 
(Daftary 2000: 14); the raising of Albanian flag in front of the town halls in Gostivar 
and Tetovo in July 1997.         
The main issues of conflict between the ethnic Albanian demands and the 
position of the Macedonian government have been: 
 
(1). The wording of the Constitution: The dissatisfaction of ethnic Albanians 
on the wording of the 1991 Constitution in articles regarding “nationalities” and the 
preamble at particular was based on the perception that it favored ethnic Macedonians 
as ‘the owners’ of the Macedonian state, and recognized the other “nationalities” as 
second-class citizens. 
 
(2). Disputes over the censuses and the criteria of citizenship: According to 
the previous 1994 census, the Albanians were declared to constitute 22.7-23.0% of the 
total population of Macedonia. However, this was not accepted by the Albanian political 
leaders who claimed that the real number of their population is between 441,000 and 
443,000 people. The Albanian leaders explain this discrepancy with the fact that 
approximately 100,000 Albanians have been denied citizenship with the restrictive 
citizenship law. According to this citizenship law it was required to be a permanent 
resident of Macedonia for 15 years. This made it impossible for many Albanians 
previously living in other parts of the former Yugoslavia to be registered as citizens and 
additionally participate in censuses and elections. 
 
                                                 
139
 In early November 1993, police arrested a group of Albanians, including a deputy 
minister of defense in the government, with the allegation  of establishing an 
“autonomomus province of Iliriada”. 
 
140
 Ortakovski reports that, for this military scandal in 1994, ten ethnic Albanians of 
Macedonian citizenship, including the former Secretary General of the PDP, Mithad 
Emini, were pronounced guilty for planning and organizing an Albanian irredentist army 
and thus consequently sentenced to five to eight years of imprisonment. Later, he was 
released under the amnesty. See, Ortakovski (2001: 11). 
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(3). Proportional participation in public life: Although significant progress 
has been achieved since the independence, the under-representation of ethnic Albanians 
in government bodies, civil service, the army and the police continues to exist. From 
1994 to 1988, ethnic Albanians were represented by 19 members of the Parliament, 5 
ministers (one of whom was a Deputy Prime Minister) and 4 deputy ministers; since 
1998 this increased to 25 deputies at the Parliament, 5 ministers (one of whom again is 
a Deputy Prime Minister) and 5 deputy ministers.  
 
(4). Education in minority language and the issue of Tetovo University: 
Although the Constitutional order of Macedonia recognizes the right to education in the 
mother tongue in primary and secondary education, where there is an increasing 
participation in their mother tongues both at the elementary141 and secondary 
education142, still these do not match up with their proportional share in the total 
population, particularly in terms of female representation (Daftary 2001: 23). 
Furthermore, the issue of higher education is a more contentious problem between 
ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian Government. As Ortakovski pointed out, the 
reality that “university education in their mother tongue is seen as a key means of 
achieving social and economic parity with the ethnic Macedonian majority” makes the 
issue more sensitive for ethnic Albanians. The introduction of the quota system of 10% 
for all minority students in 1991/92 led an increase in the percentage of Albanian 
students143. However, what was at the center of the crisis was the demand of ethnic 
Albanians for the State to provide higher education in Albanian. Although there is not 
any restriction on the use of minority languages in private institutions, in the Law on 
Higher Education, it is stated that all tuition had to be in the Macedonian language 
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 Ortakovski cites that there is a trend to increase instruction in Albanian in elementary 
schooling: 26.8% in 1992/93; 26.95% in 1993/94; and 27.46% in 1994/95. In fact this a 
continuing trend since World War II. For a detailed account, see, Ortakovski (2001: 30).   
 
142
 Alike the primary education, there is also an increase in the number and percentage 
of students studying in Albanian in secondary education, which is not compulsory: %24 
in 1991/92; 5,9% in 1992/93; 7,4% in 1993/94; 9.8% in 1995/96; 13% in 1996/97. See, 
Ortakovski, 2001, p.31; Daftary, 2001, p. 13. It must be underlined that there must be at 
least 24 minority students in a class to be taught in their mother tongue, which was 30 in 
the previous law on secondary education from 1985. See, Daftary (2001:13).  
 
143
 While it was 2.4% in 1991/92, it increased to 10% in 1997/97. Quoted in, Daftary 
(2001: 13). 
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exclusively (Daftary, 2001:14). Thus, for instance, although the Macedonian 
Government transformed the former Pedagogical Academy with a two-year programme 
in Albanian at Skopje University into the Pedagogical Faculty with a four-year study 
programme in Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish to train pre-school and primary 
teachers, this could not prevent the establishment of a private Albanian-language 
university in Tetovo by the municipal councils of Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar.144 
However, as the 1995 Law on Local Self-Government did not provide the jurisdiction 
for local authorities over higher education, this was declared illegal. It became a 
contentious issue between the ethnic Albanians and Macedonian government until the 
resolution of the problem in July 2000 under the auspices of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel.145         
 
(5). Other language related issues: Beside the aforementioned language-
related educational problems, another contentious issue is the status of Albanian 
alongside Macedonian. The primary problem relevant to this issue was the use of 
Albanian language in administrative and legal organs of the state.  
 
(6). Religious issues: Although the freedom of religious confession is 
guaranteed by Article 19 of the 2001 Constitution, the explicit reference to the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church have been regarded as a privileged status.  
 
(7). Media: The expression of national identity through the media is probably 
one of the least conflicting issues for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Today there are 
two daily papers - the private independent Fakti and the state-sponsored Flaka. One can 
witness a more colored picture in the case of visual and audial media. There are eight 
daily hour-and-a-half broadcasts on the national radio, on the second channel, and on 
many private radio stations (Poulton 1998:81; Nessimi 2000; cited in Koinova 2002). 
                                                 
144
 Beside the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje, ethnic Albanians could also study in their 
mother tongue in the depArticlement of Albanian language and literature at the 
Philological Faculty at the University of Skopje.  
 
145
 See, Ortakovski (2001: 37-38); ICG Balkans Report no. 98 (2000: 18-20), and 
Rosůlek (2001: 47-49). 
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There are also several local radio stations.146. Albanian is also transmitted through 
visual media. At present, there are three hours of programs in Albanian from Monday 
through Friday on Macedonian National TV; numerous private stations meet the needs 
of the community. (Poulton 1998:81; cited in Koinova 2002)147. To conclude, 
generally, the ethnic Albanians’ demand for greater access to media in their own 
language has been met by the Macedonian government. 
 
 The reactions of the Macedonian government to the aforementioned demands 
of the ethnic Albanians varied. While they were sometimes overlooked or tolerated, 
some initiatives were harshly repressed by the security forces. The Macedonian public 
witnessed several demonstrations or riots of ethnic Albanians, such as the ones in 
November 1992 following the killing of an ethnic Albanian teenage by the police in 
Skopje; demonstrations in December 1994 and February 1995 for the opening and 
existence of private Albanian-language Tetovo University; again in February 1995; 
protests of Albanian parliamentarians regarding the decision to ban the use of the 
Albanian language on Macedonian identity cards and passports; hunger strike and 
demonstrations in Spring 1997 regarding the initiation of Albanian education in the 
Pedagogical Institute of the University of Skopje.148  
 
Although ethnic tensions were thought to relieve, armed clashes exploded in the 
spring of 2001 between so-called National Liberation Army (Ushtia Çilirimtare 
Kombëtare, UÇK) of ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian security forces. By the 
leverage of international community to bring an end to the fighting, an inter-ethnic 
coalition has been formed in May 2001. This was followed by the signing of the 
                                                 
146
 In her report on Albanians of Macedonia, Koinova (2002) cites several local radio 
stations such as Radio “Vati,” Radio “Fama,” Radio “24” and Radio “Haraqina” in 
Skopje (Marku, 1999), Radio “Visar” and Radio “Fama” in Tetovo, Radio “Ars,” Radio 
“Emi,” Radio “Pro FM 92,” Radio “Rumeli FM” and Radio “Rekaton” in Gostivar, 
Radio “Arbana” in Koumanovo, Radio “Merilin” in Debar, Radio “Rinia” in Prilep, 
Radio “Flora” in Krushevo, Radio “Uskana” in Kichevo. Quoted in Gligorovska (1999), 
cited in Koinova (2002) 
 
147
 Some of these TV stations are: TV “Era” in Skopje, TV “Article” and TV “Koha” in 
Tetovo, TV “Globus,” TV “Zeri I Cegranit” and TV “2” in Gostivar, TV “Festa” and 
TV “Hana” in Koumanovo, TV “Kaltrina” in Strouga, TV “Gura” and TV “Uskana” in 
Kichevo. Quoted in Gligorovska (1999), cited in Koinova (2002). 
 
148
 For a detailed account, see, Lund (2001: 181-182). 
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Framework Agreement, also known as Ohrid Agreement, in August 2001, under the 
effective participation of the European Union, the OSCE and the United States. 
Accordingly, under the monitoring of NATO, a handover of weapons by the NLA has 
been put into operation. In addition to that, the provisions of the Framework 
Agreement, namely the amendments to the 1991 Constitution, in accordance with the 
demands of the ethnic Albanians, have been approved by the electorate in September 
2001.  
 
 Since then, although several provisions of the Framework Agreement have 
been implemented by the Macedonian government, it is not possible to argue that the 
Macedonian government could succeed to overcome the threat of ethnic tensions 
among the two communities. Beside the resentments of ethnic Macedonians which 
regards the intervention of the international community as fully favoring the ethnic 
Albanians contrary to the viability of the Macedonian state, a newly formed Albanian 
paramilitary organization NLA started armed struggle since 2001 by assuring not to 
stop these “until the final liberation of all ethnic Albanian territory in the Balkans 
(Ordanoski 2001; cited in Koinova, 2002). In this regard, the position of the 
international community remains an important factor on the possibility of the peaceful 
settlement of inter-ethnic tensions and the creation of a civic, multinational Macedonia. 
 
 In view of that, the following section will be devoted how the initiatives of the 
European Union determined the settlement of inter-ethnic accommodation in post-1991 
Macedonia. 
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A. 2. The European Union in Macedonia, Macedonia in the Process of 
Europeanization 
 
Since its independence in 1991, Macedonia has been on the agenda of the 
international community due to both domestic and regional tensions, namely the crisis in 
interethnic relations and a possible spillover of violence from the north respectively.  In 
order to address these challenges, the international community initiated a wide range of 
missions such as the UNPROPOR of the UN149 and the Skopje-mission of OSCE.150 
While these were in the form of international initiatives directed at conflict prevention 
and conflict management, the relations between the EU and Macedonia has an 
additional dimension. Beside EU’s -and the then EC’s- position as a third party 
intervener, the relationship has also been shaped as a political relation between two 
political structures of international politics.  
 
While the first Macedonian representative to Brussels had been appointed in 
October 1992151, the diplomatic relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the 
European Union had been established in December 1995 due to the conflict between 
Macedonia and Greece.152  
                                                 
149
 From 1992 to 1998, UNPROFOR was employed as a peacekeeping force in 
Macedonia as a measure of “preventive deployment”(under the name of UNPREDEP 
since 1995), with the mission of securing the northern border of Macedonia from the 
threat of the spillover of violence. 
 
150
 Since 1992, OSCE established a long-term mission in Skopje with the mission of 
improving interethnic relations. Several initiatives had been undertaken under this 
mission, particularly the facilitation activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, e.g. the proposals of OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities Max van der Stoel in November 1998 and 2000 regarding the ethnic 
Albanians’  demands for higher education in Albanian and increasing their 
representation in public administration. 
 
151
 The Permanent Mission in Brussels was elevated to Embassy in February 1996. 
 
152
 Upon Macedonia’s request for EC recognition in December 1991 following its 
declaration of independence in September 1991, Greece objected mainly to its name and 
flag with the assertiton that these are signs of Macedonia’s irredentist policies as a threat 
to Greece’s integrity. Due to this objection, although the Badinter Commission of the 
EC recommended the recognition of Macedonia and Macedonia amended its 
Constitution and flag, Greece achieved to balock EU for recognition. In April 1993, a 
partial solution could be achieved, which provided Macedonia to join the UN under the 
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In March 1996, in addition to urgent and humanitarian assistance, Macedonia 
was recognized to be eligible for funding under the PHARE programme, thus achieved 
access to assistance supporting structural reforms. This financial aid program was 
accompanied with the humanitarian aid of ECHO for coping with the influx of refugees 
from Kosovo. Within the framework of Phare and Obnova programmes, the EU 
assistance to Macedonia amounted to 62.4 millions between 1992 and 2001. 
Furthermore, the humanitarian aid agency of ECHO had alone transferred 
approximately 100 millions euros in the period of 1992-2002.153  
 
Following the Transport and Cooperation Agreements, which entered into force 
in November 1997 and January 1998 respectively, the Cooperation Council was 
established in January 1998. Subsequent to these initiatives, The Parliament of the 
Republic of Macedonia adopted a Declaration in February 1998, for the development of 
relations with the European Union, which confirmed the political consensus for 
membership of the European Union as a strategic goal of the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
In March 1998, the Cooperation Council held its initial meeting and the first 
Permanent Representative of the European Commission was established in Macedonia. 
Following the conclusion of a feasibility report  to initiate the Stability and Association 
Agreement (SAA} with Macedonia on 16 June 1999, in April 2000 the EU started 
negotiations with the Macedonian government to conclude the SAA with the prospect of 
regular economic aid, improved trade relations, advance political dialogue with EU and 
finally EU integration.154 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)” without its flag 
flying at UN headquarters. The relations severed with the decision of Greece to impose 
an economic embargo in 1994. Following nearly three years period of negotiations, a 
settlement could be achieved in 1995 by the signing of the Interim Agreement. 
 
153
 See, the website of the external relations of the European Commission. 
 
154
 In the same month, an EU Delegation was opened in Skopje and the first Head of 
Delegation at ambassadorial level had been appointed. 
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Following the successful conclusion of negotiations in November 2000155, the 
initial initiative had been the inclusion of Macedonia in the CARDS Programme156 
Subsequent to that, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed on 9 April 
2001.157 
While these initiatives, as a reflection of the conflict prevention strategy of the 
EU, were drawn on the prophecy that integration within the European structures would 
ensure peace and stability, the first serious incident that tested the EU’s conflict 
resolution capabilities after the 1992-95 wars in Yugoslavia and the subsequent armed 
conflict in Kosovo in 1999 had been the Macedonia crisis in 2001. 
  
Indeed, the outburst of such a conflict, by itself, marked a serious deficiency in 
these capabilities, namely early warning-response gap. As Gounev pointed out “the most 
frequently cited causes for the conflict in 2001, namely the political, social and 
economic inequalities between the Macedonians and the Albanians have been 
overlooked.” (Gounev 2003: 232). For years, the international NGOs had reported that 
the Macedonian government has repeatedly violated the basic human rights of 
Albanians, such as under-representation in public sector, partial attitudes of the 
government with respect to the position of the religious communities and the 
establishment of the higher education institutes in their own language. However, not to 
‘break the glasses’, the EU could not hesitate to be silent. But, while it could not take 
serious attempts favoring the righteous position in its name conflict with Greece158, 
                                                 
155
 Through three rounds of main negotiations and five meetings at the experts level, i.e. 
technical negotiations. 
 
156
 In this context, only within a two years period of 2001-2002, the EU transferred 
97.70 millions euro to Macedonia.  
 
157
 The SAA was ratified by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia in April 2001 
and by the European Parliament on May 2001. The ratification process was completed 
in all the member-states of the European Union and it entered into force on 1 April 
2004. 
 
158
 Upon Macedonia’s request for EC recognition in December 1991 following its 
declaration of independence in September 1991, Greece objected mainly to its name and 
flag with the assertiton that these are signs of Macedonia’ s irredentist policies as a 
threat to Greece’ s integrity. Due to this objection, although the Badinter Commission of 
the EC recommended the recognition of Macedonia and Macedonia amended its 
Constitution and flag, Greece achieved to balock EU for recognition. In April 1993, a 
partial solution could be achieved, which provided Macedonia to join the UN under the 
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which weakened the economy of an already weak and instable post-Socialist structure 
and strengthened centralism motivated by a nation-building process, it also overlooked 
crucial factors that would soon destroy its dream of Macedonia as an island of peace in 
the region. These were mainly the increased illegal arms trade in the Kosovo-
Macedonia-Albania triangle, followed by the increasing scope of organized crime159, 
radicalization of the Albanians as their demands had been overlooked or underestimated 
both by the international community and the Macedonian government160 and the 
unsteady internal arrangements between the ethnic Macedonian majority in power and 
ethnic Albanian leadership. In the words of Schneckener (2002: 36), “measures such as 
endorsing all party negotiations on political reforms which were later introduced under 
rather difficult circumstances could have been applied much earlier.” 
  
In any case, although failed in conflict prevention capability for the emergence 
of the conflict, when compared with the previous experiences in the Balkans, EU crisis 
management has arguably improved during the 2001 crisis. In contrary to the previous 
Bosnia and Kosovo failure, this time EU responded relatively quickly with a unified 
position embodied in the position of the Secretary General High Representative 
(SC/HR).  As Nicholas Whyte pointed out (2001), rather than the pompous and 
ineffective statements issued by the Council of Ministers, ‘Europe’ was there through 
the post of Javier Solana, resembling the position of an American Secretary of State.161 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) without its flag 
flying at UN headquArticleers. The relations severed with the decision of Greece to 
impose an economic embargo in 1994. Following nearly three years period of 
negotiations, a settlement could be achieved in 1995. 
 
159
 For a detailed analysis of the role of organized crime on the instability and conflict 
prevention initiatives of the EU, see Gounev (2002). 
 
160
 Indeed a significant amount of ethnic Macedonians was going to regard the position 
of the international community mostly favoring the Albanians with a blind-eye, 
transforming force into law. As a clear example, see, Skaric (2002); ICG (2001c); 
Schenecker (2002: 33-35). For a detail account on the parties’  perceptions on the course 
of the conflict and intervention, see Norwegian Helsinki Committee Report (2003/1). 
 
161
 See, Whyte, N., \'93L’ heure de l’ Europe \endash  Enfin arriv\'e9e?\'94, in Whyte, 
N.; Arbatova, N. A. and Allin, D. H., “The Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security”, 
ESF Working Paper, no 2, July 2001. 
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Moreover, as Scheneckener underlined, for the first time Secretary General High 
Representive (SC/HR) could become active rapidly and on wide range of basis: “he 
served as a ‘trouble-shooter’, frequently traveling to the region and establishing 
contacts”, who was simultaneously supported by the mid-term and long-term 
commitments by the EU Commission (Schenecker 2002: 36).  
 
The creation of the Policy Unit as the think-thank of Solana162, together with the 
post of SC/HR could also provided him to be represented by a permanent representative 
when he could not be in Skopje. 
 
EU, at first, introduced both short-term conflict management incentives in the 
form of a package of ‘carrots’, and a long term vision of conflict prevention and peace 
building policy by the introduction of SAA in April 2001. In addition to the ‘shuttle 
diplomacy’ of Solana between Brussels and Skopje, for the first time, the EU 
Commission adopted a set of exceptional financial assistance programmes such as the 
new Rapid Reaction Mechanism which was created in February 2001 for the allocation 
of financial resources in case of emergency.163 The EU Commission also extended the 
mission of the European Agency for Reconstruction for Kosovo and Yugoslavia to 
Macedonia, beside the allocation of EuropeAid funds.  
 
In April 2001, the EU introduced the SAA accompanied by CARDS in the midst 
of the crisis. By giving the status of a potential candidate of the EU, this was used as a 
‘face-saving strategy’ towards ethnic Macedonian politicians who did not want to make 
any concessions and towards ethnic Albanians as an evidence for the EU’ s position in 
favor of a united Macedonia.  
 
                                                 
162
 By the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
163
 Adopted on 4 May 2001, the RRM worth 2.5 milion euros. Schenecker (2002) notes 
that beside EuropeAid and ECHO, for the first time the EU Commission used the new 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism for allocating financial resources, although it took a month 
for the money to arrive to Skopje. See, CARDS Assistance Programme, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002-2006, Including Multi-annual Indicative 
Programme 2002-2004, European Commission External Relations Directorate General, 
p. 20, 31.   
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While SAP offered major incentives such as funds under the CARDS 
programme and the prospect of EU membership key to a stable future, it also put 
political and economic conditions on the table, such as the establishment of regional 
cooperation, the respect for fundamental rights and the improvements in the conditions 
of ethnic minorities. However, the peace process was disrupted at the end of April 2001, 
when eight Macedonian soldiers had been killed by Albanian militants.164 
  
This forced the EU to act with the other international actors, especially with 
NATO with a more involved position. Despite the presence of spoilers particularly in 
the Macedonian side, the Solana and the NATO Secretary Robertson achieved to 
promote the establishment of a “government of national unity” on 13 May and prevent 
the declaration of a “state of war” by the Prime Minister on 6 June which would 
possibly cause further ethnic polarization within the society and make it much harder, 
even if not impossible, to keep the channels for dialogue open. (Schnecker 2002: 32-33) 
 
When it is considered that the ESDP was not declared yet operational during this 
stage of the conflict165, NATO’s presence within the conflict management processes was 
crucial as the military deterrent actor, especially when its presence in the Northern 
border of FYROM is taken into account. 
 
When the crisis entered its last stage marked by an intensified international 
mediation by EU, US and OSCE in July-August 2001, which enhanced its efforts of 
peace-making, even sometimes in the form of arbitration by proposing their own 
proposals.166 Within this structure, the EU, besides participating in this joint team by 
Francois Léotard, by itself announced significant financial aid packages for the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, mainly on the basis of SAA. (Schenecker 2002: 34) 
 
                                                 
164
 Furthermore, in contrast the previous stagecaharcterized by the fightings between the 
NLA and the Macedonian security forces, this stage was backed by civilian riots of 
ethnic Albanians. 
 
165
 The ESDP was declared operational at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. 
 
166
 The EU-US mediation team was supported by legal experts, such as Robert Badinter 
who chaired the EU Commission of experts during the wars in former Yugoslavia. the 
international team supported its proposal, a Framework Document in 7 July.   
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On 13 August 2001, under the joint mediation of the European Union -by 
Francis Léotard- and the US -by Special Envoy James Pardew, the parties concluded the 
negotiations and signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The signatories were four 
major political countries of Macedonia, namely the two Albanian parties, the 
Democratic Party of Albanians (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare/PDSH) and the Party for 
Democratic Prosperity (Partia p’r Prosperitet Demokratik/PPD), and the two 
Macedonian parties, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization- Democratic 
Party of Macedonian National Unity (Demokratska Partija na Makedonsko 
Naciolno/VMRO-DPMNE) and the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia 
(Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija/SDSM). The overall objective of the 
Agreement was declared to “(secure) the future of Macedonia’s democracy and (permit) 
the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of 
Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community.”167 Basically, the agreement provisioned 
a series of constitutional and other legislative amendments as well as measures for its 
implementation aimed at the settlement of confidence building including the 
disarmament of the NLA (Operation Harvest).168 For EU’s part, the conflict had also 
strengthened the EU’s perspective on peacekeeping to help Macedonia to recover itself 
by leaving its instability behind and reconcile the inter-ethnic accommodation. 
In this framework, the contractual relationship between the EU and Macedonia 
was based on the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement within the 
broader framework of SAA conditionality and the allocation of financial assistance in 
return. Based on this perspective, the aims of the ‘association’ were declared as:  
 
“(1) To provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue, allowing the 
development of close political relations between the parties;  
 
(2) To support the efforts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to 
develop its economic and international cooperation, also through the approximation of 
its legislation to that of Community;  
 
                                                 
167
 The English text of the Agreement is available at http://president.gov.mk 
 
168
 See, Daftary (2001a: 301-305), Daskalovski (2002: 17-27), Engström (2002: 9-19). 
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(3) To promote harmonious economic relations and develop gradually a free 
trade area between the Community and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
 
(4) To foster regional cooperation in all the fields covered by this Agreement”169 
 
The intensification of the relations was also reflected in the EU aid. While the 
EC/EU had allocated approximately a total amount of 475 million euros in the period of 
1992- 2000170, in October 2001 the EU proposed an emergency assistance with a total 
amount of 31.9 million euros, including a new RRM financial aid programme of 10.3 
million Euros aimed at the realization of the measures provisioned in the Framework 
Agreement171, beside the regular support stipulated by the CARDS programme for 
2001.172 
   
In its first annual report on SAP in 2002, main challenges for the region was 
determined by the Commission as: 
 
 (a) The challenge of building effective, democratic states, including 
fragile constitutional arrangements, weakness in applying the rule of law, 
weakness in administrative capacity, questionable standards of political 
behaviour, extreme forms of nationalism, weak civil society and media; 
(b) The challenges of tackling poverty and social deprivation 
(c) The challenges of enhancing regional cooperation.173 
 
                                                 
169
 Article 2.1 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one Part, and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia of the Other Part, Council of the European Union, 2001/0049 
(ACV), Brussels, 26 March 2001. 
 
170
 See, CARDS Assistance Programme, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
2002-2006, Including Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2002-2004, European 
Commission External Relations Directorate General, p. 69. 
 
171
 See, ibid, p. 71. 
 
172
 Ibid, p. 70. 
 
173
 The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe First Annual 
Report, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM (2002) 163 final, pp. 9-12. 
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For Macedonia, experiencing common challenges, the EU had specifically 
determined 5 basic priorities over the medium term:   
 
  (a) Maintaining peace and stability and easing inter-ethnic tensions; 
 
(b) Enhancing the efficiency of the state; 
 
(c) Alleviating poverty and developing human capital;  
 
(d) Promoting private sector growth and job creation;  
 
(e) Implementing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed with 
the European Union in April 2001.174 
 
In order to respond these challenges, in its Report on Macedonia within the first 
Annual Report on SAA Process in 2002, the EU mainly focused on four main sectors: 
Democracy and Rule of Law (inter-ethnic relations and support to civil society), 
Economic and Social Development (private and financial sector development, trade, 
local infrastructure development, social cohesion and education), Justice and Home 
Affairs (integrated border management, immigration and asylum, fight against crime) 
and Environment”,175 by allocating 41.5 million euros under the 2002 CARDS 
programme to tackle with these issues.176 The initiation of this package of ‘carrots’ was 
made conditional upon the ratification of all constitutional amendments envisaged by 
the Framework Agreement.177 
 
It specifically emphasized on:  
                                                 
174
 CARDS Assistance Programme, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002-
2006, Including Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2002-2004, European Commission 
External Relations Directorate General, p. 4. 
 
175
 Cited in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 
2003, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, pp. 7-
12. 
 
176
 In June 2002, a total amount of 3.6 million euros was re-allocated from the 2001 
CARDS Macedonia National Programme for housing reconstruction purposes. Cited in 
ibid. p. 30. 
 
177
 For instance, it postponed a donors' conference scheduled for October 15, citing 
Macedonia's delay in the implementation of the agreement. Cited in 2002 Annual Report 
of the HRW on Macedonia. 
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(a) The full implementation of the Framework Agreement of August 
2001, which was regarded as “essential to build the necessary country-wide 
political consensus and stability needed for the reform effort ahead”; 
(b) The implementation of the structural reform in economic sphere 
such as the privatization of the state-owned enterprises and sale or liquidation of 
large loss making enterprises, the regulation of banking system in accordance 
with the Interim Agreement;  
(c) The decentralization of public administration and the need for an 
action plan to cope with the weakness of the judiciary and corruption.178 
 
 
Since then the Annual Reports prepared by the Commission Staff had been the 
main instrument that determined the course of this contractual relationship including the 
allocation of the EU funds. The reports were mainly framed under three parts,:(1) the 
Political Situation, including the democracy and rule of law, human rights and 
protection of minorities, regional cooperation; (2) the Economic Situation, including the 
current economic situation, existence of free-market economy and structural reforms 
and management of public finances, and (3) the Implementation of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process, including a general evaluation, internal market and trade, sectoral 
policies and cooperation in justice and home affairs. Subsequent to the assessment of the 
general situation and specific issues regarding each title and the relevant sub-title 
including the performance based on the recommendations of the previous Annual 
Report, the Commission propose a kind of a ‘homework’ in accordance with the 
principles and priorities of the SAP by outlining further requirements for progress or 
deficiencies to be overcome, under a specific title of “priority areas needing attention in 
the next 12 months” if needed.179 
 
Regarding the protection of minorities and regional cooperation, in its second 
SAA Report in 2003, the EU had emphasized that “confidence building measures are 
starting to have an effect” while “interethnic tensions remain high”. In this regard, 
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 See, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association 
Report Executive Summary, in the Stabilisation and Association process for South East 
Europe First Annual Report, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM (2002) 163 final, (SEC 
(2002) 342) p. 22. 
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 See, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342. 
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besides calling for empathy towards minorities, the EC underlined the need for a “zero 
tolerance” in case of human rights abuses by the police and called for “higher standards 
in the application of the existing rights”, beside “relative progress” in recent months. 
Regarding regional cooperation, underlying Macedonia’s active participation, the EC 
advocated that  
 
“regional and bilateral cooperation   should continue to be seen by the 
authorities as a driving force to address common problems in a pragmatic way and 
sustain internal reforms, while supporting the country’s efforts towards further 
integration in the EU and in the NATO structures”180 
 
In the 2004 Annual Report, regarding the same issues, the EU stipulated that 
“the implementation of the Framework Agreement and confidence-building measures 
are progressively reducing ethnic tensions”, for the benefit of the whole Macedonian 
society, in the name of “strengthening of democracy and better governance”. However, 
it also underlined that “tensions have not (…) completely disappeared, and provocations 
or incidents must be kept under constant monitoring so that they do not to escalate.” 
Especially strict monitoring has been emphasized to be implemented on police 
misconduct; the establishment of “democratic and academic standards” for the third 
state university in Tetovo and the development of professional media. The EC also 
praised the Macedonian government on its active support of regional cooperation and 
the development of good neighbourhood, based on “the growing understanding of 
mutual dependency and the need to address common challenges, whether security-
related or economic, and needs of the citizens, through co-operation and 
pragmatism.”181 
 
In view of those developments, Macedonia was provided with a total amount of 
43.5 million euros through 2003 CARDS Programme and with 51 million euros through 
CARDS 2004 programme which provided a 5.5 million increase in accordance with the 
Council conclusions of 16 June 2003 particularly to be used in the sector of the 
proportional representation of non-majority ethnic minorities in the public 
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 See, ibid., pp. 7-12. 
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 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 13. 
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administration.182 Furthermore Macedonia also achieved the grants offered through the 
CARDS Regional Programme, EC macro-financial assistance, ECHO, and European 
Investment Bank and funds collected in Donor’s Meeting such as the EU-World Bank 
joint initiative in March 2002.183 
  
Following the ratification process of the SAA by all the member states in 
January 2004184, The Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia adopted a Declaration 
for the submission of an application for membership of the European Union which was 
submitted a month later. The Council of the European Union considered the application 
and asked the European Commission to prepare an opinion in May 2004.  
 
While this process was processing, The EU had formally published the 
European Partnership for the Republic of Macedonia in March 2004. Through this, the 
EC reiterated short term and medium term priorities to be respected and the relevant 
policies to be realized in accordance with the titles determined in the SAA. Regarding 
our cases, it required the Macedonian government for the short term,  
 
“to (1)185ensure the functioning of state institutions in all the territory, 
implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement,186 improve the functioning of the 
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 Cited in ibid. p. 34. 
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 For detailed account, see, ibid., pp. 34-35 and Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia Stability and Association Report 2003, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, pp. 31-32. 
 
184
 The SAA entered into force in April 2004, which was the first amon the countries 
from the SAp. 
 
185
 Under the title of “Democracy and the Rule of Law”. 
 
186
 The Macedonian Government was exclusively ordained to “Implement the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement - Implement the legislation already adopted to implement the 
Framework Agreement (FA). Adopt remaining legislation required by the FA, in 
particular adopt and implement the Laws on the  Territorial Organization, Municipal 
Finance and the City of Skopje. Achieve rapid  progress in the implementation of the 
decentralisation process to allow proper  local elections as scheduled, in particular 
strengthening the municipalities’ capacity in financial management and management of 
transferred competences and assets through training, consultancy and provision of 
equipment. In parallel, strengthen administrative capacities to supervise and facilitate 
the decentralisation process, including at central level, in particular of the Ministry of 
Local Self-Government and of the Ministry of Finance in relation to fiscal 
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public administration, strengthen the judicial system, and improve the fight 
against corruption; (2)187 Improve the respect of human rights by law enforcement 
bodies, promote freedom of expression of media, and ensure respect of minority 
rights188; and (3)189 promote regional cooperation190, ensure proper 
implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in the field of 
regional co-operation191, adopt an appropriate legal framework on cooperation 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and 
implement international agreements concluded by the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia.192 
 
These were supplemented by the medium term policies to be implemented in the 
aforementioned sectors respectively:  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
decentralization as well as the line ministries in their own areas of competence. Ensure 
that appropriate budgetary resources are allocated in order to ensure a smooth transfer of 
competencies. Adopt a medium term strategic plan for equitable representation of 
minorities, including adequate budgetary means, and ensure speedy implementation. 
Take further measures to ensure the implementation of the FA provisions on the Use of 
Language and on community symbols. Improve the monitoring and evaluation capacity 
of the central government. Enhance efforts to revitalize former crisis areas.” See, 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in 
the European Partnership with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, presented 
by the Commission, Brussels, xxx, COM (2004) yyy final, p. 6.  
 
187
 Under the title of  “Human Rigts and the Protection of Minorities”.  
 
188
 It was stated that the Macedonian Government should “Ensure that the process of 
establishing a third State University in Tetovo is completed in a way that creates 
synergy with the South East European University and provides for academic standards 
in line with the Bologna Declaration” See, Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the European Partnership with the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, presented by the Commission, Brussels, xxx, 
COM (2004) yyy final, p. 7. 
 
189
 Under the title of “Regional Cooperation and International Cooperation”. 
 
190
 Macedonian Government was ordained to “Comply with the Stabilisation and 
Association process requirements and Thessaloniki commitments in terms of regional 
cooperation. Ensure implementation of all regional free trade agreements. Pursue the 
conclusion of agreements with neighbouring countries, including on cross border 
cooperation as regards the fight against organised crime, trafficking and smuggling, 
judicial co-operation, border management, environment and energy, and ensure their 
effective implementation.  See, ibid, p. 7-8. 
 
191
 The EC stated that the Macedonian Government should “Conclude negotiations with 
Croatia on the bilateral convention on regional cooperation. See, ibid, p. 8. 
 
192
 Ibid. pp. 6-8.  
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(1) Implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement193, further improve the 
functioning of the administration, further strengthen the judicial system, and 
further improve the fight against corruption;(2) Ensure the respect of human 
rights by law enforcement bodies, further promote freedom of expression and 
media, and further promote the principle of non-discrimination and equal 
representation194; (3) Further promote regional cooperation195, and implement 
international agreements concluded by the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.196 
 
While the Macedonian government adopted its ‘Action Plan for the 
Implementation of the European Partnership for the Republic of Macedonia’ in 
September 2004, in the same month the first meeting of the Stabilisation and 
Association Council was held in Brussels, which is the highest institutional body in 
charge of the SAA implementation. 
 
 The fundamental ‘carrot’ that was used in this contractual relation was the 
programming of Community Assistance.197 Accordingly, while the follow up of the 
European Partnership is ensured through the mechanisms established under the SAP, 
particularly the Annual Reports, the Community Assistance was determined to be 
“conditional on further progress in satisfying the Copenhagen political criteria and in 
particular progress in meeting the specific priorities of this European Partnership, 
adding that “failure to respect these general conditions could lead the Council to take 
                                                 
193
 The medium term policies to be implemented were determined as to “Implement the 
strategic plan for equitable representation of minorities. Ensure the proper functioning of 
the decentralised levels of government. Sustain efforts in revitalizing former crisis 
areas.” See, ibid, p. 11. 
 
194
 The Macedonian Government was ordered to “Foster employment opportunities for 
all ethnic communities and facilitate access to education. Promote higher education for 
minorities and ensure that higher education in Albanian respects European standards as 
defined in the Bologna declaration.” See, ibid., p. 12. 
 
195
 The priorities detemined in the field of regional cooperation were to: “Maintain a 
constructive and balanced  regional policy which promotes dialogue, stability, good 
neighbourhood and co-operation. Implement the Memorandum of  Understanding of the 
South East Europe (SEE) Core Regional Transport Network. Implement the 
commitments undertaken in the framework of the 2003 Athens Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Regional Energy Market in SEE, and prepare for the 
establishment of the Integrated Regional Energy Market.” See, ibid., p. 12. 
 
196
 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
 
197
 For the programming, see, ibid. p. 15. 
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appropriate measures on the basis of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2666/2000.” It was also stated that “Community assistance shall also be subject to the 
conditions defined by the Council in its Conclusions of 29 April 1997 and 21-22 June 
1999, in particular as regards the recipients’ undertaking to carry out democratic, 
economic and institutional reforms.”198 
 
 While the EU contributed to the presence of international community in 
Macedonia for the monitoring of the security situation and implementing the relevant 
confidence building measures through its first ever Military Mission “Concordia”199 
and Police Mission “Proxima”,200 as stated in its 2004 SAA Annual Report on 
Macedonia, “development in the security situation led to the assessment that 
international military presence in the field was no longer necessary but that further 
steps were necessary before the rule of  law could be considered fully established in the 
former crisis areas.”201   
To conclude, accepting full-fledged membership in the European Union as a 
“clear and totally shared strategic interest and a consistent priority goal in the policy of 
the Republic of Macedonia” since its declaration independence202, its ‘power of 
attraction’ has been regarded by the European Union as the fundamental element of its 
“compulsory-” and “enabling impact” for the adoption of internal reforms which would 
lead the settlement of inter-ethnic accommodation in Macedonia. Furthermore, by 
                                                 
198
 See, Ibid. p. 15. 
 
199
 EU took over the mission from NATO in April 2003 and was in charge by  15 
December, when the Proxima had been launched.  
 
200
 As stipulated in the 2004 SAA Annual Report on Macedonia In order to further 
improve the security situation and stabilisation of the country, the General Affairs 
Council upon the invitation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities, 
adopted on 29 September a Joint Action establishing a European Union Police Mission. 
The Mission have been deployed since 15 December 2003 within the Ministry of 
Interior and in police stations at Tetovo, Gostivar, Kumanovo, Debar, Ohrid, Kicevo and 
Struga. See, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association 
Report 2004, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 8. 
 
201
 Ibid., p. 8. 
 
202
 Proclaimed by the Government of Macedonia in  the “National Strategy for European 
Integration of the Republic of Macedonia”, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Skopje, September 2004, p. 29. For the chronology  of the development of relations 
between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union, see  table 5. 
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stating in its first Annual Report on SAA in 2002, that “integration with the EU is only 
possible if future members can demonstrate that they are willing and able to interact 
with their neighbours as EU Member States do”203, the EU put the regional cooperation 
on the table as another fundamental element for its broader strategy of conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding for the region. In this regard while creating key 
organizations such as the Stability Pact (1999) in helping the region to further enhance 
this goal, it also aimed to facilitate the process within their own mechanisms and by 
encouraging initiatives of the region in bilateral and regional level by putting it within 
the conditionality framework of the Stability and Association Process.204  
 
 In the next part, I will assess whether and how the EU integration process 
affected these two dimensions. For the first part regarding the protection of minorities, 
the adoption and implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, as a fundamental document setting out the ‘European’ standards in 
minority protection will be analyzed. For the latter part, it will be analyzed whether and 
how the minority community and the progress in its position due to this “domestic 
Europeanization” affect the relationship between the “host-state” and the “kin-state” 
and encourage “external Europeanization (Wolff, 2003: 3). In this part, particular 
emphasis will be given on the assessment of the reference points through a secondary 
data analysis composed of the media coverage of the statements of the Macedonian 
political leaders for this envisaged bilateral and regional cooperation, namely the 
position of the national minorities and its role in setting good-neighbourhood, the 
regional dynamics and priorities and the prospect of European integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203
 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 
Executive Summary, in the Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe 
First Annual Report, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM (2002) 163 final, (SEC (2002) 342) 
p. 22. 
 
204
 See the previous chapter on “Post-1999 Period of the European Vision: the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and the Stability Pact”. 
 95 
A.3. Evaluation of the Normative Framework from the Perspective of the 
Framework Convention 
 
As the first legally binding, multilateral instrument to protect national minorities 
within the respective territories of the signatory Parties, the Framework Convention was 
opened for signature by the Council of Europe’s member States on 1 February 1995 and 
entered into force on 1 February 1998 after the required number of 12 member states 
had ratified the Convention205. As the 33rd state that signed the Framework Convention 
on 25 July 1996, Macedonia ratified the Convention on 10 April 1997 and it was entered 
into force on 1 February 1998. The first cycle of the monitoring process developed as 
follows: the first state report was submitted on 23 September 2003206; the first visit by 
the Advisors Committee (AC) was initiated during the period of 08-12 December 2003; 
on 27 May 2004 the first opinion of the AC was adopted which was published on 02 
February 2005, followed by the comment of the Macedonian state on the same day. This 
process was also accompanied by NGO parallel reports on September 1999 and March 
2001. The Committee of Ministers has not presented its Resolution yet.    
 
In addition to the initial categories of “international co-operation”, the definition 
of the term of “national minority” and general provisions, the Framework Convention 
identifies six specific objects of minority rights, namely territorial provisions, political 
participation, language, education, media/culture, and religion.207 
 
In this regard, most of the policies that brought considerable changes towards a 
more democratized society in regard with the minority rights regime envisioned in the 
Framework Convention were adopted by the Constitutional Amendments of 17 
November 2001 and other reforms in accordance with the provisions of the Framework 
Agreement, which was monitored regularly in the Annual Reports of the SAA through 
                                                 
205
 On the history and content of the Framework Convention, see Estébanez and Gál 
(1998), Troebst (1998). 
 
206
 The second state report was due to 01.02.2004. However, the Macedonian 
government has nott submitted it yet. The delay in the monitoring process should be 
taken into account in this case. For details see, 
http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/minorities 
 
207
 See, the Introduction. 
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the use of the aforementioned contractual links. The importance of the FCNM 
regarding the protection of minority rights was explicitly stated in the 2004 SAA 
Annual Report on Macedonia: “Efforts made fully to apply European standards, such as 
the implementation of the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities 
of the Council of Europe, would help to build further confidence and sense of loyalty to 
the State.”208 This process is principally under the supervision of the Commission 
Delegation and the EU Special Representative in Skopje, which was regarded to be 
“critical in supporting the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.209  
 
The following outline systematizes de jure situation of minorities, namely the 
Constitutional and other legislative provisions in accordance with the standards of the 
Framework Convention.   
 
International Cooperation (Article 1) 
  
The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia recognizes that “the 
international agreements ratified in accordance with the Constitution are part of internal 
legal order and can not be changed by law” (Article 118)210. This is extended to the 
whole judiciary process by ensuring that “courts judge on the basis of the Constitution 
and laws and international agreements ratified in accordance with the Constitution 
(Article 98). 
 
 
                                                 
208
 See, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 
2004, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 12. 
 
209
 See, ibid, p. 7. 
 
210
 In the minority rights report of Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
(1999), the relevant documents that Macedonia has ratified are cited as: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid, the Convention on Slavery, the Convention on the Status of 
Persons without Citizenship, the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the Framework Convention on the 
Protection of National Minorities and it is signatory of the Charter on Regional and 
Minority Languages. 
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Definition of minority (Article 3) 
 
While the 1991 Constitution recognized the term of “nationality” in the use of 
“national minority”, these frames were adjusted in a more democratic approach 
following the provisions of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement. Today, the term communities is 
used instead of “national minorities” and communities not in the majority instead of 
minorities211 
 
General Provisions (Articles 4, 5, 6) 
 
Article 8 of the Constitution determines “the fundamental values of the 
constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia (as) the basic freedoms and rights of 
the individual and citizen, recognized in international law and set down in the 
Constitution; equitable representation of persons belonging to all communities in public 
bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life; the free expression of national 
identity … (Article 8). The subsequent article (Article 9) ensures the equality of all the 
citizens of Macedonia. The general provisions provided for the expression and 
protection of the rights of the members of national minorities are set out in details in 
Article 48: “members of communities have a right freely to express, foster and develop 
their identity and community attributes, and to use their community symbols. The 
Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of all communities. Members of communities have the right to establish 
                                                 
211
 In Article 3 of Part III on  “Specific Comments in Respect of Article 1-19” of the 
“Opinion” of the Advisory Committee on “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”, adopted on 27 May 2004, it is noted that the instrument of ratification 
deposited on April 1997 by “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” contains the 
following declaration:  
1. The term “national minorities” used in the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities is considered to be identical to the term “nationalities” which is 
used in the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Macedonia.  
2. The provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities will be applied to the Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Roma and Serbian national 
minorities living in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia.” 
As noted above, these terms were amended by the constitutional changes provisioned by 
the Ohrid Agreement in 2001. 
The underlined part cited hereinafter are the amendments to the Constitution in 
accordance with the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement (2001). 
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institutions for culture, art, science and education, as well as scholarly and other 
associations for the expression, fostering and development of their identity. Members of 
communities have the right to instruction in their language in primary and secondary 
education, as determined by law. In schools where education is carried in another 
language, the Macedonian language is also studied. 212 The constitution also set out 
provisions for the prevention of any attempts directed towards the exercise of these 
rights (Articles 20; 54, 110).  
 
For the implementation of these rights a Committee for Inter-Community 
Relations has been established: “The Assembly shall establish a Committee for Inter-
Community Relations. The Community consists of 19 members of whom 7 members 
each are from the ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians within the Assembly, and a 
member each from among the Turks, Vlachs, Roma, Serbs and Bosnians. If one of the 
communities does not have representatives, the Public Attorney213, after consultation 
with relevant representatives of these communities, shall propose the remaining 
member of the Committee. The Assembly elects the members of the Committee. The 
Committee considers issues of inter-community relations in the Republic and makes 
appraisals and proposals for their solution. The Assembly is obliged to take into 
consideration the appraisals and proposals of the Committee and to make decisions 
regarding them. In the event of a dispute among members of the Assembly regarding 
the application of the voting procedure specified in Article 69(2), the Committee shall 
decide by a majority vote whether the procedure applies. (Article 78)214 
 
In addition to these Constitutional provisions regulating the free exercise of the 
rights of the members of national minorities, the relevant bodies of laws also ensures 
                                                 
212
 In the original form of the Constitution in 1991, the terms used are nationality, 
national attributes and the language of a nationality. 
 
213
 Identical to the role of Ombudsman. 
 
214
 The previous Committee was named as the Council of inter-ethnic relations. A more 
important amendment is its structure. In its former structure (Article 78.2), it is stated in 
the Constitution of 1991 as “The Council consists of the President of the Assembly and 
two members each from the ranks of the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and 
Romanies, as well as two members from the ranks of other nationalities in Macedonia”. 
Additionality by the Amendment XII, line 7 of Article 84, which states that the 
President of the Republic of Macedonia “proposes the members of the Council for Inter-
Ethnic Relations” had been deleted.  
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penalty in case of any breach of these rights, such as Article 137 of the Criminal Code; 
Article 9 of the 1996 Law on Telecommunication and Article 4 of the 1996 Law on 
Political Parties. 
Furthermore, according to Article 77 of the Constitution, and the subsequent 
Amendment XI to the Constitution in accordance with the Ohrid Agreement, the 
People’s Attorney (Ombudsman) has the mandate to pay special attention to the 
protection of the principles of nondiscrimination and adequate and equitable 
representation of members of communities in the organs of the state administration, 
organs of local self-government units and in public institutions and services. The 
People’s Attorney is elected by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia for a term 
of office of eight years, with the right to one reelection. The Office was granted greater 
financial independence by the Law on the Ombudsman of 10 September 2003 and 
opened its local offices in Bitola, Kumanovo, Tetıvı, Stip, Strumica and Kicevo.215 
Regarding these general provisions of minority protection, the implementation 
of the provisions ordained in Framework Agreement on the equitable representation of 
minorities in the public administration and public enterprises, use of language and 
community symbols has been among the key areas of priorities specified by the EU in 
the SAP Annual Reports 2002, 2003 and 2004 and the last Council Decision on the 
“European Partnership with the FYROM”. The Commission specifically indicated that 
the strategy adopted by the Government on 3 February which proposes “an action plan 
for the implementation of the FA, and operational programme for decentralisation and a 
draft programme for fair and equal representation of minorities in public administration 
and public enterprises”216 was a confirmation of  “governing coalition’s positive 
ambition to take the process forward at a good pace” adding that “it now needs to 
implement this speedily and effectively”217 It also underlined in the same report that the 
                                                 
215Cited in Advisory Committee on the FCNM Opinion on “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”, adopted on 27 May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)001, 
Strasbourg, 02 February 2005, Articles 35-36. 
 
216 Mainly in accordance with the Law on Civil Servants (Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Macedonia No. 59/00,59/02)  
 
217
 Advisory Committee on the FCNM Opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”, adopted on 27 May 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)001, Strasbourg, 02 
February 2005, p. 4. However, while indicating that although the recommendations in 
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Parliamentary Committee on Relations between the Communities “should play an 
important role in preventing or resolving inter-communities issues”218 
 
 However, in the 2004 SAP Report, despite initial measures taken in 
accordance with the FA and the recently adopted plan of the Government in spring 
2003, it was emphasized that “the mid-term objectives of the Government (14%) have 
not been met, except in specific sectors”, adding that “increased efforts will be needed”. 
In this regard the Commission explicitly stated that this requires a clear and a 
comprehensive strategy, which also included the critical budgetary dimension, training 
and changes in the regulations relevant to the employment in the public sector.”219    
 
 Additionally, despite some progress like the availability of identity cards in 
May 2003 either in Macedonian and Albanian languages upon request, it was 
emphasized that “the use of language(s) in the public administration and the use of 
community symbols are two other sensitive areas where further measures need to be 
adopted” such as the extension of the aforementioned implementation to all identity 
documents.220  
 
Territorial Provisions (Article 16) 
  
Articles 114 to 117 of the Constitution determine the issue of local self-
government in the Republic of Macedonia. They are granted administrative (Article 
114/1) and financial autonomy (Art 114/3). Their mandate is determined by Article 
115: “urban planning, communal activities, culture, sport, social security and child care, 
                                                                                                                                                        
2002 SAR on “(providing) the Civil Servants Agency with the means to implement civil 
service in a perspective of future integration into the EU structures, (promoting) 
transparency and ‘merit’ based organisation in the public administration and in all state 
bodies” had been basically not implemented. See, ibid. p. 13. 
 
218
 Ibid., p. 9. In accordance with the constitutional amendments ordained by the Ohrid 
Agrement, it has been established under the Article 78 of the Macedonian Constitution. 
 
219
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 5 . See also the 
part under the title of Public Administarion in the same Report, p. 6. 
 
220
 Ibid. p. 5. 
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preschool education, primary education, basic health care and other fields determined 
by law.” Besides, Skopje is determined as a “particular unit of local self-government”, 
granted administrative and fiscal autonomy (Article 117) 
  
Following the Law on Local Self-Government, adopted in 1995; the new Law 
on Local Self-Government was passed on 24 January 2002, in accordance with the 
Framework Agreement and the related Amendments to the Constitution. This process 
of decentralisation has been regarded by the EC as a “pivotal part” of the Framework 
Agreement, which “will help to strengthen democracy throughout the country and bring 
public services closer to citizens”.221 The Law regulates  
“competencies of the municipality; direct participation of the citizens in the 
decision-making; the organization and the work of the organs of the municipality; 
municipal administration; the acts of the organs; the property – ownership of the 
municipality; supervision of the work of the municipal organs; dissolution of the 
council of the municipality; mechanisms of cooperation between the 
municipalities and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia; neighbourhood 
self-government; the protection of local self-government; determining of official 
languages in the municipalities; and other issues of importance to the local self-
government.”(Article1) 
 
. Accordingly, the municipalities “may cooperate with units of local self-
government of other states, as well as international organizations of local communities, 
and may be members of international organizations of local governments.” (Art 14, 
item 4). The law also ensured the establishment of a Committee for Inter-Community 
Relations if “in the municipality in which more than 20% of the total number of 
inhabitants of the municipality determined at the last census are members of a certain 
community” (Article 55), and decide on the use of any other language as an official 
language alongside Macedonian language (Article 90). In its 2002 Stability and 
Association Report, the Commission underlined that “the changes to the Constitution in 
November 2001 and the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government in January 
                                                 
221
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 2003, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, p. 4. The 
same message was reiterated in the 2004 SAP Report by underlying that the process is 
“a key challenge the country must tackle to enhance the quality of its governance and its 
democracy”, by adding that it khas two key objectives, namely “to bring government 
closer to the people and to improve the delivery of services. See, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, pp. 6-7.   
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2002 were a positive direction”222 In its 2003 SA Report, it further emphasized that 
“fiscal decentralisation and allocation of resources, territorial division of municipalities 
and institution building will be the main elements of this process which needs to be 
largely completed by the time of the next local elections in 2004.”223 It also added that 
“partnership with citizens associations and a serious communication programme will 
help the smooth implementation of the decentralisation process.”224  
 
Subsequently, following the final results of the Census on the ethnic 
composition of the resident population225, the new “Law on Territorial Organization of 
the Local Self-Government” was prepared on 11 December 2003 and passed by the 
Parliament on 11 August 2004. This law was a part of an Operational Programme 
including three principal laws (the Law on the City of Skopje and the Law on 
Municipal Finance) co-ordinated with other reforms through an inter-ministry 
Decentralisation Working Group and a Coordinating Body of State Secretaries.226 The 
Law envisioned the reduction in the number of municipalities from 123 to 84 in 
accordance with the recommendation of the EC in 2004 SAP Report that “its success 
depends on rationalizing the size and number of municipalities in order to increase 
fiscal and managerial capacity and on transferring to the municipal level the 
                                                 
222
 The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe First Annual 
Report, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM (2002) 163 final, p. 22. 
 
223
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 2003, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, p. 4. It was 
also added that “the legislative framework which will ensure smooth implementation of 
the decentralisation process through offering the appropriate means to the central state 
bodies to manage the process, and developing the capacity of local self-government 
bodies to undertake the transferred responsibilities” has not been basically implemented 
although included in the recommendations in the 2002 SAP Report. 
 
224
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 2003, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, p. 13.  
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 The Census was published on 1 December. The final data showed that while there is 
an increase in the Albanian population both in number and in percentage of overall 
population from 22.7% to 25.17, and a decrease in the percentage of the Macedonians of 
the overall population from 66.6% -1994- to 64.18%.  See, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 4.  
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competencies listed in Article 22 of the Law on Local Self-Government”227. Its 
importance for the stability of Macedonia and in its pace within the process of 
European integration has also repeatedly expressed by Macedonian top officials. For 
instance, in his interview with the Macedonian TV MTV 1, President Branko 
Crvenkovski stated that he “supported the territorial organization law ... not because 
this is an ideal solution” adding that  
“the reason why this is important is that the Framework Agreement sets out 
that a new territorial organization law must be adopted by revising the existing 
municipal boundaries. Second, this law must be adopted using what is known as 
the Badinter majority. In other words, in addition to the general, that is, regular 
procedure for adopting a law, the majority of non-Macedonian Assembly deputies 
must vote for it. So the Framework Agreement stipulates that a consensus on the 
issue is needed.” 
 
The president further remarked that  
“Macedonia does not have time to lose. It will be catastrophic for us if 
Macedonia spends the next six months, a year or even two standing in one place 
and arguing on the territorial organization. Somebody may not like what I am 
going to say, and this may be met with serious criticism, but I fear that while 
trying to save Struga's municipal boundary, Macedonia’s European future will slip 
through our fingers.”228   
 
By this arrangement, the minorities achieved the opportunity to establish 
majority populations in several municipalities, so that they could achieve higher levels 
of self-government capabilities. However, although the EC underlined that “the 
rationalization and the transfer of competencies should take place so that the new 
decentralised set-up can begin to function on 1 January 2005”229, the referendum held 
for it on November 2004 failed as the majority of the citizens abstained from voting. 
According to the State Election Commission, the voter turnout equaled 26.24 %.230 It is 
important that although the EC emphasized the procedural arrangements and its 
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 Ibid, p. 7. 
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 Reported by MTV 1 Skopje on September 08, 2004, avavilable at 
http://www.csses.net.  
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 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 7. 
 
230
 Cited in http://www.ifes.org.mk/EN/latest.asp. For detailed information, see also 
http://www.makedonija.com/mic/vesti.php?pn=view&seite=15  
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implementation process231 the progress has been impeded by the citizens’ 
unwillingness.232    
Political Participation (Articles 7, 17) 
    
The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia guarantees its citizens “the 
freedom of association to exercise and protect their political, economic, social, cultural 
and other rights and convictions. Citizens may freely establish associations of citizens 
and political parties, join them or resign from them. (Article 20). The citizens are also 
granted “the right to assemble peacefully and to express public protest without prior 
announcement or a special license. The exercise of this right may be restricted only 
during a state of emergency or war.” (Article 21)   
 
Language (Articles 10, 11) 
 
Although the Constitution recognizes the Macedonian language as the official 
language of the Republic of Macedonia, it also guarantees the recognition of any other 
language spoken by at least 20 per cent of the population as an official language along 
with Macedonian (Article 7) The same law also provides the applicability of this 
principle to the units of local self-government.  
 
 The exercise of this right in specific circumstances is determined by the 
relevant laws, i.e.1995 Law on Local Self-Government (Article 89)233; The 1995 Law 
                                                 
231
 It was emphasized by the EC that the “progress is now dependent on effective co-
ordination within the central government, parliamentary approval of the required 
legislative acts, training of the municipal administrations and clarification of the 
situation with regard to municipal debt.”. 
 
232
 In fact this was its second rejection by the citizens. Before that formal referendum, 
by claiming that this law is “a threat to Macedonia’s survival”, The opposition block, 
composed of political parties, civic associations and individuals, called on Macedonian 
citizens to support an initiative for referendum on annulling the territorial organization 
law. See, MIA news agency, 13 August 2004, http://www.csees.net 
 
233
 This Article proposes that in areas where there are nationalities, and where the latter 
are either the “majority” (50 percent of the population according to the last population 
census) or are in “considerable numbers” (20 percent of the population), “besides the 
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on the Personal Names (Article 9); 1995 Law on Identity Cards (Article 5); the Law on 
Registries of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Article9). 
 
However, although The Law on the Criminal Procedure and the Law on the 
Lawsuit Procedure proposed that those involved in the procedures are guaranteed the 
use of their mother tongue, and the state authorities are obliged to ensure translation 
during the procedures (Ortakovski 1998:349; Koinova 2002), With the 1997 changes of 
the Law on the Criminal Procedure, the official language in court became Macedonian 
(Najcevska, 2000).234 
 
In addition to that, sometimes problems occur at the Parliamentary level. For 
instance, although Albanian has been in use in Parliamentary session since its 
constitution on 3 October 2002235, the refusal by some opposition members to chair the 
committees of which they are in charge in the Macedonian language has been hindering 
their regular works for more than a year.236 
 
Education (Articles 12, 13, 14) 
 
Article 48 of the Constitution guarantees that “members of communities have a 
right freely to express, foster and develop their identity and community attributes, and 
to use their community symbols” beside their right to “establish institutions for culture, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet, the language and the alphabet of the 
nationality” shall be in use”. Cited in MHC, 1999. See also Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 5. 
 
234
 During the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, all documents of communication with 
the courts could be written in the minority languages. (Koinova 2002) In late 1998, the 
Macedonian Constitutional Court ruled that court decisions should be only in 
Macedonian, thus overruled past practice (Nessimi 2000; cited in Koinova 2002). 
 
235
 Cited in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 
2003, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, p. 3. 
 
236
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 6.  
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art, science and education, as well as scholarly and other associations for the 
expression, fostering and development of their identity”237  
 
The relevant laws of education such as Article 8 and 81 of the 1995 Law on 
Primary Education and Art 7 of the 1995 Law on Secondary Education set the details of 
the exercise of these rights. For instance, Article 8 of the specifies that the education and 
instruction for persons belonging to nationalities is carried out in their language. In 
Article 81 of the same law, it is proposed that (1) The pedagogical documents and 
records are being written and issued in Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet, 
(2) For pupils who attend the instruction in one of the languages of nationalities, the 
pedagogical documents and records are registered and issued both in the Macedonian 
language and its Cyrillic alphabet and in the language and alphabet of the nationality, 
while the pedagogical evidence is written in the language and alphabet in which the 
instruction is being carried out. 
 
By the Education Law of July 2000, higher education is allowed in other than the 
Macedonian language only in private universities in Macedonia. In these private 
institutions, instruction is provided in a “world-language” or the language of the 
nationalities, while Macedonian is also studied. Furthermore, education in Macedonian 
is to be provided for at least two additional educational subjects (Article 95, Law on 
Higher Education, Georgieva, 2000; cf. Koinova, 2002).238 In addition to that, the law 
allows the instruction of “didactic-methodic subjects” in the languages of the 
nationalities in a special pedagogy center affiliated with the pedagogical faculty of 
Skopje University for the training of secondary school teachers. A third new moment is 
that Article 198 opens the possibility for the people, involved in civic initiatives, to take 
part in state education (Georgieva, 2000, Article 95 of the Law on Higher Education, 
July 2000; cf. Koinova, 2002). This implicitly gives the students of the private 
                                                 
237
 The law explicitly states that “Members of communities have the right to instruction 
in their language in primary and secondary education, as determined by law. In schools 
where education is carried in another language, the Macedonian language is also 
studied” In the original form of the Constitution in 1991, the terms used are nationality, 
national attributes and the language of a nationality. 
 
238
 However, even before the adoption of this law, the three faculties of the Skopje -
state- University, namely, the pedagogical, linguistic and drama faculties instructed in 
the mother tongue of the nationalities. 
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Albanian-language239 Tetovo to take state exams, and accordingly validate their 
unrecognized academic status. Especially following its re-establishment based on the 
proposals of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to a university with 
three-language education, it has been also recorded by the EC that “its continuous 
development and wide impact across various communities has confirmed it as a viable, 
forward looking, and academically sound educational institution.”240  
 
Culture and Media (Article 9) 
 
Article 16 of the Macedonian Constitution guarantees “the freedom of speech, 
public address public information and the establishments of institutions for public 
information” (Article 16/2)It also guarantees free access to information, freedom to 
receive and impart information (Art 16/3). Additionally, by the Article 48 members of 
the communities are guaranteed “the right freely to express, foster and develop their 
identity and attributes of their communities and use symbols of their communities” are 
guaranteed. (Art 48/1)  
 
Furthermore, the “Law on Broadcasting” determines the conditions of 
broadcasting activities. In Article 45, paragraph 2 of the Law orders the public 
broadcasting company, the Macedonian Radio and Television to broadcast programs in 
the languages of communities beside Macedonian language.  Paragraph 3 of the same 
Article of the Law on Broadcasting foresees that in the areas where members of 
communities constitute a majority or a significant number, the local public broadcasting 
company must broadcast programs in the language of that respective community. The 
subsequent paragraph accepts the same right exercised by commercial broadcasting 
organizations.  
                                                 
239
 Which was declared to be illegal by the Macedonian authorities until February 2004 
subsequent to its modification in accordance with the model faciliateted by OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities. 
 
240
 Cited in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association 
Report 2004, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 12. 
As stated in the same report, “at the end of the four year cycle (in 2004), Albanian 
students will represent over 14% of all higher education students in the country”, while 
their percentage was 4.8% for 2000/2001. See, Ibid., p. 12. 
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Under Article 6, paragraph 1 , subparagraph 1 of the Law on the Establishment 
of the Public Company Macedonian Radio Television (2000), the public company 
Macedonian Radio and Television is obliged to produce and broadcast radio and TV 
programs within the framework of the guaranteed freedoms and rights of the individual 
and citizen in respect of informative, educational, cultural, scientific, sport, musical, 
entertaining and other contents in the languages of nationalities, that is to say 
communities living in the Republic of Macedonia.  
   
Religion (Article 8) 
 
The constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia guarantees the freedom 
of religious confession and accordingly its expression “publicly, individually or with 
others” by its Article 19. The same article also specifies some religious communities in 
Macedonia and determines the rights granted to them and emphasizes on the separation 
of religious communities and the state: 
 “The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious 
Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, 
the Jewish Community and other Religious communities and groups are separate 
from the state and equal before the law. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as 
well as the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, 
Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish Community and other Religious 
communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and 
charitable institutions by way of a procedure regulated by law.”241   
  
Furthermore, the Law on the Religious Communities and Groups (July 16, 
1997) supports the principles established in the 1991 Constitution. In Article 8, the 
Muslim denomination is defined as one of the recognized “religious communities,” i.e. 
“voluntarily organized non-profit communities of adherents of the same religion,” equal 
in status to the Catholic and the Macedonian Orthodox church (IHF, 1998; cited in 
Kaikovski, 2002).   
  
 
                                                 
241
 In the previos form of the Constitution in 1991, only the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church is explicitly mentioned, the rest are expressed under the statement of  “other 
religious communities and groups.” 
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A. 4. Factual Situation on the Exercise of National Minority Rights 
 
 Despite the existence of small scale tensions and problems, especially 
following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the democratization process 
has brought a considerable relaxation in Macedonia with regard to inter-ethnic relations 
when compared with the period of 1991-2001. In this section, examination of the 
implementation of minority rights standards will be evaluated by drawing on the reports 
of the three international human rights organization, namely the Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch and the International Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia, particularly between 2001 
and 2005.     
 
 Prior to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the SAA in 2001, 
the main concerns relating to the protection of the rights of ethnic Albanians were cited 
as242: 
 
- Provisions of the Constitution (IHF 1997) 
 
- Lack of citizenship rights due to the 1992 Citizenship Law, which remained 
large number of ethnic Albanians, Turks and Roma stateless (IHF 1997, IHF 1999, IHF 
2000, HRW 2001, IHF 2001)   
 
-Lack of proportionate employment in public sector, especially in police force 
(IHF 1997, IHF 1999, HRW 2001): 
 
- Access to Albanian-language education and the broader framework of 
education policy, particularly the establishment of private secondary schools, the 
recognition of the private Albanian-language Tetovo University founded in February 
1995, the language of instruction at the Pedagogical Faculty of St. Cyril and Methodius 
University in Skopje in 1996, treatment of Albanian instructors, and the delayed law on 
                                                 
242
 According to the 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 Annual Reports of the 
International Helsinki Federation; 1999, 2000 and 2001 Annual Reports of Human 
Rights Watch; and the 2001 Annual Report on Amnesty International. For the main 
points of disputes, see also pp. 39-41. 
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higher education (IHF 1997, IHF 1998, HRW 1999, IHF 1999, IHF 2000, HRW 2000, 
HRW 2001, IHF 2001) 
 
- The position of the Orthodox Church vis a vis the state and the relevant issue 
of religious freedom, particularly issue relevant to the 1997 Law on Religious 
Communities and Groups, which favored the “traditional” religions over the other 
minor religious believers under the category of “religious group” (IHF 1998, IHF 1999, 
IHF 2000, HRW 2000, IHF 2001) 
 
- Irregularities during the election processes, particularly regarding the 
composition of the electoral commissions, district gerrymandering and inadequate state 
funding for voter education (HRW 1999; IHF 1999, HRW 2001, IHF 2001). The 
irregularities also included administrative measures towards the media critical of the 
government (AI 2001; HRW 2001)  
 
- Biased media coverage of inter-ethnic relations (IHF 1999; IHF 2000, IHF 
2001) 
 
- In sufficient presentation of cultural identities through media channels, and 
banning of press and confiscating the licence of Albanian language stations, i.e. the 
temporary shut-down of the Tirana based daily newspaper Bota Sot, which is critical of 
the Albanian party in the coalition and the case of TV-Koha in Tetovo and TV-2 in 
Gostivar, losing their licence (IHF 1997, IHF 1999, AI 2001, HRW 2001).   
 
- Use of minority languages in communication with the administrative and legal 
authorities, and the use of bilingual names of locations in the municipalities with a 
significant minority population (IHF 2000): 
 
- The status and location of refugees following the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (HRW 
1999, HRW 2000, IHF 2000, IHF 2001) 
 
- Human rights violations by the Police forces, particularly following the flag 
raising event in July 1997 in Gostivar and Tetovo where more than 200 people injured; 
and the killing of three police officers outside the Albanian village of Aracinovo on 
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January 11, 2000 (IHF 1998, IHF 1999, AI 2001). Besides, crossing the ethnic 
boundaries, illegal behaviors of the police such as use of excessive force, conducting 
“informative talks” or holding suspects more than twenty-four hours allowed by the law 
are also cited nearly all the reports of the international organizations (IHF 1997, IHF 
1998, HRW 1999, IHF 1999, IHF 2000, IHF 2001, HRW 2000; AI 2001, HRW 2001)  
 
In 2001, the inter-ethnic tension that has existed in Macedonia since the 
independence, which was evidently reflected in the aforementioned reports of the main 
international NGOs, escalated into open armed conflict. During 6 months of fighting 
between the ethnic Albanian armed groups, namely the NLA and the Macedonian 
security forces Pax-Macedonia was significantly upset.  
 
In the course of the six-months fighting human rights violations became more 
frequent, both committed by the NLA and the Macedonian forces including 
government forces and paramilitary groups such as the Lions, Tigers and the Red Berets 
(AI 2002, HRW 2002). Implementation of the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement 
brought considerable changes to the socio-political conditions of Macedonia. These can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
-By the implementation of the proposed amendments to the Constitution by the 
Ohrid Agreement, Albanian language was recognized as an official language243 (HRW 
2003), following the guarantee of proportional access for national minorities to the 
aforementioned structures of public sector; according to the Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee, during the three years since the Ohrid Agreement was signed, there has 
been an 80% increase in the employment of minorities, which provided the ethnic 
Albanians a closer level of representation to their share of the country’s population 
(HRW 2004); as one of the main controversies since several years, the Albanian- 
                                                 
243
 The Framework Agreement proposes that in areas where more than 20% of the 
population speak it as their mother language, Albanian has to be recognized as an 
official language. In addition to Macedonian, Albanian is an official langue in 34 
municipalities, Turkish in 5 municipalities, and Romany and Serbian in one 
municipality each (Source: Ministry of Local Self-Government;cf. fn. 7 in the Opinion 
of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities). Relevant items propose use of Albanian language in communication with 
administrative units.   
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language private Tetovo University eventually has been recognized in February 2004 
(HRW 2004); following the introduction of the Law on Local Self-Government on 24 
January 2002, by the introduction of redistricting plan under the Territorial 
Organization Act on August 11, 2004, the last package of the provisions of the Ohrid 
Agreement, the powers of the administrative districts were increased and their numbers 
were proposed to be decreased from 123 to 76 in 2008244, which decentralized the 
country and increased the number of the local districts where Albanian would be used 
as an official language and representation of a large number of ethnic Albanians in 
local governments (HRW 2004). Within the broader legal framework, the ethnic 
Albanians were also provided with a legal power on the issues regarding national 
minorities, of which the Ohrid Agreement required not just the majority of all 
parliamentary disputes, but also the majority of all deputies representing national 
minorities for such a law to be adopted (HRW 2004). 
 
- On August 2002, the national television channel MTV opened a multi-ethnic 
channel, of which nine hours of the total 12 hours of daily programming were in 
Albanian language (IHF 2003) 
 
- Following a Presidential pardon by Trajkovski on December 2001(AI 2002), 
in March 2002 an amnesty law was introduced for former NLA combatants who had 
not committed war crimes and voluntarily laid down their arms by 26 September 2002. 
This was regarded as by the international community as crucial for reconciliation and 
inter-ethnic peace (AI 2003, HRW 2003). This was followed by the disarmament of 
NLA under the NATO operation of “Task Force Harvest”. NATO declared that through 
the operation 483 machine guns and 3210 assault rifles in addition to tanks/APCs 
weapon systems mines, explosives, and ammunition were collected245.  
 
- The general elections in September 2002 resulted in the new “Together for 
Macedonia” coalition led by Branko Crvenkovski of the Social Democratic Union 
                                                 
244
 See the the previous section on the legal situation regarding territorial provisions. 
 
245
 RFE/RL NewsLine 26 September 2001. Keesing’s, September 2001 – Macedonia. 
Completion of NATO weapons collection operation – New NATO operation. Available 
at http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/. Cited 
in Eldgridge (2002: 67). 
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(Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija/SDSM) with the recently established ethnic 
Albanian party, Democratic Union for Integration (Demokratska Unija za 
Integracija/DUI), led by the former Albanian rebel leader Ali Ahmeti246 replaced the 
former VMRO-DPMNE and PDSH coalition.  
 
However, beside these developments the same period also witnessed challenges 
for the democratic process proposed by the Ohrid Agreement such as: 
- The establishment of the mono-ethnic special police unit of the Lions, which 
allegedly included many former criminals (IHF 2002) and the continuing police 
violence mainly backed up by the argument of fighting against extremist and terrorist 
groups.(IHF 2002, HRW 2004)247. Police abuse and human rights violations has been 
an issue of crossing all ethnic boundaries (AI 2002, AI 2003, AI 2004, HRW 2004, IHF 
2002, IHF 2003)   
 
- Declaration of St. Dimitrija as the patron-saint by the Ministry of Interior (IHF 
2002) 
 
- Incidents of biased, one-sided media coverage favoring ethnic prejudices and 
hate speeches during the inter-ethnic conflicts (IHF 2002, IHF 2003) 
 
- The government’s pressure on the ethnic Albanian media, i.e. tapping of the 
Albanian-language newspaper Fakti’s telephones. (HRW 2003, IHF 2002).  
 
- The disintegration of ethnically mixed schools. After the ethnic Albanian 
community demanded that the names of the schools their children attended to be 
changed to reflect Albanian culture and its well-known people and placed Albanian 
symbols in front of many schools, inter-ethnic tensions escalated into violent conflicts 
in 2002 and 2003, which led a vicious cycle of retaliation among ethnic Albanians and 
                                                 
246
 The coalition took 40.4 % of the vote, where DUI won the greatest portion of ethnic 
Albanian vote. See, HRW 2003 Annual Report.  
 
247
 One of the most serious incidents occurred in August 2002. Following the attack of 
the Macedonian police on the ethnic Albanian village Ljuboten, ten civilians died and 
more than 100 were arrested, amny of whom were severely beaten in police custody. For 
details, see, IHF 2002.  
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Macedonians such as the cases of Matin Adili and Vanco Josifovski in 2002 and  
Arsenie Jovkov and Bitola cases in 2003  (IHF 2003, IHF 2004) 
 
- Irregularities during the 2002 elections (IHF 2003)          
Today, in addition to the obligations required under the Framework Convention, 
the basic framework of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in relation to the 
protection of the rights of national minorities is the full implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement in the legal and factual framework, what is one of the highest 
political priority goals and tasks of the Government on the way of EU integration. 
In this respect, in its opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” 
at its 19th meeting on 27 May 2004, the Advisory Committee (AC) on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities welcomed “the fact that the 
constitutional and legislative changes made so far, in accordance with the Ohrid 
Agreement, lay the foundations for greater protection for minorities, inter alia, in such 
fields as the use of minority languages, education and participation, with the 
introduction of the principle of equitable representation for minorities at all levels of 
public administration.”248 However, underlying that “the fostering of mutual 
understanding and intercultural dialogue remains vital to the future of social cohesion in 
the country, which has been adversely affected by the armed conflict of 2001” the AC 
indicates in its opinion that “the interethnic tensions observed, particularly in the 
younger population groups, continue to give cause for great concern and bear witness to 
the existence of significant barriers between the different communities, and particularly 
between Albanians and Macedonians”, adding that “additional efforts should be made to 
encourage interaction between the different components of society, particularly in the 
sphere of education, where individuals’ knowledge of the languages spoken in their 
region could be promoted.”249 The same anxiety has also been highlighted by the EC 
through its SAP Reports. In its 2003 Report, noting the existence of “a few ethnically-
                                                 
248
 Cited in the Executive Summary of the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Conventıon for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on “The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, adopted On 27 May 2004.  Strasbourg, 02 February 
2005.  
249
 Ibid. Concluding Remarks, item 152. 
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motivated incidents have taken place”, it stated that although “a responsible attitude has 
been shown so far by public authorities (…) the potential for such incidents to escalate 
clearly remains. Polarisation of young people along ethnic lines is a serious concern and 
needs to be addressed on both sides of the ethnic divide”250 In this regard by referring to 
the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Relations between the 
Communities, the EC explicitly stated that “further measures to build confidence and 
promote dialogue between communities will be vital to support on-going political 
process and reinforce the de facto cooperation which often, at the local level, allows 
daily public affairs to be conducted.”251 For instance, both in its 2003 and 2004 SAP 
Reports, it was stated that religious dialogue between Communities can usefully 
contribute to the relaxation of existing cultural and inter-ethnic tensions.252 
Although state report was submitted by the Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia on 23 September 2003253 (due on February 1, 1999), the AC points out that 
“this report contains detailed information on existing legislation together with more 
limited information on relevant practice”, besides, it is argued that “the armed conflict 
of 2001 and its consequences are not fully reflected in the State Report”254, of whose 
effects are “still being felt in society and are making implementation of the Framework 
Convention more complicated”.255  
In this context, although a steady progress can be observed in the Macedonian 
citizens’ support on the Ohrid Agreement (see, Table 5), support for the Constitutional 
                                                 
250
 2003 Sap Report, p. 9. However, a similar statement had also been declared in 2004 
SAP Report due to “incidents and protests with racist connotations at the reopening of 
schools”. The EC warned that “over-politicing the education issue may well put at risk 
progress in a key area for the future of the country”. See, ibid. p. 12.   
 
251
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 2003, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, p. 10. 
 
252
 See, ibid, p. 9, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and 
Association Report 2004, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 
373, p. 12.  
 
253
 Due February 1, 1999. 
 
254
 Ibid. General Remarks, item 6.  
 
255
 Ibid. General Remarks, item 10. 
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amendments provisioned in it such as the law on territorial division256, equitable 
representation (see, table 6) represents fluctuations, which are generally opposed more 
than half of the ethnic Macedonian population. For instance, On October 2004, Albanian 
daily in Macedonia, Fakti reported that the latest opinion poll indicated that over 50 % 
of the Macedonian population opposed the law on territorial divison257, One year before, 
in its Early Warning on Macedonia, the UNDP experts reported that 63.1% of the ethnic 
Macedonians somewhat oppose the process, while only 17.6 % somewhat accept it. The 
same figures for ethnic Albanians were 34.2 % and 39.8 % for ethnic Albanians 
respectively (UNDP 2003: 69, 73) In a more recent opinion poll conducted by the 
International Republican Institute in Macedonia in May 2005, it was reported that 62 % 
of the citizens back decentralization process, considering it as a very significant 
prerequisite of accession to the EU. In that survey, 47 % of the Macedonian citizens 
stated that they are not satisfied with the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
256
 Reported by MIA state news agency, May 23, 2005, Available at 
http://www.csees.net. However, it must be taken into consideration that these results 
reflects total percentages reflecting both the Macedonian and Albanian approach. 
 
257
 Fakti, October 7, 2004. available at http://www.csses.net 
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Table 5: Approaches on Ohrid Framework Agreement 
Sources: US Government Opinion Poll, October 2001, BCR No.250, 25 May 
2001; cf. IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 341258; US Government Opinion Poll, June 
07, 2002, cf. IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 341; UNDP Macedonia Early Warning 
Report No.1, January 2003, p. 44; Report from 24 June 2003, A1 TV, Skopje; Opinion 
Poll by the US International Democratic Institute, 3-9 September 2003, reported by A1 
TV, Skopje; Opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in 
Macedonia at the end of 2004, Reported by the HINA news agency, Zagreb, January 13, 
2005. 
 
Support Oppose 
Date Ethnic 
Macedonians 
Ethnic 
Albanians 
Ethnic 
Macedon
ians 
Ethnic 
Albani
ans 
Oct. 
2001 
44 % No data 56 % No data 
June 
2002 
37% 90% 63% 10% 
Jan. 
2003 
38% 91,6 % 55.1% 2.8% 
June 
2003 
53% 53% 40% 40% 
Sept. 
2003 
55% 55% 40% 40% 
Jan. 
2005 
57% 57% 38% 38% 
 
 
 
                                                 
258
 This data and the subsequent data is available at http://www.csses.net 
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Table 6. Attitudes of Macedonian citizens on equitable representation of ethnic 
communities 
Sources: UNDP Macedonia Early Warning Report No.1, January 2003, pp. 69, 
73; UNDP Macedonia Early Warning Report, No.2, March 2005, p. 50; UNDP Early 
Warning Report on Macedonia, No.3, June 2005, p. 64. 
 
Opinion Macedonians Albanians Others 
 January 
2003 
March 
2005 
June 
2005 
January 
2003 
March 
2005 
June 
2005 
January 
2003 
March 
2005 
June 
2005 
Strongly 
disagree 
24.6% 36.0% 35.4% 14.3% 0 0.9% X 26.2% 5.6% 
Somewhat 
disagree 
37.3% 20.6% 23.0% 12% 0 2.1% X 14.% 13.9% 
Somewhat 
agree 
16.0% 28.5% 27.9% 16.7% 10.2% 17.5% X 21.5% 25.0% 
Strongly 
agree 
4.3% 30.3% 10.3% 30.3% 85.5% 75.6% X 37.4% 49.1% 
  
While these results of the opinion polls reflect the Macedonian resentment, the 
tensions are particularly experienced at the societal level, although relaxed when 
considered with the early 2000s. In this context, despite the amendments of the legal 
framework and the relevant policies, the recent polls highlights how inter-ethnic 
relations are still unstable and peoples have the tendency for not to trust “the other”. For 
instance, in May 2001 the percentage of Albanians favouring of an ethnically mixed 
Macedonia was 71 %, this reduced to 61 % in October 2001, and to only 39 per cent in 
June 2002259. What is interesting was that members of other national minority groups 
reconcile more with Macedonian rather then Albanians260 (see Table 8).  
                                                 
259
 Cited in US Government Opinion Poll, June 07, 2002, See, IWPR Balkan Crisis 
Report No. 341, Available at http://www.csees.net. The results are more moderate when 
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Table 7. Living with ‘the Other’261 
Sources: US Government Opinion Poll, October 2001, BCR No.250, 25 May 
2001; US Government Opinion Poll, June 07, 2002, cf. IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 
341; UNDP 2003 Macedonia Early Warning Report, No.1, pp. 70-71. 
 Marriage 
with a 
Mac. 
Marriage 
with an Alb. 
Having a 
Mac. friend 
Having an 
Alb. Friend 
Sharing 
village, 
street, block 
with a Mac.  
Sharing 
village, 
street, block 
with an Alb. 
May 
2001 
82%  87%  25 %  45%  No data No data 
June 
2002 
91%  95 %  61%  52 %  No data No data 
Jan. 
2003 
95.3% 84.9% 35.8% 37.1% 39.1% 47.2% 
                                                                                                                                                        
it is a temporary meeting with the other when compared with the ones in table 10. For 
instance, In May 2001 14 % of the Albanians state that they would not go to shoping 
from a shop owned by a Macedonian, while 40% of the Macedonian states the same for 
an Albanian. These were reduced to 35% for Albanians, and 52 % for Macedonians 
respectively. The other results were: 33.5 % of the Macedonians, 23.1% of the 
Albanians do not accepting to share the work place with ‘the Other’; 41.7% of the 
Macedonians, 31.9% of the Albanians rejecting to make business, and 15.8% of the 
Macedonians and 83.6% of the Albanians states that he/she would not vote for a 
candidate who is a member of the other national group. This also reflects how the 
approach has been politicized for the ethnic Albanian population. For the results see, US 
Government Opinion Poll, June 07, 2002, See, IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 341, 
Available at http://www.csees.net, and UNDP (2003). 
 
260
 One of the reasons for this can be the fact that they already enjoyed the rights given 
to national minorities, beside the fact the rebel of the ethnic Albanians has transformed 
the political framework in the country to a platform of the struggle of two ‘majority’ 
nationalism, which furthjer marginalized their position in the political and 
administrative structures. For a critics of the Ohrid Framework Agreement from thjis 
point of view, see, Engström 2002. This fact reveals itself when the question is on 
whether a member of another national minority would vote for a Macedonian or an 
Albanian. 96. 2 % completely or somewhat agree to vote for a Macedonian candidate, 
while this is only 26.4 % for an Albanian candidate. See, UNDP (2001: 70). 
 
261
 The ratios indicate those who gives a negative response to the aforementioned 
questions. 
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Table 8. Living with a Macedonian or an Albanian? 
Source: UNDP 2001 Macedonia Early Warning Report, No.1, pp. 70-71. 
 
 Get married  Having a/an Share village, street, 
block 
 with a 
Macedonian 
with an 
Albanian 
Macedonian 
friend 
Albanian 
friend 
with a 
Macedonian 
with an 
Albanian 
1 64.2 % 18.9 % 88.7 % 50.9 % 94.3 % 58.5 % 
2 17.0 % 9.4 % 9.4 % 26.4 % 3.8 % 15.1 % 
3 3.8 % 7.5 % - 9.4 % - 5.7 % 
4 13.2 % 64.2 % 1.9 % 13.2 % 1.9 % 20.8 % 
 
1- Completely agree, 2- somewhat agree, 3- somewhat disagree, 4- completely 
disagree 
These results have also been supported by the poll of Gallup in 2003, indicating 
that 85% of the Macedonians interviewed agree with the approach that sees minorities 
as a threat.262 These results stipulate that the situation has been still fragile within the 
first years of the implementation process, although it has been presented as a success 
story for both the EU and Macedonia. The 2005 Early Warning Report on UNDP on 
Macedonia revealed that despite the policies of the government, inter-ethnic 
reconciliation can not be observed in the realm of society, which is the fundamental 
requirement for a stable multi-ethnic Macedonia. (2005a: 25) Accordingly, over 54% of 
the ethnic Macedonians perceive interethnic relations as very bad or a bit better than 
that. The same attitude is presented by 23 % of the ethnic Albanians.263 (UNDP 2005a: 
                                                 
262
 Macedonia 2003, Gallup IBEU Project, cited in Mungiu-Pippidi, p. 11. 
 
263
 What is more interesting is the fact that, in March 2005 while 88.6 % of ethnic 
Macedonians of those interviewed stated that he/she “like Macedonia”, that was only 9.7 
% for ethnic Albanians while it was 81.5 % for other persons belonging to a national 
minority group other than Albanians. The percentages of those who stated as “I do not 
know this song” were 8.7 % for ethnic Macedonians, 60.2 % for ethnic Albanians, and 
12.0% for members of other national minority groups. See, UNDP (2005a: 51).  
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50). While the Early Warning Report of the UNDP in June 2005 reported that it was 
reduced to 41.8 % for ethnic Macedonians, it increased to 25 % for the Albanians 
(2005b: 63) (See, figure 2) Further more, Macedonia is the country with the greatest 
ratio that the people feel that their country is still under the threat of armed conflict. 
(See, Fig. 3) 
 
Figure 1: Inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia in March 2005 
Source: UNDP (2005a: 25). 
 
 
  
 
 Figure 2: Inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia in June 2005 
 Source: UNDP 2005b: 30. 
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Figure 3: Opinion on the Probability of Armed Conflict   
Source: International Commission on the Balkans (2005). The Balkans in 
Europe’s Future, p. 46, fig. 9. 
 
 
 In this context, the Advisory Committee on FCNM recommends that “the 
authorities should resolutely pursue the reforms begun in relation to the protection of 
minorities (…) so that the existing legal framework is completed and consolidated.”264 
Therefore, further measures that are recommended to be taken by the government are 
the issues of instruction in minority languages and providing qualified teachers for 
teaching265, facilitating contacts between pupils and teachers of different communities 
and thus functioning of ethnically mixed societies266; reviewing the prohibition on 
establishing private education267; promoting access to the media for persons belonging 
to national minorities268; relaxation of requirements for citizenship such as having a 
                                                 
264
 Concluding Remarks, item 151.  
  
265
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 12, item 77; and 
Article 14, items 88, 89, 90, 91and 92; IV. Main Findings and Comments of the 
Advisory Committee, In Respect of Article 12, items 136 and 137, Article 14, items 141 
and 142. 
 
266
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 12, items 74 and 
75; and  IV. Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect of 
Article 12, item 134. 
 
267
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19,  Article 13, items 85, 86; 
IV. Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect of Article 13, 
items 140; and Concluding Remarks, item 153. 
 
268
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 9, item 65; IV. 
Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect of Article 9, item 
129; and Concluding Remarks, item 155. 
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permanent source of income, proof of legal residence, and the requisite identity 
papers269; monitoring and fully investigating cases of violence and ill-treatment inflicted 
on persons belonging to minorities by the law enforcement officials and police270; 
continuing to promote participation in public administration, i.e. judiciary where there is 
considerable under-representation271; the conclusion of decentralization process272; 
generally the authorities are recommended to guarantee non-discrimination towards 
numerically smaller minorities, particularly Roma273 and Vlachs274.  
 
Similar anxieties are also reflected in the IHF Report on the human rights 
situation in Macedonia in 2004 such as the continuing human rights violations by the 
police force and the secret police force, the Lions, state-church relations in favor of the 
Orthodox Church, unsuccessful disarmament of the armed ethnic Albanian groups275; 
                                                 
269
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19,  Article 4, item 38; IV. 
Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect of Article 4, item 
118. 
 
270
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19,  Article 56, item 53; and 
IV. Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect of Article 6, 
item 123. 
 
271
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 15, items 97, 98, 
and 99; and IV. Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect 
of Article 15, items 144 and 145. According to the statistics provided in the State Report 
only 11.5 % of (elected) judges belong to minorities. Of these, 6.2% are Albanians, 
0.8% Turks, 1.9% Vlachs, 0.3% Macedonians of Muslim religion, 0.5% other persons of 
Muslim religion, 1.1% Serbs, 0.5% Montenegrins, 0.1% Croats and 0.1% Bulgarians. 
 
272
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 15, items 100 and 
101; and IV. Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect of 
Article 15, item 146. 
 
273
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 4, items 30, 31, 32, 
33; Article 6, item 52; Article 14, item 92; IV. Main Findings and Comments of the 
Advisory Committee, In Respect of Article 4, items 115 and 116; and Concluding 
Remarks, item 154. 
 
274
 Ibid., III. Specıfıc Comments in Respect of Articles 1-19, Article 5, item 45; Article 
14, item 91; IV. Main Findings and Comments of the Advisory Committee, In Respect 
of Article 5, item 120; and Concluding Remarks, item 155. 
 
275
 For ethnic Macedonians, these were just a small portion of the arms of the Albanian 
rebels. Cited in Eldgirdge (2002: 67). The same anxiety was also applicable to the armed 
ethnic Albanian population, it is cited that three years after the end of the armed conflict, 
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restrictions of the election process in the early Presidential elections. However, what is 
more significant is the fact that, while the AC opinion takes the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement for granted for the protection of national minority rights accompanying the 
Framework Convention, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of 
Macedonia points out that, after four years of the signing, a crucial problem is the 
degraded role of the parliamentary institutions in favor of political parties due to the 
further ethnicization of the political situation by the Ohrid Agreement. As cited in its 
Annual Report on the human rights situation in Macedonia, it can be observed that 
under the dominance of the Ohrid Framework Agreement determining the current 
political structure in Macedonia, what is promoted is “a civic state through ethnically 
defined measures” (Engström 2002, 13). The consequence is evidently pointed out in 
the Joint Statement of the Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights:  
 
“On the one hand, the events resulted in the Macedonian majority 
population’s increased sensitivity to the Albanian issue, leading to 
overreactions, growing mistrust and fear of movements towards secession. 
On the other hand, the ideas of bilateral dialogue or bi-nationalism 
provoked reactions on the side of the other minorities in Macedonia  -the 
ethnic Turks, the Roma, the ethnic Serbians and last but not least- the 
Vlachs.” (Joint Statement, 2001) 
 
Under the dominance of this de facto bi-national structure, as reflected both in 
the annual reports of the international NGOs and the AC Opinion, discrimination 
towards minor national minorities could not be prevented. These clarify why members 
of the minor national minorities do not coincide with ethnic Macedonians (see Table 8). 
Furthermore, “the political parties have negated the Parliament as a forum for 
negotiation and agreement-reaching, and emerged as substitutes of the overall state 
apparatus and of the legal structures of the authority” (IHF 2005). Sometimes, it can 
also be observed that the dominance of the political parties on the future of the country 
is also reflected into other sectors of the state structure such as the judiciary mainly by 
through the appointment process of judges and public prosecutors.276  
                                                                                                                                                        
the government could not still succeed in fully disarming the armed groups of ethnic 
Albanians (HRW 2004, IHF 2004). 
         
276
 Cited in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 
2003, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, p. 6. 
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Taking these into consideration, as mentioned above today the European Union 
mainly monitors the process through the SAP Reports and the recently established 
mechanism of European Partnership. Regarding the current situation drawing on the 
aforementioned priorities outlined in its 2004 SAP Report277, the EC underlined that 
“… (T)he completion of the implementation of the Framework Agreement, a sense of 
political responsibility by local authorities, including in the former crisis areas, in 
addition to the forthcoming implementation of the Ministry of Interior reform, should 
be key elements to ensure possible future incidents and provocations remain 
isolated”278. 
 
In this regard, under the monitoring of the “carrot-and-stick” policy, the EU 
adds the two critical factors among the fundamental causes of the 2001 conflict into its 
monitoring process through the SAP279, namely addressing organized crime and the 
unresolved issues relating to Kosovo.280 Where the two meet is the regional 
cooperation, which was set by the EU as a crucial requirement, by putting itself as a 
framework to be adopted However, it seems unlikely to reach a durable settlement 
without addressing these two essential factors. This is required not just for the 
                                                 
277
 “The implementation of the Framework Agreement and confidence-building 
measures are progressively reducing ethnic tensions. The reform process has started to 
benefit not only minorities but society as a whole and contributes to the strengthening of 
democracy and better governance. Tensions have not however completely disappeared, 
and provocations or incidents must be kept under constant monitoring so that they do 
not to escalate. Effort is still needed to ensure that police misconduct is efficiently 
prevented or, if it occurs, duly sanctioned. In the field of higher education, the process 
of establishing a third State University in Tetovo has also been a highly symbolic 
development. Great care must be taken to ensure that this process undertaken ensures 
that democratic and academic standards are met. More generally education is an area 
where much remains to be done. The development of the country’s democracy will also 
depend on the development of professional media. Further efforts are needed to ensure 
the greater independence and the upgrading of the broadcasting services. Greater 
professionalism in the media would also contribute to furthering democracy.” Cited in 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, p. 10. 
 
278
 Ibid., p. 12. 
 
279
 Of which the Ohrid Framework Agreement failes to take into account. 
 
280
 For a more detailed analysis on the relation between organized crime and EU conflict 
prevention efforts in MAcedonia, see, Gounev (2003). 
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reconciliation of inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia but also needed for the settlement 
of good-neighbourhood relations between Macedonia and Albania. 
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A. 5. Implementation of the EU Vision of Good Neigbourhood Relations 
 
 The webpage of the European Union’s relations with South Eastern Europe 
starts with the following phrases: “The EU’s fundamental aim for South East Europe is 
to create a situation where military conflict is unthinkable -expanding to the region the 
area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom established over the last 50 years by the 
EU and its Member States”281. In fact, in its 2002 SAP Report, the EU explicitly stated 
that “integration with the EU is only possible if future members can demonstrate that 
they are willing and able to interact with their neigbours as EU Member States do.”282  
By arguing that “the five countries face a number of common threats and 
developmental problems which they can only sensibly deal with by working together 
with each other, the EU and other neigbouring countries283, the EU constructed both its 
own mechanisms and institutions for the region, such as the Stability Pact284, and 
further encouraged the countries in the region to set up bilateral and regional 
cooperation mechanisms guided by the same motivation. It is stated that this is essential 
to facilitate the crucial problems of the region, such as the normalization of bilateral 
relations, tackling organized crime, issue of refugees and displaced persons, market 
opening, and reconnecting regional transport, energy and information networks.285 
 
As implemented in internal issues, the SAAs also provide the priorities and 
recommendations for the countries which are monitored through Annual Reports based 
on the same principles of conditionality.286 For instance, in the 2002 SAP Report, the 
                                                 
281
 Cited in http://europa.eu.int/comm/externa_relations/see/index.htm 
 
282
 See, The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe First Annual 
Report, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM (2002) 163 final, p. 11. 
 
283
 Ibid. p. 11. 
 
284
 In the 2002 SAP Report, is it stated that “the Stability Pact has an important role to 
play with the EU in helping the region to take forward these ambitions and, though its 
axctivities, in complementing and reinforcing the Stabilisation and Association 
Process.” Cited in ibid. p.12. 
 
285
 Ibid, p. 11-12. 
 
286
 In the same Report, it is stated that “the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
provide the model for the extent and type of co-operation the EU expects to be 
replicated between the five countries of the region. They also require each signatory to 
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achievements of Macedonia was cited as to be an active participant in the main regional 
cooperation initiatives such as the Stability Pact, South East Europe Cooperation 
Process, Central European Initiative and Adriatic Charter beside its progressing 
relations with neigbouring countries realized through the June 2001 Memorandum of 
Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation within the framework of the 
Stability Pact and Free Trade Agreements with Albania287, Croatia, Romania and 
Slovenia in line with the recommendations in the 2002 SAP Report, while it was also 
recommended among the “priority areas needing attention in the next 12 months” to 
“continue efforts to enhance regional co-operation”.288 This positive approach has also 
been reflected in the 2004 SAP Report, by referring to Macedonia’s active participation 
in SP, SEECP and the conference on border security and management in Ohrid in May, 
bilateral memoranda for co-operation on EU integration-related matters, cross-border 
cooperation and its further initiatives in Thessaloniki Summit. Macedonia has also been 
praised in the same report due to its significant cooperation with Albania.289 The 
proposal on European Partnership with Macedonia has also been written in a positive 
expression. The priorities of the proposal both in short and medium term was on the 
policies to be implemented for further intensification of bilateral and regional 
                                                                                                                                                        
conclude a bilateral convention on regional co-operation with other signatoris to 
support the creation of links between the Stabilisation and Association process 
partners”. See, ibid. p. 11.  
 
287
 It was signed on 29 March 2002 and ratified on 19 June 2002.  Macedonian 
Economy Minister Besnik Fetai said that this agreement should contribute to a greater 
bilateral exchange among the two countries: “This agreement complies with WTO 
[World Trade Organization] regulations, EU legislation and the Trade Liberalization 
Memorandum among the countries from southeastern Europe within the framework of 
the Stability Pact. It is very suitable, and it is also very important for us that Albania as a 
WTO member has average customs rates of 8 per cent," adding that (Albania) has 
signed eight bilateral free trade agreements so far.” Cited in Nova Makedonija, Skopje, 4 
March 2002. 
 
288
 See, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stability and Association Report 
2003, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, SEC (2003) 342, pp. 11-
14.  
 
289
 See, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Report 
2004, Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 373, pp. 13-14. 
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cooperation rather than a discrepancy between the recommendations of the previous 
SAP Reports and the current situation.290 
  
In fact, beside the aforementioned inter-ethnic tensions, as a small, landlocked 
state, one of the most challenging issues for the newly independent Macedonia was the 
settlement of good relations with neigbouring countries, most of which were late in 
recognizing it due to either ethno-cultural (Bulgaria and Greece) or territorial questions 
(Serbia). When these tensions with the other neigbouring states examined, it can be 
stated that bilateral relations between Macedonia and Albania have been relatively 
good. Since the border between the two countries was reopened in April 1999, for the 
first time after 44 years, despite the disputes regarding the Albanian question in Kosovo 
and Macedonia, as cited in a report of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, “both 
governments have shown restraint by not exaggerating potential problems or 
capitalizing on existing disputes for short term gains at home.” (Vik 2001: 32)   
 
For the Albanian side, this was mainly due to the fact that Macedonia has been 
seen as a “counterweight to Serbia” (Pettifer 2001: 21). As one Albanian analyst 
indicated: “For Tirana, Macedonia, home to a large ethnic Albanian community, is a 
source of deep angst, a foreboding that destabilisation of the fledgling country lead to 
Serbian intervention, and consequently, Serbian-Greek encirclement of Albania” 
(Biberaj 1998: 239; cited in ICG 2001: 7). In this context, although Albania had 
initially welcomed the independent Republic of Macedonia, it also affirmed its stand 
that such a state does not particularly belong to the ethnic Macedonian people (Isakovic 
                                                 
290
 In the proposal the short term priorities for regional cooperation are cited as: 
“Comply with the Stabilisation and Association process requirements and Thessaloniki 
commitments in terms of regional cooperation. Ensure implementation of all regional 
free trade agreements. Pursue the conclusion of agreements with neighbouring countries, 
including on cross border cooperation as regards the fight against organised crime, 
trafficking and s muggling, judicial co-operation, border management, environment and 
energy, and ensure their effective implementation; Conclude negotiations with Croatia 
on the bilateral convention on regional cooperation. Besides the long term priorities are: 
“- Maintain a constructive and balanced regional policy which promotes dialogue, 
stability, good neighbourhood and co-operation. Implement the Memorandum of  
Understanding of the South East Europe (SEE) Core Regional Transport Network. 
Implement the commitments undertaken in the framework of the 2003 Athens 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Energy Market in SEE, and prepare for 
the establishment of the Integrated Regional Energy Market.” Cited in European 
Partnership, pp.7-8, 12. 
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2000: 220).The diplomatic mission of Albania was opened in 24 December 1993. This 
was followed by the signing of an agreement on mutual cooperation in 1994. 
Accordingly, Albania opened the port of Durres for Macedonia to ease the 
consequences of the economic embargo of Greece (SIDA 2003: 11). 
 
The only exemption in the early 1990’s for this moderate relations was the 
personal approach and the subsequent interferences of the former Albanian President 
Sali Berisha. As indicated by Williams, during his term Berisha “frequently and 
publicly raised the question of the rights of ethnic Albanians, which prompted protests 
from the Macedonian government that Albania was interfering in Macedonia’s internal 
affairs” (2000: 28)   
  
 The two incidents in 1994 and 1995 were the most controversial issues that 
strained the bilateral relations. The former was the support of the ruling Democratic 
Party’s (DP) support of the break-up of the PDP in Macedonia, which led to the 
formation of a more radical party of the ethnic Albanians, namely DPA. In this event, 
Sali Berisha’s stance, who openly criticized PDP for its cooperation in the ruling 
coalition in Macedonia and supported the DPA (Williams 2000: 28), received 
immediate criticism not only from the Macedonian state, but also from the USA which 
later “led Berisha to moderate his comments on the issue” (Vik 2001: 17). The latter 
incident took place in 1995, when the Albanian foreign minister declared his reactions 
on the decision of the Macedonian government to close down the University of Tetovo, 
in addition to the support of Berisha for the University instructing in the Albanian-
language. This was also criticized by the Macedonian government as an attempt to 
interfere its internal issues.      
 
 Since the fall of Berisha relations between the two countries have been 
progressively developed as the Albanian leaders of Tirana stood on the policy of the 
collaboration of the ethnic Albanian political leaders in Macedonia within the existing 
political structures of Macedonia. Although the relations strained in 1997, due to the 
border incidents during the crises in Albania291, the relations were improved following 
the visits of the Albanian Prime Minister in the early 1998. During these visits several 
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 See, Vik (2001: 33). 
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co-operation agreements were signed such as the reduction in customs tariff, 
elimination of double taxation, improved legal cooperation etc. (Vik 2001: 17). This 
was followed by the signing of co-operation accords m the end of January 2001 on the 
field of education, free trade and health. (ICG 2001: 7)  
 
Despite the improving relations, the 2001 crisis put the Albanian political 
leaders in a difficult position. During the crisis the Albanian government tried to follow 
a moderate stance in middle course by both respecting the sovereignty of the 
Macedonian government and addressing the demands of the ethnic Albanian 
Macedonians. On his visit to France, Prime Minister Ilir Meta expressed his “hope that 
the Albanians of Southern Serbia and Macedonia would choose dialogue because 
otherwise they will become isolated and lose everyone’s support. (…) As for 
Macedonia, the maintaining of its territorial integrity and sovereignty are as essential 
for Albania as they are for regional stability”.292 Besides, in his interview with BBC, he 
told that “Tirana would have zero tolerance for anyone supplying weapons to the ethnic 
Albanian rebels in Macedonia” adding that the situation was totally different from that 
in Kosovo two years ago and his government would give no support to the rebels”293. 
This co-operative stance was also reflected in practice for border incidents.294    
 
 However, it must be underlined that the same moderate policy could not be 
followed by the other political actors in Albania. The Tirana government was fiercely 
criticised by its opponents, such as the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), 
Arjan Starova, for ignoring the problems of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and 
following “only cosmopolitanism” detrimental to “national interests”.295 Nevertheless, 
Albanian government can be regarded as successful dealing with both these internal 
critisms and the broader discourse of the “Albanian threat” towards regional stability296 
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 Reuters, 6 March 2001; cited in ICG (2001: 7).  
 
293
 BBC monitoring, 4 April 2001, 10:35 ,cited in ICG (2001: 3). 
 
294
 See, ICG (2001: 7). 
 
295
 See, ICG (2001: 7-8). 
 
296
 As commented by the daily newspaper, Shekulli, “the latest incidents taking place on 
the border between Macedonia and Kosovo have revived ancien prejudices, historical 
 132 
Furthermore, since then, shared aspirations for the EU and NATO Membership have 
enhanced the dialogue between the two countries.297 
 
 In this framework, thirty-four bilateral agreements have been signed by the 
two states in various fields.298 Furthermore, following the signing of a Free Trade 
Agreement on 29 March 2002299, a Memorandum of Understanding300, and the draft 
text of the Agreement on Good-Neigbourly Relations and Friendship is also in 
progress.301 Furthermore the bilateral relations have also been strengthened directly 
                                                                                                                                                        
divisions are again surfacing. Albania’s neighbours are still haunted by the tem Greater 
Albania, or at the very least a Greater Kosovo. The ensing of the war in Kosovo and the 
strengthening of the position of Albanians following that conflict has again brought to 
the surface the old syndrome of “the Albanian threat to the region’”. See, ICG (2001: 7-
9).    
 
297
 For an analysis of cross-border cooperation between the two countries which reflect 
an important dimension of bilateral cooperation. See, COE & ISIG (2002). In this 
report, it is stated that the Macedonian-Albanian border relations have been among the 
ones with the highest marks in the region, namely regarding the level of propensity 
towards co-operation, cross-border relation by sector of activity and economic factors 
for co-operation. In this regard obstacles to a further co-operation are mainly depended 
on the relevant characteristics of state centralization inherited from the socialist era .see, 
Ibid p. 178. These  levels are (1) level of propensity towards co-operation, (2) level of 
traning of local bodies and coordination, (3) cross-border cooperation relation by sector 
of activity, (4) incisiveness of institutional obstacles, (5) incisiveness of economic 
obstacles, (6) incisiveness of socio-cultural obstacles, (7) institutional factors for co-
operation, (8) administrative factors for co-operation, (9) economic factors for co-
operation, (10) linguistic, cultural and historical factors for co-operation. See, Ibid, pp. 
152-154.     
 
298
 See, the Annual National Program for Membership of the Republic of Macedonia in 
NATO, 2004-2005, Skopje, September 2004, p. 15-16. 
 
299
 As stated above, this agreement complied with EU legislation and the Trade 
Liberalization Memorandum among the countries from southeastern Europe within the 
framework of the Stability Pact. Cited in Nova Makadonija, Skopje, 4 March 2002. 
Cited in the Stabilisation and Association Report 2003 of the Council of Europe 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 26.03.2003, p.11.  
 
300
 Cited in “National Strategy for European Integration of the Republic of Macedonia”, 
Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, September 2004, p. 47. See, the 
same document also for the regional initiatives that Macedonia is a partner to, pp. 45-47. 
301
 Cited in the Annual National Program of the Republic of Macedonia for NATO 
Membership, 2004/2005, Skopje, September 2004, p. 15.  
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under the coordination of regional initiatives, such as the Adriatic Charter”302, and the 
establishment of the Prespa-Ohrid Euroregion between Macedonia, Albania and 
Greece303, Corridor 8 and the AMBO Trans-Balkan oil pipeline and other projects of 
regional initiatives.304   
 
 In addition to these, with regard to the EU vision of the building of good-
neighbourhood relations, Macedonia is also an active party to the existing regional 
cooperation initiatives, namely, the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), 
the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Stability Pact (SP) and the Initiative for 
Cooperation in South-East Europe (SECI). While it is a full-fledged member of these 
initiatives, it is also on the way of full-fledged membership to the Organisation for 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC) and has the observer status in the Adriatic-
Ionian Initiative and in the Szeged Process.305  
  
In fact, the signing of the Stability and Association Agreement, on 26 March 
2001, and the monitoring of this process by the EU through its Annual SAP Reports, is 
principally believed to strengthen the ties with both the countries of the region and with 
the EU on the way of membership, as a foreign policy priority306. This was already set 
up as a condition in the SAA with Macedonia. In its Article 11, it is stated that  
 
                                                 
302
 Macedonia, Albania, Croatia and USA are the parties to the Adriatic Charter, which 
was signed in Tirana on 2 May 2003, expected to be the prelude for future NATO 
membership.   
 
303
 The local pArticleners in this project are the Regional Enterprise Support Centre in 
Bitola, Macedonia; the Regional Development Agency (RDA) of Korca, in Albania; and 
the center for Inter-Balkan Co-operation (CIBC) of Kozani, in Greece. More 
information on the Prespa-Ohrid Euro-region is available at http://www.ewi.info. 
 
304
 The latter two initiative is cited in the Annual National Program for Membership of 
the Republic of Macedonia in NATO, 2004-2005, Skopje, September 2004, p. 16. 
 
305
 Cited in the “National Strategy for European Integration of the Republic of 
Macedonia”, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, September 2004, p. 
47. See, the same document also for the regional initiatives that Macedonia is a partner 
to,  (2004: 45-47). 
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 Cited in ibid., p. 47. See, the same document also for the regional initiatives that 
Macedonia is a partner to, pp. 29. 
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“(I)n conformity with its commitment to peace and stability, and to 
the development of good neighbourly relations, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia will actively promote regional promote regional 
cooperation. The Community will also support projects having a regional 
or cross-border dimension through technical assistance programs.”307 
 
 The following Articles 12-13-14 of the SAA also determined the conditions of 
cooperation with Macedonia and “with other countries having signed a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement”, “with other countries concerned by the Stabilisation and 
Association Process” and “cooperation with countries candidate for EU accession” 
respectively. It is quite clear that grounding these relations on the basis of SAA and EU 
Membership conditionality for a country which stated that “the integration (…) into the 
European Union is a clear and totally shared strategic interest and a consistent priority 
goal in the policy of the Republic of Macedonia at all levels of government”,308 the 
motivation for the goal of EU membership would be an unavoidable factor on 
establishing bilateral and regional cooperation. In this framework, building cooperative 
relations with the other countries of the region with the same vision of EU integration 
would not confront with significant problems; as also they have not directly been a 
party to a conflict with Macedonia. However, taking it into consideration that a 
constructive change in the bilateral relations can be achieved if the variables of the 
conflict can be successfully transformed into a factor of reconciliation between the 
conflicting parties, the resolution of the Albanian conflict is also dependent on the 
reference points in the normalization of relations between the host-state and the kin-
state of the ethnic communities.  
 
In this context, to see the extent of the role of the ethnic minorities in the 
cooperative perspectives of the countries and whether there is a direct relationship 
between the normalization of inter-ethnic relations and the bilateral cooperation with 
Macedonia and Albania, I conducted a secondary data analysis through a detailed 
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 “Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
of the other part”,  Brussels, 26 March 2001, (OR. en) 6726/01, p. 13. 
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 Cited in the “National Strategy for European Integration of the Republic of 
Macedonia”, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, September 2004, p. 
47. See, the same document also for the regional initiatives that Macedonia is a partner 
to,  pp. 29. 
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account of media coverage provided in the Macedonia section of the website of the 
Center for South East European Studies (CSSES)309. Within the media coverage of the 
statements of the state officials and political leaders from Macedonia, I looked for the 
reference points for the enhancement of bilateral relations which would both reflect the 
effectiveness of the EU membership conditionality and determine how the minorities 
had been reflected in the policy level for the cooperation process (see Annex 2). 
 
Having clustered them, the results indicates that the references to the EU-related 
words or phrases indicating the reference points for bilateral cooperation, such as 
“integration into Europe”, “more rapid EU integration”, “join EU-Atlantic structure”, 
“EU and NATO membership”, “EU integration” and “Integration in EU and NATO”, 
and “EU and NATO membership” reveals the biggest motivation of the Macedonian 
leaders in their relations with Albania (45.45%, 10 out of 22). When we specifically 
consider NATO, it is also close to the former result (36.36% with 7 results out of 22). 
In other words, by putting them together, integration with transnational bodies reflects 
the largest motivation (54.54%).  In this context, there has been just one reference 
specifically to the role of the Albanian community in Macedonia and the Macedonian 
community as a motivation for good-relations between the two countries, alongside one 
expression by Crvenkovski stating that “Good regional cooperation creates a better 
climate for taking care of Macedonians living in the neighbouring countries”. The 
clustered reference points are: 
 
European/EU Integration > 4 out of 22 
EU& NATO/Euro-Atlantic > 6  
NATO > 2 
The interest of two countries > 2 
Successful cooperation for the region > 2 
Fight against organized crime > 1 
Prevent illegal crossing- 1 
Stabilization of the region > 1 
The role of Albanian and Macedonian communities > 1 
Taking care of Macedonian minorities in neighbouring countries > 1 
                                                 
309
 http://www.csees.net 
 
 136 
These results highlight that the perspective of EU memberships is the most 
important reference point for the Macedonian officials to enhance their relations with 
Albania. It further underlines that the position of the Albanian minority and the 
democratisation process regarding the relaxation of their conditions do not directly 
affect these relations with the same weight as much as the former do. In view of that, it 
becomes important whether this script of cooperative schemes could be reflected to the 
communal level when the politicians mostly focus their efforts on EU vision. In this 
regard, this dissertation is drawn on the premise that the question of whether 
Europeanization brings peace both at domestic and regional level requires a positive 
respond for both. 
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B. The Serbian Question in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia 
 
B. 1. Historical Background 
  
 Marcus Tanner accurately describes the outcome of the Serbian demands and 
the subsequent 1991-1995 fighting in Croatia in his work “Croatia: a nation forged at 
war”: “After demanding all, they had lost all.” Having experienced the worst scenes of 
the Second World War under Ante Pavelic’s independent Nazi puppet-state in 
Croatia310, the Serbs were granted the status of one of the two constituent nations of the 
Socialist Republic of Croatia311. Although this constitution does not explicitly grant the 
rights of ethnic Serbs in Croatia, by the principles of equal representation and power-
sharing in SFRY, they lived secure in Socialist Croatia. Ethnic minorities were granted 
the use of minority languages, the right to education in the first language, to cherish 
cultural identity, to establish minority organizations, to proportional representation in 
government bodies, to official use of minority languages before the court and 
administrative bodies, etc. (Art. 137-138; cited in MRG 2003: 8). Besides, these 
constitutional guarantees were also incorporated in the statutes of the 26 multiethnic 
municipalities and in three regional communities. (Dominim 1990: 97; cited in MRG 
2003: 8) However, despite these extensive rights provided by the legal framework, the 
fact that deep ethnic cleavages were not resolved but rather tried to be frozen under the 
Titoist structure of governance, was going to reveal itself evidently like the other 
republics, following death of Tito in 1980. What’s more, the Croatia has an additional 
factor to overcome, that is the legacy of the Ustasha state and the crimes committed 
against the Serbs.  
 
 Following the establishment of the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) in 1989, the leader of this nationalist revival, Franjo 
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 Under this Ustasa state, mostly in the summer of 1941, more than 500,000 Serbs 
were murdered, 250,000 were expelled and 200,000 were forced to convert to Roman 
Catholicisim. See, MRG (2003: 7). 
 
311
 Article 1 of the Constitution of Croatia defines the sate as “the national state of 
Croats, Serbs in Croatia and other nationalities”. The Constitution of Croatia, Zagreb, 
Radnicke novine, (1981: 214); cited in MRG (2003: 7-8).  
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Tudjman shed light what the world community, and the Serbs in Croatia could face in 
this newly independent state. At the first congress of the HDZ, he stated that, the 
Independent State of Croatia, so-called the Ustasha state had not only been a “fascist 
crime, but also an expression of the historic aspirations of the Croatian people for an 
independent state”312. Inevitably this approach evoked the memories of the Ustasha 
crimes in the minds of the Serbs in Croatia. Especially, as Caspersen pointed out, when 
it is considered that beside the government in Belgrade, the Serb minority is the second 
crucial obstacle to the plans of Tuđman and his dream of an independent Croatia. 
 
 After the first multi-party elections on 22 April and 6 May 1990, Croatia began 
his journey from a member of the Socialist Federation to an independent state. The 
elections highlight the rise of HDZ policies among the Croats: HDZ secured 42% of the 
vote, with 55 seats out of  80, while the Serbian party, the Serb Democratic Party 
(Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS) could only got electoral mandates in the Knin area 
in western Croatia.(Caspersen 2003: 3). Following his victory, Tudjman adopted a 
package of constitutional amendments on 25 July 1990. Accordingly, the use of 
“Socialist in its name was abandoned, the five pointed star in the flag of the Socialist 
Republic of Croatia was replaced by the Šahovnica symbol, instead of the former 
“President of Presidency” the office of “President of Croatia” was introduced, instead of 
the office of the Republican Secretaries, ministries were formed, Croatian language was 
recognized to be the only official language and the former principle of the requirement 
of a two-third majority in decisions on inter-ethnic issues was removed.(Hislope 1998: 
73; Goldstein 2001: 218).  
 
 However, the intensive nationalism of HDZ was going to reflect itself in a two-
fold dimension. These policies led the radicalization of both the Croats and the Serbs of 
Croatia. As mentioned above, the SDS could not get a considerable support in 1990 
elections, while the Serbian population was continued to be represented by the Serb 
representative in non-ethnic parties such as the SDP. However, as the nationalist policies 
started to diminish the position of the Serbs and led the conflict to be intensified, the 
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 Većernji List, 25 February 1990, p.5; cited in Caspersen (2003: 3). Similarly Wiberg 
indicated a question in the Croatian identity’s strong linkage to state identity, which was 
described as sanctity of state (1993: 103). For the state traditions of the Croats, see, 
Isakovic (2000: 37-55). 
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support of the Serbs were also started to shift from the reformed communist gather 
under the Party for Democratic Change (Stranka Demokratskih Promjena, SDP) to SDS. 
This was also reflected in the policies of the SDS, while initially it had a moderated 
position, advocating cultural autonomy (Caspersen 2003: 3), by the rise of the radical 
wing headed by Milan Babić, the mayor of Knin, against relatively moderate Rašković, 
the demands for territorial autonomy started to be voiced. Although defended by 
Raškovic to reflect a basis for cultural autonomy rather than a territorial autonomy 
(Rašković 1990: 311; cited in Caspersen 2003: 5), this was first realized by the 
establishment of the Community of (Serb) Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and 
Lika in April 1990 (Caspersen 2003: 5).     
 
Not surprisingly, on the day the constitutional amendments were passed by the 
Croatian Sabor, the Serb National Council was founded in the village of Srb in Krajina. 
Rejecting the changes made by the Croatian Parliament, Sabor, it passed the 
“Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of Serbs in Croatia” stating that the 
“Serbia people in Croatia have the right to autonomy. The Content of the autonomy will 
depend on either federal or confederal order in Yugoslavia” adding that “the future of 
Yugoslavia could not be determined without the participation of the Serb people” 
(Caspersen 2003: 5). Subsequently, although it was declared to be illegal by the Zagreb 
Government and followed by the banning of the Community of Municipalities 
(Caspersen 2003: 6),  the Serbian leaders Babić and Rašković proclaimed their decision 
for a referendum on Serb “sovereignty and autonomy” in Croatia at the end of 
August.313 On the day of the referendum, 17 August 1990, following the riot of groups 
of Serbs outside the police station in Benkovac, claiming that the Croat authorities were 
coming to take away the guns stored inside, Tudjman decided to deploy a “special” 
police unit to Knin to stop the Serb ‘rebellion’ from spreading. The plan was to land in 
Knin and to seize the town hall and the police station. However, although the army of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, JNA) 
forced them back, this was presented by Babić as the return of the Ustasha. He declared 
“a war situation” (Tanner 1997: 233). A People’s Defence Council was founded and the 
roads and railway lines in and out of Knin were barricaded by barricades of logs. 
Although there had not occurred any serious incidents, the balvan revolujica (“log 
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 It was going to be held on 17 August 1990. 
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revolution”) which began on 17 August 1990, was the beginning of both fighting with 
the Serbian rebels and Croatian government and the beginning of Yugoslav wars. 
(Goldstein, 2001: 218; Tanner 1997: 232-233). On 25 August Babić declared the birth 
of the Autonomous Province of the Serbian Krajina (Tanner 1997: 243)  
 
Incidents then followed one another. In October 1990, the Serbs proclaimed the 
Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (Srpska Autonomna Oblast Krajina, SAO) 
(HRW 1997), which was immediately joined by five other municipalities with a 
Serbian-majority (Goldstein 2001: 219). In 22 December 1990, the Croatian Sabor 
adopted a new Constitution, which recognized the semi-presidential system but also 
denying the status of the Serbs as one of the constituent peoples. (Caspersen 2003: 6). 
Beside the tensions among the Serbian leaders in Croatia on the following months314, on 
18 March 1991315, the National Council declared the independence of Krajina. Babić 
was appointed the President of SAO Krajina and Rasković was declared persona non 
grata in Knin. (Caspersen 2003: 8; Goldstein 2001: 219; HRW 1999).  
     
  Following the Ohrid talks on 19 April 1991, where a referendum on the future 
of the Federal Yugoslavia was agreed to be held, the referendum was held in Croatia in 
May 1991, by which 94 % voted in favor of an independent and sovereign Croatia. 
Meanwhile, the tensions rose between the Serb and Croat nationalists which were going 
to lead to an armed conflict, when the rebel Serbs in Borovo Selo, killed thirteen 
Croatian police officers who were seeking to rescue two police officers taken hostage by 
the Serbs at the end of April 1991 (HRW 1997; Goldstein 2001: 221).   
 
Subsequently, on 25 June 1991, the Croatian Sabor passed the “Constitutional 
Act on Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia”.(MRG 2002: 9) 
Following the declaration of Independence, the para-military Serbian groups launched 
offensives to establish control of the regions with a majority of Serbian population, 
namely the counties within Eastern Slavonia. These regions were declared to be parts of 
                                                 
314 For details, see, Caspersen 2003, pp. 7-10. The same article also give details on this 
cleave throughot the whole process of conflict.   
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 It is recorded as 16 March in a HRW report (1997). 
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the Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Srem. (HRW 1997) 
 
After the refusal of Tudjman’s offer of local self-government to Knin 
(Woodward 1995: 182; cited in Caspersen 2003: 8) on 31 July, and the Carrington Plan 
in October 1991, offering extensive territorial and political autonomy to Serbs316, on 19 
December 1991, the Parliament of the SAO Krajina declared its independence from 
Croatia under the name of the Republic of Serb Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina, 
RSK). Later, the other SAOs of Slavonia, Baranja, Western Srem and Western Slavonia 
had joined the RSK (Caspersen 2003: 10).    
 
Throughout this period, since September 1991, the JNA and Serbian paramilitary 
groups from Serbia were obviously coming to the military aid of rebel Serbian forces in 
Croatia. Between August and November 1991, para-military Serbian forces from Serbia 
and the JNA jointly undertook the siege and destruction of Vukovar. By the end of 
1991, local Serbian forces backed by the JNA eventually assumed control of over 30 
percent of Croatia, including Eastern Slavonia and systematically persecuted, 
imprisoned or expelled Croats, Hungarians and other non-Serbs living in areas they had 
captured. By late 1991, Serbs had expelled over 80.000 ethnic Croats from Eastern 
Slavonia. 317  
 
Meanwhile, an intense web of diplomatic activity took part throughout the 
process: “up till the end of 1991 a total of sixteen ceasefires was signed, none of which 
lasted no longer than twenty-four hours”! (Golstein 2001: 231) Eventually, this phase of 
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 Where they were majority, the plan was guaranteeingextensive rights such as the 
rights to establish their own parliament and administrative structures, a seperate 
education system,  the use of national amblems and flags, etc. For a more detailed 
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the war ended when the parties agreed on a peace plan on 3 January 1992, by the 
mediation of UN negotiator Cyrus Vance since late 1991. The agreement put forward 
the creation of “UN Protected Areas”, overlapping the areas in which Serbs had formed 
a majority or substantial minority before the war. The remaining Serb-held areas were 
authorized as “pink zones” and allocated for the eventual return to the control of the 
Croatian authorities. Furthermore, the plan urged the withdrawal of the JNA and the 
disarmament of the Serb militias. (Tanner 1997: 279). Accordingly, three areas came 
under the mandate of the UN forces (UNPROFOR): Sectors South and North, along the 
Croat-Bosnian border and including the towns of Glina and Knin; Sector West, around 
the town of Pakrac; and Sector East, comprising Eastern Slavonia. The UNPROFOR 
mission was initially authorized for twelve months but its mission was renewed and 
extended seven times. Following the end of the sixth extension in February 1995, the 
Croatian government declared that it would no longer agree to extend the mandate of 
UNPROFOR, by claiming that its presence in Croatia permitted the consolidation of 
rebel Serb territorial gains. (HRW 1997) However, on February 4, 1995, the Security 
Council approved a configuration for the new U.N. mission in Croatia. Under the new 
mission, named as the U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), the U.N. 
troop presence was reduced from 14,000 to 8,000.318 As suggested by the U.N. Security 
Council in February 1995, UNCRO's mandate was to include implementation of the 
1994 cease-fire accord and facilitate the implementation of an economic agreement 
between the Croatian and RSK authorities. The number of UNCRO troops was 
eventually reduced even further, but the details of its mandate were not proposed due to 
disagreements between the Croatian government and RSK forces. (HRW 1997).  
 
However, such debates became groundless when the Croatian army launched an 
offensive against Serb-populated “UN Protected Areas” in May 1995. By “Operation 
Flash”, the Croatian army took Western Slavonia after a three-day offensive. In August, 
the Croatian army launched another attack against North and South sections (“Operation 
Storm”) and recaptured the remaining areas outside Eastern Slavonia. This led to the 
exodus of some 200,000 Serbs. (MRG 2003; HRW 1999)319 Approximately 60-70,000 
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 In its 1997 report, HRW cites that this is the single largest population displacement 
during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.  
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of these displaced persons went to Eastern Slavonia, with the rest going to Serbia, 
Kosovo, Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina, or third countries (HRW 1997). 
During the “Operation Storm”, the exodus was also accompanied by the killings of Serb 
civilians and widespread fire-setting and dynamiting of Serb housing. (HRW 1999).  
 
The threat of further conflict following the “Operation Storm”, which would 
probably include the JNA, the international community intervened to the conflict on 
Eastern Slavonia to resolve its status. Following talks co-chaired by Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, the then U.N. negotiator for the former Yugoslavia, and Peter Galbraith, the 
U.S. ambassador to Croatia, the Serbian leaders of Krajina agreed, in principle, to return 
Eastern Slavonia to Croatian government control. In return, the Croatian government 
agreed to a phased transfer of authority and to the maintenance of an international 
presence in the area during and after this transition period. The agreements were set 
forth in the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Sirmium 
(also framed as the Erdut Agreement or the Basic Agreement), signed on 12 November 
1995.320 (HRW 1997).  
 
According to the agreement, Eastern Slavonia would be demilitarized321 and 
administered under a two-year temporary administration of the UN by its return to the 
control of the Croatian government in January 15, 1997. It was composed of three main 
parts: (1) the provisions for the establishment of a Transitional Administration by the 
UN Security Council to govern the region during a transitional period of 12 months 
(with the possibility of an extension for one year if either party demands it) in the 
interest of all those resident in or returning to the region (Articles 1-5 and 12), (2) the 
provisions for the protection of human and civil rights, and (3) provisions for the 
monitoring of human rights in Eastern Slavonia by the international community 
subsequent to the transition period (Articles 10-11) (MRG 2002: 10-11).  
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Based on the Erdut Agreement, the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established on 15 January 
1996. Its administrative body was composed of a military component (5,000 soldiers), 
civilian police monitors, a transitional police force and the other civilian staff (HRW 
1997)322. Its mandate was primarily “to supervise and facilitate the demilitarization of 
the region within 30 days; to monitor the voluntary return of refugees and displaced 
persons; to contribute, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the 
region; to establish and train a transitional police force; to organize elections; and to 
monitor and facilitate the determining of territory within the region” (MRG 2003: 10). 
Following a one-year extension due the request of the local Serbs, on November 15, 
1996, the UN Security Council extended the transition period and UNTAES's mandate 
to July 15, 1997. This resolution also raised the option of a reduced UNTAES mission 
which would remain after July 15, 1997 until January 15, 1998323. (HRW 1997) 
Eventually, subsequent to the expiration of the UNTAES mandate in January 1998, all 
the Croatian territory was brought under government control. A small U.N. police 
monitoring mission remained in Eastern Slavonia until October 1998, when it was 
replaced by police monitors from the OSCE mission. 
 
In its “Letter of Intent” to the UN Security Council324, the Croatian government 
provisioned a detailed plan on the implementation to the Erdut Agreement on 13 
January 1997. The letter laid down basic assurances on general voter qualifications, 
provisions for cultural and educational autonomy for Serbs and other minorities and 
proportional representation in the police and the judiciary, provision of a two-year 
suspension from military service for Serbs, and the assurance of the allocation of  
several senior government posts to the Serbs (HRW 1997) 
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 See, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1037, January 15, 1996; cited in HRW 1997. 
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United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, attaching the Letter 
from the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the completion of the peaceful 
reintegration of the region under the Transitional Administration, Republic of Croatia, 
January 13, 1997, S/1997/27. Cited in HRW 1997. 
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In principle, the Erdut Agreement seemed to offer a crucial contribution to the 
reintegration of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia and the Serbs to the broader Croatian 
society. Additionally, it proposed the foundation of essential institutions for the 
protection of the rights of the Serbs such as several autonomous organizations like the 
Serb National Council, and their representation in the Chamber of Counties (MRG 
2003: 11). However, the Croatian authorities were often criticized by the local and 
international organizations for ignoring or manipulating the provisions of the Erdut 
Agreement, “particularly regarding human rights, property rights, the return of internally 
displaced persons, discrimination against people who lived in the region during the war, 
and the position and proportional representation of the local Serbian community” (MRG 
2003: 11).  
 
In this context, the next section will be devoted to the analysis of the minority 
rights in the post-1995 period, both in principle grounded on legal texts and in practice 
based on the reports of European Commission, and prominent international NGOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 146 
B. 2. EU in Croatia, Croatia in the Process of Europeanization 
 
The positions of the minorities in the Republic of Croatia have been determined 
by two main factors: the process of nation-state formation and the relevant nationalist 
policies, and the wars between 1991 and 1995 and the massive forced migrations during 
these wars. What made it more fragile was the fact that these two processes overlapped, 
namely the Croats faced their own process of nation-building in the midst of a wave of 
ethno-nationalist wars which put the minorities in a post of “the other”, or what is worst, 
the Trojan horses within the realization of an ethnically homogeneous motherland. 
Furthermore the Croatian governments had to reconcile the two developments with the 
third one, namely to establish contractual relations with the European Union, which was 
put forward as the strategic goal of the Republic of Croatia.325 
 
Following the EU recognition of Croatia as a sovereign state in January 1992326, 
the year 2000 marked the turning point for the relations between Croatia and the EU. 
Subsequent to the parliamentary elections in January 2000 and the election of Stjepan 
Mesic as President of the Republic of Croatia in February 2000, the new Croatian 
leadership immediately showed its commitment on the accommodation with democratic 
values and principles set out as a condition for EU integration. This commitment was 
responded by the EU primarily by the establishment of an EU Croatia Consultative Task 
Force, which has provided Croatia with expertise and technical assistance in preparation 
for the Stability and Association Process. Following the upgrading of the EU Office of 
the Special Envoy in Zagreb to a permanent delegation of the EC in March, in May 
2000, the Commission adopted a positive Feasibility Report proposing the opening of 
negotiations for a Stability and Association Agreement.327 In November, the 
autonomous trade measures (ATMs) were granted to Croatia.328 In October 2001, The 
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 In June, in Fereira Summit, the European Council declared that all SAP countries are 
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Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed between Croatia and the 
EU. Accordingly, by the end of the year, the European Commission adopted a country 
strategy for Croatia covering the period of 2002-2006 and providing a framework for 
EC assistance under CARDS programme. Subsequently, an Interim Agreement (IA) was 
concluded in parallel with the SAA329 covering the trade and relevant measures.330 
 
The previous financial support from the European Commission to Croatia had 
mainly been shaped in response to the country’s position in the conflict cycle: during the 
first phase of war and post-socialist transition between 1991 and 1995, the EC granted 
244 million euros for humanitarian and relief assistance; subsequently during 1996-
2000, the assistance was mainly focused on post-conflict reconstruction, mainly the 
return and the integration of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Totally, 
during this period EC co-operation assistance amounted to approximately 370 million 
euros.331 However, by the introduction of the national programme for 2001, the financial 
assistance programme combined the previous post-conflict reconstruction aids, such as 
the issue of refugee return, with the stabilisation programme within the framework of 
SAA towards European integration, with the total amount of € 60 mil332 (see, Table 9). 
During 2001, the Commission had also financed two schemes of micro-projects 
undertaken mainly by local NGOs: a strand of the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Small Scale Operations scheme (SSO). These 
projects supported nearly 30 projects with the main objectives of “(strengthening) the 
capacity of civil society to deal with issues related to the sustainable return of refugees, 
conflict resolution, peace building, protection of human and minority rights, 
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participation of citizens in the decision making process, gender issues and sustainable 
economic development and market oriented initiatives.333 In addition to that, the EU 
Member States and other donors’ programmes are also engaged in the co-operation 
activities.334    
 
Based on the aforementioned contractual relationship, the response strategy of 
the EC to these financial aid programmes was drawn on “an analysis of the political, 
economic and social situation in Croatia, and on an assessment of how Community can 
best contribute to the long-term goal of Croatia’s integration in the European 
mainstream.”335 In this regard, based on the three critical objectives, namely “the direct 
policy goals of the SAP, “conflict prevention” and “poverty reduction.”336 
 
The EU implemented the same conditionality mechanism for Croatia in 
accordance with its policy towards the SAP countries. In fact, particularly during armed 
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction in the period of 1991-2000, the EU used this 
tool several times, although it was sometimes impeded due to different positions of EU 
members.337  
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 Cited in ibid, p. 21. However, it is reported in the Strategy Paper that these project 
sometimes had to deal with problems due to the weak professional standards in 
reporting by these NGOs.  
 
334
 For a detailed account of this co-operation schemes and their areas of intervention, 
see, ibid. pp. 22-23, 69-71 
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 Cited in ibid. 24. In this context, the priorities for co-operation were specified as (1) 
Democratic Stabilisation (return of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
establishing ‘a well-developed and vocal civil society’), (2) Economic and Social 
Development (revision of trade policy and relevant legislation, enabling investment 
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policing and organized crime, integrated border management, (4) Administrative 
Capacity Building (public administration reform, national, regional and local 
development, public finance, (5) Environment and Natural Resources. For details, see, 
ibid. pp. 24-30. 
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 For instance, while EU -the then EC- involvement in Croatia within the UN’s 
UNPROFOR mission beside its own monitoring mission in Serb-held areas of Croatia, it 
condemned the Croat government for supporting Bosnian Croats and in June 1993 it 
threatened to “initiate restrictive measures” if Croatia did not withdraw its military 
support from Bosnia which was also followed by the debates on diplomatic pressure in 
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Subsequent to the Croatian Army’s offensive in Western Slavonia, the EU halted 
its initiatives to negotiate a trade and cooperation agreement. Furthermore, despite the 
warnings of the EU’s General Affairs Council’s on June 12 that it should respect human 
rights and work for peace in former Yugoslavia, and European Council of Minister’s 
warning at the Cannes Summit of June 26-27 that it should not use military force to 
recapture Krajina, the Croatian Army launched an offensive to recapture Krajina. In 
response to that, the EU suspended negotiations with Croatia on trade and cooperation 
agreement and implementation of PHARE aid programme for Croatia on August 4, 
1995.338  As of mid-October 1996, the negotiations remained suspended.339 In 1997, 
EU’s frustration with Croatia was reflected in the EC’s Presidency Conclusion of its 
Amsterdam Summit, stating that for an improvement of relations between the EU and 
Croatia “strict respect for human and minority rights throughout the country, including 
the return of displaced persons and refugees, remains an essential requirement”.340 With 
this “no compliance” rating, as cited in the 1998 Annual Report of the HRW on Croatia, 
EU again used the threat of trade sanction in case of lack of any improvement.341  
 
The EU used this tool in 1998. While the relations between the parties were 
based on the aforementioned “Regional Approach” of the EU, due to Croatia’s failure in 
meeting human rights criteria, the EC limited the aid to Croatia to 6.65 ECU for 
humanitarian assistance and 2.7 million ECU for supporting independent media. 
Besides, Croatia also remained ineligible for PHARE reconstruction aid. What’s more, 
on April 27, 1998, the EC Council of Ministers threatened to suspend autonomous trade 
measures (ATMs) underlying that the Procedure for Return is inadequate. As a response 
                                                                                                                                                        
July 19. However, Germany prevented the imposition of sanctions and the EC 
representatives only warned Croatia that such sanctions could be imposed in future. 
Cited in 1994 HRW Report. 
 
338
 Cited in 1996 Human Rights Watch Annual Report on Croatia. 
 
339
 Cited in 1997 Human Rights Watch Annual Report on Croatia. 
 
340
 Presidency Conclusion of the Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997  
 
341
 However, as cited in the same report, the EC continued to provide financial support 
for demining efforts and reconstruction of infrastructure. 
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to that threat, Croatia adopted its Mandatory Instructions and the Program on Return.342 
The EC welcomed these initiatives by urging that the Croatian government should 
“continue its efforts to implement fully all its commitments, notably on refugee return, 
media and the election law.”343  
 
1999 also marked disappointment for EU on Croatia’s performance. Although in 
May 1999 the EU Foreign Ministers approved the Stability and Association process for 
Western Balkans, in June the EU foreign ministers concluded on Croatia’s progress on 
human rights and democracy as “insufficient” for PHARE assistance for reconstruction, 
by adding that it could benefit if there is a progress. Subsequent to that, in September, 
due to lack of efficient cooperation with ICTY, the EU governments postponed a 
decision on a consultative task force on contractual relations. However, Human Rights 
Watch reported in its 2000 Croatia Annual Report that “the foreign ministers’ statement 
in June and the resumption in July of an informal EU-Croatia political dialogue which 
was suspended in 1995 suggested that the EU may be willing to relax its previous 
human rights conditionality, a signal that is only likely to worsen Croatia’s 
performance.” 
 
Despite this bad record, the aforementioned the silent democratic revolution in 
January and February 2000 led the EU to modify its policy towards Croatia. In March 
2001, it upgraded its Office of the Special Envoy in Zagreb to a permanent delegation of 
the EC in March. Following the positive Feasibility Report in May 2000 which opened 
the way for negotiations for a SAA, in November it granted ATMs to Croatia within this 
framework.  
 
In October 2001, The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was 
signed between Croatia and the EU. Within this framework, in its 2002 SAP Report, the 
EC underlined that although there has been significant progress in the areas of 
democratisation, respect for human rights and compliance with obligations under the 
Peace agreements344, the weakness of the judiciary and the nationalistic pressures are the 
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fundamental challenges on the pace of the reforms, particularly affecting the policy of 
the government on return of refuges and the relevant measures, co-operation with ICTY 
and enhancement of  regional co-operation345 In this regard, the EC concluded its 
analysis on Croatia by arguing that “the implementation of the adopted legislation 
remains a major challenges and the administration needs to look at its own capacity to 
implement the reforms and address the deficit it finds” by adding that “although the 
Government appears to appreciate this, it continues to focus too much on the headline 
political objectives of Croatia’s European policy rather than on the enormous effort that 
moving closer to European standards requires”346 Nevertheless, following the resolution 
adopted by all parties in the Croatian Sabor in December 2002, determining EU 
membership as a strategic national goal and asking the Croatian government to submit 
the application for EU membership, the Government submitted its application for EU 
membership on 21 February 2003 beside its integration within SAP. In its 2003 SAP 
report, EU concluded that despite the achievements, such as a stable, democratic 
political situation in general, the enhanced regional cooperation and legislative 
amendments to facilitate refugee return, “not enough has been done to overcome the 
other short-term priorities identified in last year (2002) report”, specifying that “the 
Government’s attitude in the co-operation with ICTY remains lukewarm”, by adding 
that “(i)n practice only limited progress has been achieved for the return process, and de 
facto integration of the Serb minority.”347 On 19 December 2002, a further step in 
minority rights protection was taken by the adoption of the “Constitutional Law on the 
Rights of National Minorities”348, a longstanding commitment of Croatia since its 
accession to the Council of Europe in 1996. Although its adoption and the additional 
progress in the refugee return process and legislative steps to allow the reintegration of 
the Serbian minority were promising developments for the EU, it found it regrettable 
that “the Government excluded minority representatives from the work of the drafting 
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 Cited in ibid. p. 19. 
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group of this Law, and a compromise was reached only due to international pressure”, 
adding that “it is now crucial that the CLNM be quickly and correctly implemented”349 
The report also recommended that the Law on Local Elections of April 2001, needs to 
be amended to implement provisions of the new CLNM, by adding that “(b)y-elections 
for minorities in local government were not held, and the deadline set by the Law has 
not been respected”, which was required for appropriate representation of minorities.350 
It was also stated that although “the Government maintained its stated commitment to 
implementing all obligations related to the return of refugees and displaced persons 
contained in the Dayton/Paris Agreements (…) in practice there are still obstacles to the 
return of refuges and IDPs”351  These deficiencies were reflected in the “priority areas 
needing attention in the next 12 months”, the road map provided for Croatia: 
 
 “Ensure full co-operation with ICTY352; (…) Ensuring 
implementation of the recently adopted Constitutional Law on National 
Minorities; holding of by-elections for national minorities for local 
government bodies according to the Law on the Election of Members of 
the Representative Bodies of Local and Regional Self-Government Units; 
refugees: effective implementation of adopted legislation to complete the 
repossession of property, take administrative decisions for all pending 
application for reconstruction; design an operational system for 
compensation of lost tenancy/occupancy rights inside and outside the 
areas of special State concern; creation of social and economic conditions 
to improve the climate for returns and the acceptance of refugees by 
receiving communities353; (…) Adoption of Law on Elections to re-define 
the representation of the ‘diaspora’ and ensure appropriate representation 
of minorities354; Establishing a strategy for the protection and integration 
of Roma.”355 
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Despite the aforementioned deficiencies, Croatia had been granted CARDS 
financial aid programmes. However, different from the prior assistance, beside the 
already remaining post-conflict reconstruction assistance, such as the issue of refugee 
return (23.2 million euros), majority of the resources were allocated for the development 
and institution building needs (36.8 million euros) for meeting the commitments of the 
SAA.356 Accordingly CARDS 2002 national programme was based on five priority 
areas: “Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons and Civil Society; Trade, 
Investment Climate Development and Social Cohesion; Modernisation of Justice, 
Policing and Organised Crime and Integrated Border Management; Public 
Administration Reform, National, Regional and Local Development and Public Finance; 
Strategy for EU Environmental Law Approximation, Pilot Waste Management Strategy 
for Dalmatia, Water Information System (Standardisation and Monitoring) and Support 
to an Environmental NGO network.”357 The total amount mobilized for Croatia was 59 
million euros. In addition to national programmes, Croatia also benefited from the 
programmes of CARD Regional Programme, the LIFE-Third Countries, European 
Investment Bank. The annual allocations for Croatia has also been gradually increased: 
while it amounted to 62 million euros in 2003, it was determined as 68 million euros for 
2004358   
  
The improving financial assistance had also been supported by enhancing 
political relations. Following the General Affairs and External Relations Council’s 
(GAERC) request to prepare an Opinion on Croatia’s application on 14 April 2003, the 
Commission prepared it on 20 April 2004. On the same day of the submission of its 
Opinion, the EC also presented it Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Croatia, pointing out the required priorities 
for further integration. Regarding the protection of minorities, these priorities for short 
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p. 66; For the individually mobilised on-going cooperation by the EU Member States 
and donors’ assistance, see ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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term and medium term were mainly focused on the need to improve respect for minority 
rights, such as the implementation of the CLNM, equitable representation, the proper 
functioning of Minority Councils, protection and integration of Roma; speed up the 
process of refugee return and undertaking relevant reforms for short-term and the 
continued respect for minority rights, Roma at particular and the completion of the 
refugee return process for the medium term.359  
 
Taking this into consideration, in its Conclusion of the Opinion, regarding the 
political criteria, The European Commission stated that: 
 
 “Croatia is a functioning democracy, with stable institutions 
guaranteeing the rule of law. There are no major problems regarding the 
respect of fundamental rights. In April 2004, the ICTY Prosecutor stated 
that Croatia is now cooperating fully with ICTY. Croatia needs to 
maintain full cooperation and take all necessary steps to ensure that the 
remaining indictee is located and transferred to ICTY. Croatia needs to 
make additional efforts in the field of minority rights, refugee returns, 
judiciary reform, regional co-operation and the fight against corruption. 
On this basis, the Commission confirms that Croatia meets the political 
criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the 
Stabilisation and Association Process conditionalities established by the 
Council in 1997.”360  
 
In the light of these evaluations, the Commission recommended the opening of 
negotiations. Accordingly, the European Council, in December 2004, decided that 
accession talks can start with Croatia on the 17th March 2005, provided there is full 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Subsequently, the SAA with Croatia entered into force on 1 February 2005. However, 
the European process has been delayed with a disappointing decision for Croatia on 16 
March 2005: the European Union delayed the planned start of negotiations with Croatia, 
due to its failure to find a key figure as an evidence for cooperation with the ICTY. But, 
                                                 
359
 Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Croatia, p. 6 and 11. 
 
360
 Ibid, p. 119-120. Regarding the assessment of the minority rights and refugee issues, 
which is more or less identical to the previous SAP Report, see pp. 24-30 
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it was emphasized that the door of the EU will be open to Croatia as soon as it provides 
“full cooperation” with UN prosecutors in the Hague.361     
 
In fact, although improving in a promising pace, cited in the Opinion of the EC 
as one of the issues that “Croatia needs to make additional efforts”, minority rights has 
been one of the contentious issues for Croatia on the way to both regional stability and 
further integration with the EU. In this context, as the first legally binding international 
instrument, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has 
been one of the key documents for the assessment of the protection of national 
minorities.  
 
Croatia signed the Framework Convention on 6 November 1996 and 
subsequently ratified it on 11 October 1997 and the Convention entered into force on 01 
February 1998. The monitoring process was initiated by the submission of the first State 
Report on 16 March 1999, which was due to 1 February 1999. This was followed by the 
publication of the Opinion of the Advisory Committee on 6 April 2001, drawing on their 
visit to Croatia in the period of 16-18 October 2000. The Croatian government has 
published its Comment on the Opinion on 6 February 2002, on the same day of the 
Council of Ministers’ Resolution on the Opinion. This was followed by the follow-up 
seminar on 21 March 2002. After the completion of the first cycle of monitoring, 
Croatia submitted its second State Report on 13 April 2004, which was due to 1 
February 2004. Upon its submission, the AC adopted its 2nd Opinion on 1 October 2004 
and published it on 13 April 2005. On the same day, Croatia presented its 2nd Comment 
on the Opinion of the AC.  
 
 According to the 2001 census, 7.5% of the Croatian population consists of 16 
national minorities. The most sizeable and territorially concentrated minority is the 
Serbs with 4.5% of the total population, followed by Bosniaks (0.47%), Italians 
(0.44%), Hungarians (0.37%), Albanians (0.34%), and Slovenes (0.3%). Although the 
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available at www.turkishpress.com 
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proportion of Roma was registered as 0, 21% in this statistics, the actual figure is 
probably significantly higher.362 
 
Table 9: Ethnic structure of the population in Croatia, 1981-2001 
Source: Statiscal Almanac of Croatia, 1991, p.64; Croatian Governmental Office 
for Statics Census 2001, www.dzr.org; cited in MRG 2003, p.5 
 
Nationality 1981 1991 2001 
Croats 3,454,661 75,1 3,736,356 78,1 3,997,171 89,6 
Serbs 531 11,5 581,663 12,2 201,631 4,5 
Non-determined 17,133 0,4 73,376 1,5 89,130 2,61 
Bosniaks - - - - 20,755 0,47 
Italians 11,661 0,3 21,303 0,4 19,636 0,4 
Hungarians 25,439 0,6 22,355 0,5 16,595 0,37 
Slovenes 25,136 0,6 22,376 0,5 13,171 0,3 
Albanians 6,006 0,1 12,032 0,3 15,082 0,3 
Yugoslavs 379,057 8,2 106,041 2,2 - -363 
Muslims 23,740 0,5 43,469 0,9 - -364 
Unknown 64,737 1,4 62,926 1,3 17,975 0,4 
Others365 593,366 1,3 102,368 2,1 46,314 1,05 
Total 4,601,467 100 4,784,265 100 4,437,460 100 
 
 
The following framework elucidates the legal framework for the protection of 
national minorities in Croatia in the light of the Framework Convention.  
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International Cooperation (Article 1) 
  
Today, Croatia is party to a full range of minority rights obligations which has 
been a part of the domestic legal system (Art. 134).366 Furthermore by the adoption of 
the “Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities” on 19 December 2002, a 
longstanding commitment of Croatia since its accession to the Council of Europe in 
1996,367 the Republic of Croatia assured that  
“Apart from human rights and freedoms which are recognized by 
constitutional provisions, the Republic of Croatia also recognizes and 
protects all other rights foreseen in the international documents as per 
Article 1 of this Constitutional Law, depending on the exceptions and 
limitations foreseen in these documents, without discrimination on the basis 
of sex, race, the colour of skin, language, professing of religion, political 
and other conviction, national and social origin, connection with a national 
minority, ownership, the status inherited by birth or pursuant to some other 
basis, in compliance with Articles 14 and 17, Paragraph 3 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.”  
 
(CLNM Art. 2). Furthermore, by the Art 6 of the same law, the Croatian 
government declares that it “may conclude international agreements with other countries 
                                                 
366
 For the full list of the international documents regarding human and minority rights, 
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25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
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and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia (“Official Gazette”, 
No. 65/91, 27/92, 34/92- consolidated text, 51/00 and 105- consolidated text), which 
was the former fundamental legal instrument of minority protection in Crotia, ceased to 
be valid. 
For a detailed on the adoption process of the Constitutional Law on National Minorities, 
see, OSCE Mission to Croatia Headquarters, Background Report Constitutional Law on 
National Minorities, 20 August 2002. 
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whereby it shall regulate the issues of the rights and freedoms of members of national 
minorities in the Republic of Croatia.” 
 
In the EC’s Opinion on the application for membership of the European Union, 
the EC found it promising that “Croatia has ratified all the Council of Europe 
conventions which it had signed”, in addition to bilateral agreements of protection of 
national minorities with Hungary, Italy, and Serbia and Montenegro.368  
 
     
Definition of minority (Article 3) 
The concept of national minority is not exactly defined by the Croatian 
Constitution. Rather than using a strict, restrictive approach on the minorities within 
Croatia, Chapter 1 (“Historical Foundations”), Paragraph 3 of the Constitution defined 
as autochthonous minorities Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, 
Germans, Austrians, Ruthenians, Ukrainians and others who are citizens of the Republic 
of Croatia:  
“Considering the presented historical facts and universally accepted 
principles in the modern world, as well as the inalienable and indivisible, non-
transferable and non-exhaustible right of the Croatian nation to self-determination 
and state sovereignty, including its fully maintained right to secession and 
association, as basic provisions for peace and stability of the international order, 
the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croatian nation 
and the state of members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, 
Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and 
Ruthenians and the others who are its citizens, and who are guaranteed equality 
with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of national rights in 
accordance with the democratic norms and standards of the United Nations 
Organization and the countries of the free world.” 
 Therefore, their recital is not numerus clausus. However, the concept of 
authochthonousness is not been defined.369 
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This confusion was removed with the adoption of CLNM. In its Article 5, 
“national minority” is defined as  
“a group of Croatian citizens [drzavljani], whose members have been 
traditionally settled in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and who 
have ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious characteristics which are 
different than those of other citizens [gradjani], and who are guided by the 
wish for the preservation of those characteristics.” 
Under the Constitutional framework, a citizen of the Republic of Croatia can 
exercise his right to identify or not to identify himself as a member of national minority, 
in many different manners, such as the electoral process. As regulated by the “Law on 
Voters' Registers” (Official Gazette, no.19/92), nationality is defined by Article 9 of this 
law as one of the data required for registering Croatian citizens with a right to vote. This 
enables the persons belonging to national minorities to exercise their electoral right and 
to elect their representatives to the Croatian Sabor on the basis of national identity. 
However, a person belonging to a national minority can also choose not to exercise his 
electoral right on the basis of his nationality. In Article 15 of the Constitution, it is stated 
that “Members of all nations and minorities shall have equal rights in the Republic of 
Croatia. Members of all nations and minorities shall be guaranteed freedom to express 
their nationality, freedom to use their language and script, and cultural autonomy.” 
  
General Provisions (Articles 4, 5, 6) 
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia ensures the equality of all its citizens 
(Articles 14, 15, and 26). Furthermore, a special protection of minority rights is 
guaranteed in a way that the Constitution provides for a special procedure, namely the 
requirement of a two-third majority of all representatives in the House of 
Representatives of the Sabor, for passing legislation regulating minority rights. (Article 
83). In addition, the Constitution also provides that such laws shall be passed only after 
an opinion has been obtained from the House of Counties. (Article 81).   
The respect for national minority rights is determined in a more precise approach 
in the CLNM. In Article 3 of the CLNM, it is stated that  
“(1) The rights and freedoms of persons who belong to 
national minorities, as basic human rights and freedoms, shall be an 
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inseparable part of the democratic system of the Republic of Croatia 
and shall enjoy necessary support and protection, including positive 
measures to the benefit of national minorities. (2) Ethnic and 
multicultural diversity and spirit of understanding, mutual respect 
and tolerance shall contribute to the promotion of development of 
the Republic of Croatia.”  
In the subsequent article, the principle of the equality of the citizens of Croatia is 
emphasized, followed by the acknowledgement of non-discrimination principle. (Article 
4) In the concluding chapter of “Rights and Freedoms”, guarantees for the exercise of 
the basic rights of the members of national minorities are ensured (CLNM, Articles 9-
22)   
In addition, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia ensures the full 
observances of the principle of non-discrimination  (Article 6, paragraph 1) and 
proposes penalties for the breach of the equality of its citizens (Article 106/1) and 
exercise of their rights for the preservation of their national characteristics, such as to 
freely express his or her national belonging or the right to cultural autonomy (Article 
106/2), the use of language and script (Article 106/3), association of citizens to form 
political parties or other associations to advance their national, cultural goals (Article 
109). This provisions also includes penalties for the promotion of the idea of racial 
superiority or any forms of racial discrimination (Article 39; Article 174/2, Article 
174/3)   
Furthermore, “in order for national minorities to participate in the public life of 
the Republic of Croatia and especially to discuss, propose, regulate and resolve issues 
related to the exercise and protection of rights and freedoms of national minorities”, the 
CLNM proposed the establishment of the “Council for National Minorities. (CLNM, 
Article 35, paragraph 1) With its goal specified in Article 35, it was added that “the 
Council shall co-operate with the competent state bodies and bodies of self-government 
units, councils of national minorities or minority representatives, associations of national 
minorities and legal persons performing the activities, through which minority rights and 
freedoms are exercised.(CLNM, Article 35, paragraph 1) 
As an institution for the protection of human rights, the Ombudsman’s Office has 
also been established in accordance with Article 7, Paragraph 5 of the Ombudsman Law 
(1992) Official Gazette 60/92): “The Ombudsman may submit his admonitions, 
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information, proposals and reports to the media, who have the obligation to make them 
public.” The Ombudsman also submits his annual activity report to the Croatian 
Parliament (Article 8) on the status of constitutional and legal civil rights. 
Territorial Provisions (Article 16) 
The main principles of local and regional self- government in the Republic of 
Croatia are defined and established in the sixth chapter of the Constitution under the title 
“The Law on Local Self- Government and Administration”. The units of self-
government are proposed to  
“carry out the affairs of local jurisdiction by which the needs of 
citizens are directly fulfilled, and in particular the affairs related to the 
organization of localities and housing, area and urban planning, public 
utilities, child care, social welfare, primary health services, education and 
elementary schools, culture and physical education and sports, customer 
protection, protection and improvement of the environment, fire protection 
and civil defence. Units of regional self-government shall carry out the 
affairs of regional significance, and in particular the affairs related to 
education, health service, area and urban planning, economic development, 
traffic and traffic infrastructure and the development of network of 
educational, health, social and cultural institutions” (Art. 134).  
They are proposed to have their own revenues and have the right to free disposal 
in performing affairs within their jurisdiction (Art. 137).    
The basic provision which regulates the new district organization of the Republic 
of Croatia is the “Law on District Areas, Cities and Municipalities in the Republic of 
Croatia”, which was passed on December 30, 1992. It went through a number of 
amendments where “utmost thought was given to respecting the homogenous of the area 
in which national minorities are the majority”. Eventually, the territorial organization 
was revised before the second local elections in the Republic of Croatia by passing the 
“Law on the Territories of Counties (Zupanije), Cities and Municipalities in the 
Republic of Croatia”. The law was passed by the House of Representatives of Croatia on 
January 17, 1997, and published in “The National Gazette” No. 10/97, on January 30, 
1997 and went into effect on February 7, 1997. 370  
                                                 
370  See, the “Report submitted by Croatia pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, received on 16 
March 1999; Article 16, Narrative, paragraph 2-3. 
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In additional to these legal provisions, in paragraph 5 of Art. 4 of the CLNM, it 
is guaranteed that “The undertaking of measures which change the proportion among the 
population in the areas inhabited by persons who belong to national minorities and 
which are directed at hindering the exercise or restricting the rights and freedoms 
stipulated by this Constitutional Law and special laws, shall be forbidden.” 
 
Political Participation (Articles 7, 17) 
 
By the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Articled 42) all citizens are 
guaranteed the right to peaceful assembly and public protest aimed at protection of their 
interests or promotion of their social, economic, political, national, cultural, and other 
convictions and objectives. Furthermore, these rights are regulated by the “Act on Public 
Assembly.” By Article 15 of the CLNM, national minorities were granted the right to 
establish associations, endowments and foundations.  
 
In addition to that, the CLNM also guarantees the right to establish contacts with 
their kin-states. (CLNM, Article 16, paragraph 1) In this context, several bilateral 
agreements were signed with the states in the region.371 
 
In addition to the guarantee of Article 18 of the Constitution regarding the 
allocation of seats in the Parliament for the participation of national minorities in the 
decision-making process both at the national and local level, the CLNM takes explicit 
assurances by its Articles 19 and 20. In these articles, the members of national 
minorities are guaranteed the right to representation (Article 19; paragraph 1); with a 
guaranteed quota of “a minimum of five and a maximum of eight of their 
representatives in special electoral units” (Article 19; paragraph 2), the minorities with 
a population less than 1,5% are also guaranteed a minimum of one and a maximum of 
                                                 
371 9 bilateral cooperation agreements are cited in the State Report on the Framework 
Convention for Protection of National Minorities to the Council of Europe. Recently in 
February 2005, an official agreement was also signed with Serbia and Montenegro. See, 
the “Report submitted by Croatia pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, received on 16 March 1999; 
Article 17.  
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three representative seats (Article 19; paragraph 3). The subsequent article ensures the 
same rights for representation at local self- government units (Article 20).  
Furthermore, the CLNM introduces the establishment of Councils for National 
Minorities under the chapter of “Councils and Representatives of National Minorities 
(Articles 23-34). The representation mechanisms provided for the members of national 
minorities are stipulated in details in Article 24 of the CLNM. 
 
 The CLNM also proposes the establishment of a broader institution, namely the 
“Council for National Minorities” “in order for national minorities to participate in the 
public life of the Republic of Croatia and especially to discuss, propose, regulate and 
resolve issues related to the exercise and protection of rights and freedoms of national 
minorities.” (Art. 35, paragraph 1) 
 
Language (Articles 10, 11) 
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the CLNM distinguish the 
private, public and official use of a minority language. The official use is realized 
exclusively in the work of the bodies of local self-government units and administrative 
authorities, where local authorities authorized to introduce a minority language and 
script into the official use on its area and form of its application shall be determined by 
the law (Article 12).372 The CLNM sets out the various dimensions of the right to use of 
own language for the minority languages from the personal level to the acceptance of it 
as an official language alongside Croatian language: use of surname and name, the 
identification card in his/her own language (Article 9); use of language and script 
privately and publicly (Article 10); the equal use of the language and script used by 
members of a national minority in a local self-government unit, “when members of a 
particular national minority comprise at least one third of the population of such a unit” 
(Article 12, paragraph 1 and the subsequent paragraphs); use of language and script of a 
                                                 
372 However, at the time of the Republic of Croatia’s submission of his Report on 
Framework Convention to the Council of Europe, the relevant law has not been passed 
by the Parliament, thus the process of application has also been determined by the local 
self-government units, which of course cause differences.  
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national minority in traditional names and signs; in settlements, streets and squares 
(Article 13); the use of signs and symbols of national minorities (Article 14).   
Furthermore, the Law on General Administrative Procedure set out the details of 
the use of minority language in administrative procedures (Article 15). This right is also 
extended to the judicial processes (The Law on the Civil Proceeding, Articles 7, 102, 
103, 104, 105, 367/3; The Court Standing Orders/Rules/Rules of Procedures, Article 88, 
and paragraph 2).  
 In addition to these, local self government units have the authority to arrange 
official use of minority language involving the use of the names of cities, streets, 
topographical indications etc, in the minority language. These units arrange these 
questions by their statutes, in dependence with local circumstances and tradition on an 
individual area. The state by its regulations or jurisdictions does not intervene this right 
of the local self government unit.373  
 Furthermore, the Law on the First Name determines the scope of the selection 
and change of the first name (Article 6, 8).  
 
Education (Articles 12, 13, 14) 
  
Croatian laws permit national minorities to request education in their languages, 
and contributes organizationally, financially and other ways of acquiring knowledge 
such as the curriculum reflecting their literature, culture and history. While the 
Constitution guarantees cultural autonomy (Article 15), by underlying the obligation of 
the Croatian government to ensure education in the language and script which the 
national minorities use (CLNM, Article 7), CLNM specifically determines the procedure 
of education in the language of a national minority. 
 The education of minorities is organized through the accomplishment of 
various aspects of schooling such as the professional training of primary teachers and 
                                                 
373 See, the “Report submitted by Croatia pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, received on 16 
March 1999; Article 11, paragraph 3, narrative. 
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professors (Law on Education, Article 13), additional curricula relevant to their 
nationalities, textbooks written in the language of minorities. Subsequently, in its State 
Report on the Framework Convention to the Council of Europe it was emphasized that 
“a smaller number of pupils is tolerated in classes than the required number for classes 
attended by pupils of Croatian nationality. Teachers in these classes are usually 
members of national minorities and have an adequate degree for the corresponding 
school level.” The Ministry of Education and Sport also ensures to cover the increased 
costs for minority schools.374 
 The Law of Preschool Education”, the “Law of Elementary Schools” and the 
“Law of High Schools” do not address the education of minorities in detail. However, it 
must be stated that by Article 65 of the Constitution, everybody regardless of his of her  
race, color of skin, national or ethnic origin or religious beliefs, has the right to primary, 
secondary and higher education according to the abilities. Furthermore, as proposed in 
Article 11, paragraph 3 of the CLNM the Croatian government also implements 
affirmative actions. 
 
Culture and Media (Article 9) 
Beside the general recognition of the freedom of thought and expression (Article 
38), through the CLNM, the Republic of Croatia guarantees the members of national 
minorities, the right to access to media and cultural matters in general (CLNM, Articles 
17; 18). The Law on Telecommunication also provides for broadcast in languages of 
ethnic and national communities, with limits (Article 64). İn its report on Framework 
Convention, the Republic of Croatia also ensures that “all national minorities are 
entitled under the same terms to access and freedom of expression in the program and 
broadcast of (the state television) HTV”, 375 which are proclaimed in the Law on 
Croatian Radio-Television (Article 6, paragraph 2; 8).    
 
                                                 
374 See, ibid, Article 12, paragraph 2, Narrative from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education and Sport.  
 
375
 Ibid, Article 9, paragraph 3. 
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Religion (Article 8) 
The Constitution of Croatia ensures the freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 
40, 41). Pursuant to Article 106, and regarding Article 41 of the Constitution, the 
President of the Republic of Croatia has set up a State Commission for the relations with 
religious Communities and appointed its members.  The Commission is responsible for 
considering the regulation of relations between the state and the church, co-operating 
with the competent commission of the Croatian Bishops' Conference and representatives 
of other religious communities, as well as submitting Joint proposals to the state 
commissions and executive bodies.376 In this context, religious communities have the 
right to association set forth in Art. 43 of the Constitution, supported by the “Act on 
Associations”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
376
 Ibid, Article 6, paragraph 1, from the Jurisdiction of the State Commission for the 
Relations with Religious Communities.” 
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B. 3. Factual Situation on the Exercise of National Minority Rights 
The Parliamentary and Presidential elections in January 2000 marked a turning 
point in the Croatian democratization process, particularly regarding the respect for the 
rights of national minorities. Following the victory of a centre-left, pro-European six-
party coalition, the Parliament amended the 1991 Constitution in May 2000 which 
reintroduced some of the suspended provisions regarding the Serbian minority and 
adopted a longstanding commitment to the Council of Europe, namely the 
“Constitutional Law on National Minorities” in December 2002. These developments 
provided considerable improvements has been achieved with respect to the protection of 
the rights of national minorities, however, the implementation of the Framework 
Convention in Croatia is still strongly affected by the legacy of the 1991-1995 conflict. 
Although this affects the exercises of the national minorities in general, it specifically 
affects the rights of the members of the Serbs and the Roma.   
Today, there are still crucial problems that the Croatian government had to 
overcome. These can be summarized as follows:  
Refugee Returns: Between 300,000 and 350,000 ethnic Serbs in Croatia left 
their homes during the 1991-95 war and fled to Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (AI 2005; HRW 2005). By August 2004, the government had registered 
112,162 Serb returnees (HRW 2005). However, as reflected in the HRW’s 2005 Annual 
Report on Croatia, “the actual number of returns is significantly lower because many 
Croatian Serbs leave again for Serbia and Montenegro or Bosnia after only a short stay 
in Croatia” (HRW 2005; MRG 2003: 32). This is especially due to legal and 
administrative obstacles and the intolerant attitudes of some central and local officials 
(CERD 2002).377  
 
                                                 
377
 In this regard, in its 2002 Conclusion, CERD reported inconsistencies and the lack of 
transparency in the National Programme for Return: “The insufficient efforts of the 
State party to prevent discrimination against minorities, especially Croatian Serbs, in 
addressing issues of restitution of property, tenancy and occupancy rights, 
reconstruction assistance, as well as the inter related issues of residency and citizenship 
rights.” See, CERD Concluding Observations, 21 May 2002; cited in MRG 2003, p. 31. 
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 The fact that inadequate conditions at the local services and economy 
“discourage potential returnees to flee once more” (UNHRC 2002) was confirmed by 
the US State Department’s report that the administrative obstacles continued to exist, 
such as “delays in ‘covalidation’ of legal and administrative documents” tracing back to 
the war, “to make it difficult for ethnic Serbs both to return and remain” (USDS 2003)378 
Furthermore, in its study in Knin in 2003, UNHCR showed that only 62 per cent of the 
return could be considered as sustainable, while 27 per cent were “commuters” moving 
between their place of origin and where they fled. This required an effective 
resettlement programme guaranteeing mainly the repossession of houses, tenancy rights, 
status rights, employment and the essential social benefits. In this context, although 
gradually the legal framework has been set up for an effective resettlement, the 
international organizations have reported an evident, lengthy process for returnees 
pursuing to hold their rights, which requires the political will.  
  
 In 2003, the government adopted several documents regarding the 
implementation of the return process, property repossession and reconstruction of 
damaged homes of the ethnic Serbs. The ministry for Public Works, Reconstruction and 
Construction regarding destroyed residential properties and in July adopted three 
additional laws.379  However, during the parliamentary process of adopting these laws, 
The Croatian Helsinki Committee criticized several discriminatory processes, such as 
the one stating that refuges of Serb ethnicity could not apply for compensation if they 
did not possess Croatian citizenship, or the one ordering the compensation process only 
in cases of responsibility for damage caused by terrorist acts (IHF 2004: 8). Although 
some were deleted in the later stages, it still has provisions violating some articles of the 
Constitution.380 Furthermore, the process of the repossession of property continues at a 
                                                 
378
 US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practice Croatia 2002. In its 
2002 Global Report, UNHCR also cited that inadequate conditiond at the local services 
and economy “discourage potential returness to flee once more”.  
 
379
 The Law on the Responsibility for Damage Caused by the Terrorist Acts and Public 
Demonstrations, the Law on the Responsibility of the Republic of Croatia for Damage 
Caused by Members of the Croatian Armed Forces and Police During the Homeland 
War and the Law on Responsibility of the Republic of Croatia for Compensation 
Resulting from Damage Caused in the Former FRY for which the Former FRY 
Responsible. Cited in, IHF 2004 Croatia Annual Report, p.7. 
 
380
 See, IHF (2004). 
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very slow pace (AI 2005). The main reason behind that was “the inefficiency of the 
judiciary and the fact that it tended to favor the occupants over the legal rights of 
owners” (IHF 2004: 8; HRW 2005) In its 2005 Annual Report on Croatia, The HRW 
reported that the process is eventually nearing completion by citing the government data 
that 1,800 houses were returned to their owners in the first seven months of 2004, with 
only 1,700 occupied houses still to be returned (HRW 2005). However, AI also reports 
that the repossession rate remained slow, adding that “lengthy, and in some cases unfair, 
proceedings, particularly in lower levels, remained a major obstacle for returnees 
pursuing their rights in court” (AI 2005). Furthermore, the positions of the Serb refugees 
contrast with that of former tenancy rights-holders with returnee status, especially the 
Croats returning to the former UNTAES mission.381  
 
 While the same violations have also been witnessed regarding the tenancy 
rights, the government introduced some set of measures. For instance, in October 2002, 
the Minister for Public Works proclaimed that former occupancy/tenancy rights-holders 
who return to the Areas of Special State Concern can receive temporary accommodation 
in collective centres, as a temporary solution to the problem.382 In a more recent 
initiative, in June 2003, the government proposed a series of provisions which enabled 
former tenancy right holders, outside the Areas of Special State Protectorate, i.e. former 
Krajina, to rent or purchase the government-built apartments at below-market rates 
(HRW 2005; IHF 2004). However, many of ethnic Serbs refuges are still unable to 
regain their rights. As HRW reported, in August 2004, the government admitted that the 
implementation of the aforementioned plan in June 2003 had yet to begin. (HRW 2005) 
  
 In contrast to these, reconstruction assistance by the state given to returning 
Croatian Serbs, which was initiated first in 2002 (MRC 2003: 33) has continued at a 
satisfactory pace (HRW 2005) 
 
 Beside these initiatives targeted to the infrastructure, the last, but not the least, 
problem is the status rights of the returnees. According to the Return Program of 1998, it 
was recognized that all people considered under the 1952 Geneva Conventions should 
                                                 
381
 See, MRG (2003: 32). 
 
382
 OSCE Mission to Croatia Status Report, No.11, p.16. Cited in MRG 2003, 33. 
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be able to return. However, in practice, the ethnic Serbs who could not confirm his or 
her Croatian citizenship face problems regarding the recognition of their status as 
residents. What’s more, under the 1991 Law on Croatian citizenship, which is based on 
ethnic criteria, provides ethnic Croats, even if they have not been the resident of Croatia, 
to obtain citizenship, but makes it much difficult to acquire permanent residence status 
and citizenship, for the persons who were the resident of Croatia in pre-war period but 
have not registered as Croatian citizens (ICG 2002: 5)383. In this regard, while obtaining 
documents and the process of application may cause considerable delay (MRG 2003: 
33; ICG 2002: 5), additional problems may arouse when these are not confirmed by the 
Ministry of Interior (“no-MOI” cases) (ICG 2002: 6). In this context, many returnees, 
although being residents of Croatia for long time, have been treated as immigrants (ICG 
2002: 6). To avoid the emergence such problems, the Joint Working Group on 
Legislation recommended on September 2002, the incorporation of lesser requirements 
(MRG 2003: 33), which was agreed by the Croatian authorities that “the permanent 
residence would be reinstated  on the basis of habitual residence on 8 October 1991, 
with no other conditions being attached” (ICG 2002: 6).  
 
 As cited, the issue of the refugee return has been one of the key elements of the 
EU conditionality. Underlying its interest on the issue in its 2002384, and 2003 SAP 
Reports which indicated a “limited progress in its achievements for the return process 
and de facto integration of the Serb minority.”385, EU recommended  Croatian 
government in its European Partnership Decision, to speed up the return for the shot 
term and complete it for the medium term.386 
Accountability for War Crimes and Cooperation with the ICTY: The issue 
of cooperation with the ICTY has been a persistent cause of instability both within the 
government and the international relations of Croatia which caused continuing 
international pressure, especially by the European Union, which eventually led the 
annulment of the initiation of the negotiation talks for membership. While this was the 
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 For the process of obtaining citizenship for those refugess, see, ICG 2002, pp. 9-10. 
 
384
 See, 2002 SAP Report, p. 50. 
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 See, 2003 SAP Report, fn. 221. 
 
386
 For details, see, p. 6 and 11. 
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case for the retired General Janko Bobetko, the former Chief of Staff of the Croatian 
Army387, it was not implemented by the Racan government by the end of 2002, arguing 
that then indictment contravened the Croatian Constitution (HRW 2003) and excuse 
grounds of his health (AI 2003), the recent crisis is on the custody of Ante Gotovina, the 
retired Croatian Army General. Although he was indicted for crimes against humanity 
and war crimes against the Serbs of Krajina in 1995 during the “Operation Storm”, “he 
had gone into hiding after the charges against him were published, although reportedly 
the authorities had been given prior warning by the Tribunal.” (AI 2003) Despite 
repeatedly criticizing of the Tribunal Prosecutor (AI 2004) and the proclamation of 
formal assurances (AI 2005), backed up the EU’s warnings through its SAP Reports 
2002, 2003, European Partnership Decision and Opinion of the EC on its application for 
membership, Croatian authorities continued to keep on their vague approaches on 
cooperation with the ICTY. Furthermore, to make matters worse, in October 2004, the 
Prime Minister Ivo Sanader publicly stated his belief in Gotovina’s innocence (AI 
2005). 
Employment Discrimination: Discrimination in employment is undoubtedly 
one of the major problems for a variety of sectors in the Croatian society, but especially 
for ethnic Serbs. As early as 1993, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed its concerns over “the circulation in Croatia 
of ethnic lists of persons considered non-Croatian in origin, which were used for 
discriminatory purposes, particularly concerning employment opportunities.”. In its 
Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 6 April 2001, the Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention, pointed out that  
“the extraordinarily low representation of national minorities within the 
executive and in the judiciary is partially a result of past discriminatory measures 
(often related to the conflict of 1991-1995) aimed at curtailing, in particular, the 
number of persons belonging to the Serb minority in various bodies, including in 
courts.”388.  
                                                 
387
 The indictment against whom was made by public by the ICTY in September 2003 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against Serbs in 1993. 
 
388
 The Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities on Croatia, Art. 15, item. 56. 
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A government statistics in July in 2000 evidently affirmed the discrimination: 
“only 2,8 per cent of the state administration employees (excluding the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Defence) belonged to the Serb minority and (...) there were 
only two Roma employed in all of these bodies”389 Although the December 2002 
Constitutional Law on Minority Rights obliges the state to ensure proportional 
representation in the administration and the judiciary, at the state, county and municipal 
levels (HRW 2004), which was repeatedly emphasized by the EU in 2003 SAP Report, 
European Partnership and EC Opinion the violations of these provisions continues to be 
reported (HRW 2005; HRW 2004; MRG 2003: 23; AI 2005)     
Religious Rights: Although there has not been any violation on the exercise of 
the freedom of religious affiliation, the problem exists rather due the position of the 
Catholic Church in respect to the official authorities. By the adoption of the Law on 
Legal Status of Religious Communities in June 2002, all “traditional” confessions were 
permitted to develop freely, found schools and carry out humanitarian work on an equal 
basis” (IHF 2004; IHF 2003, 2003 SAP Report). The Croatian government signed 
contracts with the Holy See (The Catholic Church), the Serbian Orthodox Church, and 
the Islamic Community in Croatia, which determined their activities within institutions 
such as the armed forces, prisons and schools, which guarantees the principle of equality 
in respect to their relations state institutions and the allocation of state funds. In this 
context, the Serbian Orthodox Community was proposed to receive 7,5 million kuna, 
and the Islamic Community 2,1 million kuna annually from the state budget. (MRG 
2003: 27; 2003 SAP Report: 9). However, beside the fact that these contracts do not 
regulate the repossession of property to the religious communities (MRG 2003: 27; IHF 
2004), it is also noted that the agreements did not guarantee similar privileges to those 
communities, when compared with the Holy See. (IHF 2004). For instance, according to 
the Agreement, the Roman Catholic Church achieved the right to offer religious 
education in schools and kindergartens, excluding the other communities (IHF 2003). 
The problems regarding infrastructure also violates the principle equality. Although 
religious instruction is optional in primary and secondary schools since 1992, “the lack 
of financial resources, the limited number of pupils belonging to small religious 
                                                 
389
 See, the Croatian State Report on the implementation of the Framework Convention, 
1998.  
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communities and the lack of qualified teachers has meant that Roman Catholic Church 
religious education prevails.”(MRG 2003: 26)      
The Issue of Tolerance in Public Media and Society:  As pointed out by the 
MRG Report (2003) “as early as 1995 the UN expressed its concern over the way in 
which the mass media was aggravating ethnic tensions, and over the state’s failure to 
take action against the print media for promoting ethnic hatred against Serbs.”390 Since 
then intolerance, racial discrimination and the relevant issue such as xenophobia and 
hate speech have been one of the common human rights violations reported by the 
international NGOs, Croatian Helsinki Committee at particular. In its annual reports 
2002 and 2003, IHF emphasized that there was not a comprehensive legislation 
explicitly prohibiting racial discrimination in public life, although Croatia is a party to 
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
which stipulates the relevant measures (IHF 2002, 2003).  
In this period hate speech was mainly observed in demonstrations in support of 
the generals accused of committing war crimes(IHF 2002), during the electoral 
campaign in November 2003 (IHF 2004), on printed media, i.e. the cases of Slobodna 
Dalmacija, the weekly Focus, and Hrvatska slovo (IHF 2002), on radio broadcasting, i.e. 
Radio Rijeka and Plavi Radio cases (IHF 2002) 
Beside these, it was also reported that numerous citizens and foreigners have 
been attacked by the skinheads (IHF 2002, IHF 2003, IHF 2004). While these incidents 
took place, a public opinion poll in October 2002 clearly displayed the potential of 
intolerance especially towards the ethnic Serbs who were seen as the cause of the war 
between 1991 and 1995 and the Trojan horse within Croatia: one in four Croatian adults 
stated that he or she would expel ethnic Serbs from Croatia.391. This was even higher in 
Dalmatia and Slavonia, which was severely affected by the war: 44 and 35 per cent 
respectively.392 The hate towards the Serbs was also revealed in a poll on in April 2002, 
with the results that 35% of the interviewed stated that they hated Serbs; while only 7% 
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 CERD Conclusions, 22 September 1995; cited in MRG 2003, p. 28.  
 
391
 This was one in seven for the Bosniaks and Montenegrins, and one in 10 for the 
Slovenes.  
 
392
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expressed that he/she think to marry with a member of a minority group393. In another 
poll, made public on 22 November 2002, 75 per cent of the respondents stated that the 
government should not accelerate the return of the Serbs.394 CERD strongly urged the 
Croatian government to undertake measures for non-discriminatory measures in all 
sectors of public life (IHF 2003), the greater motivation and political seems to be needed 
for the accommodation of inter-ethnic tolerance.    
In this regard, as reflected in the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee on 
the FCNM, although relations between the Ombudsman and the relevant governmental 
bodies improve, it still has financial problems mainly due to limited resources. The 
reality that it is especially the members of the national minorities who face significant 
human rights violations, its course of service should be extended to the areas where the 
minority groups hold significant population, through the establishment of regional 
offices.395  
 In this context, it is quite interesting that, despite its emphasis on the adoption 
of legal procedures and their implementation, the EC does not explicitly deal with the 
intolerance within society and media towards minorities, except its statement in EC 
Opinion on application for membership that “(a)lthough hate speech is constantly 
decreasing, national minorities are perceived and presented as a separate entities and not 
as an integral part of the society”396  
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B. 4. Implementation of the EU Vision of Good Neigbourhood Relations 
 
Supplementary to the promotion of democratic governance and the protection of 
human and minority rights, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements provide the 
model for the level and type of cooperation that the EU expects to be followed between 
the countries of the Western Balkans. Furthermore, it requires each signatory state to 
conclude a bilateral convention on regional co-operation with other signatories.397 In this 
framework, as a “cornerstone of the European Union’s policy for the region”398, Croatia 
has been expected to normalize and strengthen its regional and bilateral cooperation 
with neighbouring countries, as a key element of the SAA conditionality.  
 
In this context, in its 2002 SAA Report, the EC warned that “nationalistic 
pressures affect the attitude of the Government to increased regional co-operation”.  It 
added that although “at the bilateral, practical, level there have been important steps 
forward there is a persistent tendency to over-politicise and over-estimate the impact of 
and intentions behind regional initiatives”. To conclude, it recommended that “Croatia 
needs finally to overcome regional and historical frictions and take a more open 
approach to addressing outstanding political questions with its neighbours.”399 
 
In fact, although the diplomatic relations between the two countries were 
established in 1996, the relations remained problematic mainly burdened by the heritage 
of the war. The regime changes in 2000 in both Croatia and Serbia marked a turning 
point in the adjustment of bilateral relations. Following the meetings between political 
leaders and top officials such as the meeting between President V. Koštunica and 
President S. Mesić at the summit of the EU and Western Balkan countries in November 
2000; meeting between President V. Koštunica and President S. Mesić at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2001; and the one between President 
V. Koštunica and President S. Mesić at the Forum of the Heads of State of Central 
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European Countries in Verbania in June 2001,400finally at their first official meeting in 
November 2001 in New York, the two Foreign Ministers of the two countries agreed on 
the priorities for further normalization of bilateral relations.401 Since then the relations 
between the two countries intensified through regular contacts.402 The first concrete 
reflection of this normalization process was the Free Trade Agreement on 23 December 
2002403, in accordance with the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding 
on liberalizing and facilitating trade under the auspices of the Stability Pact, which had 
been identified in the 2002 SAP Report as a priority404. The progress in bilateral 
relations was also reflected to 2003 SAP Report on Croatia as “improving”. It was stated 
that “(a)lthough the Croatian political class is still to some extent reluctant to develop 
closer political and economic ties, relations have improved in quality and regular 
contacts on working level have been established.” Among these were Border 
demarcation of the Danube River, an agreement for a temporary border regime of the 
Prevlaka peninsula in December 2002, the establishment of joint police patrols in March 
2003, an inter-state agreement on minority rights conditional on resolving the problem 
of Serb refuges from Croatia, some initiatives for the liberalisation visa regime, 
cooperation regarding the search for missing persons, readmission agreement in April 
2002, ratification of the agreement on social and pension issues by the Croatian 
Parliament in April 2002, an agreement on cooperation in fighting organized crime in 
May 2003, and the negotiations for an agreement on minorities405 However, the EC also 
noted in the same Report that “(b)ilateral relations continued (…)(to) be burdened by the 
minority issue and refugee return, as well as FRY reluctance to cooperate with ICTY 
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regarding war crimes committed in Croatia, especially Vukovar.”406 However, in its 
“priority areas needing attention in the next 12 months”, there were not any explicit 
requirement on bilateral relations within the framework of regional cooperation, rather 
what was needed were the “conclusion of negotiations on the bilateral regional 
convention with former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Work to find definitive 
solutions to the pending bilateral issues, in particular with Slovenia”407 
 
Furthermore, although problems to be resolved were recorded by the EC’s 
Opinion on Croatia’s application for membership in April 2004408, due to both the 
requirements of the Stability Pact on trade measures such as the establishment of FTAs, 
and the SAA conditionality within the process of European integration, the bilateral 
relations continues to gradually improve. After the two countries had abolished visa 
regimes in May and June 2003,409 an important psychological obstacle had been 
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dimension of bilateral cooperation between the two countries was among the weakest 
ones in the region. In their swot analysis, the COE and ISIG determined 5 dimension of 
cross-border cooperation among the weakest marks. These were the level of propensity 
towards co-operation, cross-border relation by sector of activity, incisiveness of 
economic obstacles, Institutional factors for co-operation and administrative factors for 
co-operation. (COE & ISIG 2002: 158-159). In this 2002 report, by pointing out that 
cross-border co-operation between Croatia and Serbia is “necessary and wished for”, the 
factors that stands as an obstacles to this co-operation is noted as “lack of funds, low 
economic and technological development rates, extreme labour market protection and 
tax and customs restrictions”.(COE & ISIG 2002: 115)  
 
408
 These were “the border demarcation at the Danube river and at Prevlaka, succession 
related issues, the problem of missing persons, Croatia’s claim for compensation for war 
damage, return of refugees and restitution of their property, in particular property 
restitution to business entities and the ratification of the FTA. For detailed information, 
see, the “European Commission Opinion on the application of Croatia for membership 
of the European Union,” Brussels, 20 April 2004,, pp. 32-33. 
 
409
 In May 2003 Serbia and Montenegro abolished visas for citizens from the EU and 
neighbouring countries, including Croatia. Subsequent to that, in June 2003 Croatia 
abolished temporarily the visa regime for the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro for the 
period of 10 June to 31 December 2003. This was later extended to 30 June 2004. The 
Croatian Government outlined three political conditions for the permanent abolition of 
the visa regime: (i) return of registers of births, marriages and deaths of Croatian 
citizens which were taken to Belgrade in 1995;  (ii) replacement of SaM military at the 
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overcome on 10 September 2003. During the visit of Mesic to Belgrade, the Presidents 
of Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia, Svetozar Marovic and Stjepan Mesic, apologized 
to one another on behalf of their two countries for all the evil or damage the two 
countries’ citizens have done to each other, underlining that the responsibility for the 
committed crimes must be individual. In this regard, as cited in EC’s Opinion410, 
although the issue of minorities and the regarding war-related issues has been “one of 
the most sensitive questions in normalization of relations”, concrete policies have been 
applied in the last two years, such as the exchange of the ratification instruments for the 
Social Security Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, signed on Sept 15, 1997 on April 2004411, signing of a Protocol on 
Cooperation in the process of European integrations412 in May 2004, an agreement on 
the protection of minority rights in the two countries413 and an agreement on the transfer 
of the convicted Serbs from the Lepoglava prison to the state union414 in November 
2004, and recently an agreement on the protection of minorities in February 2005. 
 
In this regard, the statements of Croatia’s top officials, particularly the President 
Stjepan Mesic and the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader reveal that the main reference point 
in the strengthening of bilateral cooperation is the prospect of European integration (see, 
Annex 3)  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Danube border by police; (iii) full cooperation regarding the search for missing persons. 
Cited in, ibid, p. 33.  
 
410
 Ibid., p. 33. 
 
411
 The Agreement, which came into force on July 2004, regulates pension and health 
security rights, dole for the unemployed, and is valid for to persons who realized the 
right to a pension in Croatia, i.e. Serbia-Montenegro before and after Oct 8, 1991, as 
well as to persons who regulated their pension status via decrees. 
 
412
 Signed by the President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesic and the Prime Minister Ivo 
Sanader in Zagreb. 
 
413
 Signed by the Serbia-Montenegro Human and Minority Rights Minister, Rasim 
Ljajic, and Croatian Justice Minister Vesna Skare Ozbolt. 
 
414
 Signed by the Croatian Justice Minister Vesna Skare Ozbolt and the Serbia-
Montenegro Human and Minority Rights Minister, Rasim Ljajic. 
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In this regard, the phrases indication a positive relationship with the Croatian 
officials’ and political leaders’ will on bilateral cooperation can be stipulated in such a 
statiscal framework out of total 37 entry: 
 
European prospects and the objective to be closer to the EU > 9  
The fact that there is no alternative to that > 6 
Traditional neighbourhood > 3 
The interest of mutual relations between states and peoples > 3 
The stability of the region > 3 
Encourage pro-European forces > 2 
Protocol on Cooperation in European Integration Processes > 2 
Intensification of reforms > 1 
A stable neighbourhood > 1 
Example to other countries > 1 
Message to citizens > 1 
Applying European standards > 1 
Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities > 1 
Transnational integration process > 1 
  
To cluster these, transnational integration process seems to be the source of main 
motivation for the Croat leaders for bilateral cooperation with Serbia (32.4%). Although 
not directly refer to expressed the objective of such integration process, when we add 
the phrases regarding “encouraging pro-European forces” and “applying European 
standards”, the European Union and the prospect for integration with it becomes the 
main motivation (40.54%). In this context, although not directly referring to national 
minorities, “The interest of mutual relations between states and peoples” holds 8.1%; 
while the only entry that directly refers to the protection of national minorities, namely 
“Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities” holds 2.7% with 1 entry. 
 
In this framework, taking European integration prospect as the main reference 
point, since 1994, the two states signed 33 treaties and acts governing further 
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cooperation between the two countries.415 Furthermore, currently Croatia continues to 
play an active role in several regional and sub-regional initiatives, such as the Stability 
Pact, the Adriatic–Ionian initiative, the “Quadrilaterale”416, the Central European 
Initiative (CEI), South-East Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the Alps-Adriatic initiative, 
the Danube Commission. It is an also observer in the South-East European Cooperation 
Process (SEECP).417 
 
In view of that, in its European Partnership Decision, EU implemented policies 
to implement for the short- and medium-term as: 
 
(1) “Enhance regional co-operation. Work to find definitive 
solutions to pending bilateral issues, in particular border issues with 
Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ensure 
implementation of all regional free trade agreements. Conclude and 
implement a set of agreements with neighbouring countries in the fields of 
fight against organised crime, border management and readmission. Start 
implementing the MoU on the Development of the South East Europe 
Core Regional Transport Network and in particular take measures to set 
up the cooperation mechanisms, i.a. the Steering Committee and the South 
East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO). Make progress in meeting 
commitments under the 2002 and 2003 Memoranda of the Athens process 
on the Regional Energy Market in South East Europe; 
Ensure proper implementation of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement in the field of regional co-operation. Conclude 
negotiations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the 
bilateral convention on regional cooperation” 
 
(2)“(w)ith regard to the Athens process on the Regional Energy 
Market in South East Europe, prepare for the establishment of an 
integrated regional energy market in 2005” in the medium term under the 
framework of “European Partnership”.418 
                                                 
415
 For a list of the treaties signed between Croatia and Serbia since 1994, see 
http://www.mfa.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1620 
 
416
 Between Italy, Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia. 
 
417In addition to that, in December 2002, Croatia signed the Sava River Basin 
Framework Agreement with Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and 
Montenegro. In February 2003 the Memorandum of Understanding on Regional 
Electricity Market in South East Europe (REM) and in December 2003 its addendum 
was signed. Cited in Opinion, p. 32. 
 
418
 See, Council Decision on the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Croatia, Brussels, 20. 04. 2004, COM (2004) 275 final, pp. 7 
and 11. 
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 What must be underlined here is Croatia’s position in the midst of EU 
membership and regional schemes. As evidently reflected in “European Commission 
Country Strategy Paper for Croatia 2002-2006 CARDS”, it is possible to witness acts of 
resistance for intensifying cooperation within regional framework. In view of that, it has 
been reported that “Croatia tends to reject regional initiatives, which it fears might 
strengthen the regional identity at the expense of closer integration with central 
European countries and EU Member States, which is its primary aim”. While this 
anxiety was reflected several times in the statements of Croatia’s top officials by 
reminding that the two processes are not mutually opposed.419 However, its position as a 
model for the other countries of the region, particularly Serbia and Montenegro, has also 
been severally declared s a contributing factor for the intensification of bilateral 
relations within the EU integration process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
419
 See,for instance Mesic’s speak at SEECP summit in Tirana, in 28 March 2002, 
reported by Hina.  
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C. Hungarian Question in Vojvodina, Serbia 
 
C. 1. Historical Background: Vojvodina and the Ethnic Hungarians 
 
In terms of ethnic and religious pluralism, Vojvodina is not just one of the most 
heterogeneous regions of Yugoslavia, but also Europe (CMK & VHRC 2003). 
Vojvodina became a part of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” in 1918.  
Although their rights were relatively restricted until 1968 despite the constitutional 
system of Tito’s Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ensuring equal representation 
and power-sharing of all national groups, until 1968, the autonomy of the two Socialist 
Autonomous Provinces (SAP) Vojvodina and Kosovo achieved considerable rights 
under the Constitution of 1974, through which “in many respects they were de facto 
republics until 1989” (König 2001: 6) In 1989, alongside the other SAP Kosovo, the 
autonomy of Vojvodina was abolished by the-then leader of the Serbian Communist 
Party, Slobodan Milosevic.  
 
As mentioned, Vojvodina has been one of the most ethnically heterogeneous 
regions in Yugoslavia, which experienced substantial changes in this ethnic composition 
due to wars, conflicts, shifts in borderlines, and migration. (CMK & VHRC 2003)420 It 
is also worth mentioning that along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina has 
registered the largest increase in the percentage of people declaring themselves as 
“Yugoslavs” between the early 1970s and the early-to-mid 1980’s (Devic 2001: 5); and 
a substantial mixed marriages (CMK & VHRC 2003) which probably clarifies the 
reason of the large number of ‘Yugoslavs’. Having experienced a new wave of 
demographic changes in its ethnic structure, today, alongside the Serbian majority (65,1 
%), Hungarians compose the largest national minority group in Vojvodina (14,3%). 
(See, Table 12) 
 
Vojvodina achieved to be secured from the violence erupted in the early 1990s. 
To some extent it also has not seen an open and systematic discrimination against 
national minorities as fiercely experienced in other parts of Yugoslavia. However, 
                                                 
420
 For a brief history of these demographical flows, see CMK & VHRC (2003). 
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particularly the Vojvodinian Croats has been an evident exception to this relatively 
optimist account. Indeed, the regime was sometimes criticized for “(taking) a low-key 
approach to dismantling previously ‘granted’ minority rights”; and thus “employing, in 
effect, a politics of creeping assimilation of Vojvodina’s minorities.” (Guzina 2000: 29). 
 
 
Table 10: Ethnic Composition of Vojvodina, 1948-2002 
Source: Table on “Changes in ethnic structure of the population of Vojvodina in 
the 20th century”, CMK & VHRC 2003. 
 
Ethnic group 1948 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002 
Serbs 
 
827633 
50,4% 
865538 
50,9% 
1017713 
54,9% 
1089132 
55,8% 
1107375 
54,4% 
1143723 
56,8% 
1321807 
65,1% 
Hungarians 428554 
26,1% 
435179 
25,6% 
442560 
23,9% 
423866 
21,7% 
385356 
18,9% 
339491 
16,9% 
290207 
14,3% 
Germans 28869 
1,8% 
- 
- 
- 
- 
7243 
0,4% 
3808 
0,2% 
3873 
0,2% 
3154 
0,2% 
Croats 132980 
8,1 
127027 
7,5% 
145341 
7,8% 
138561 
7,1% 
109203 
5,4% 
74808 
3,7% 
56546 
2,8% 
Slovaks 69622 
4,2% 
71153 
4,2% 
73830 
4,0% 
72795 
3,7% 
69549 
3,4% 
63545 
3,1% 
56637 
2,8% 
Romanians 57899 
3,5% 
57218 
3,4% 
57259 
3,1% 
52987 
2,7% 
47289 
2,3% 
38809 
1,9% 
30419 
1,5% 
Montenegrins 30531 
1,9% 
30516 
1,8% 
34782 
1,9% 
36416 
1,9% 
43304 
2,1% 
44838 
2,2% 
35513 
1,8% 
Ruthenians 22077 
1,3% 
23038 
1,4% 
- 
- 
20109 
1,0% 
19305 
1,0% 
17652 
0,9% 
15626 
0,8% 
Macedonians 9062 
0,6% 
11622 
0,7% 
15190 
0,8% 
16527 
0,8% 
18897 
0,9% 
17472 
0,9% 
11785 
0,6% 
Yugoslavs - 
- 
- 
- 
3174 
0,1% 
46928 
2,4% 
167215 
8,2% 
174295 
8,7% 
49881 
2,5% 
Others 33530 
2,1% 
78254 
4,6% 
65116 
3,5% 
47969 
2,5% 
63471 
3,2% 
95383 
4,7% 
160417 
7,6% 
TOTAL 1640757 
100,0% 
1699545 
100,0% 
1854965 
100,0% 
1952533 
100,0% 
2034772 
100,0% 
2013889 
100,0% 
2031992 
100% 
 
 
Today, ethnic Hungarians are the largest national minority group in Vojvodina. 
According to the census of 1991, they figured 16,85 % of Vojvodina’s population 
(339,491). Regionally, a massive population live in Backa (75,63%), followed by Banat  
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(21,56%) and Srem (2,81%) (Briza 2000: 15). However, when it is considered their 
population numbered less than 300,000 in 2002, the numbers indicate an emigration 
with an estimated 35,000-38,000 Vojvodina Hungarians since 1991 (Nasa Borba 15-16 
August 1998; cf. Briza 2000: 15). Briza indicates a series of reasons for this flow of 
emigration such as “the continuing fear of war and mobilization, a feeling of in security 
in an environment of ‘quiet ethnic cleansing’ of national minorities in Serbia (under the 
pressure of extreme nationalists and the regime’s passive attitude to it) and economic 
problems” (Briza 2000: 15). 
 
The same risk is even more threatening for the Croats which are officially denied 
the status of a national minority until the adoption of the Law on National Minorities in 
2002421. Due to the growing pressures of the Serbian nationalists, although there is not 
accurate numbers, it is estimated that approximately 30,000 Croats left Vojvodina since 
1995.422  
 
In the next part, having given an account of the EU-Serbian relations which is 
repeatedly determined by the position of minorities within its boundaries, Belgrade’s 
policy and performance on the protection of the rights of national minorities will be 
evaluated in the legal and factual context within the framework of the FCNM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
421
 Although the Croats in Yugoslavia achieved the status of a ‘national minority’ with 
the signature of the Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Normalization of Relations 
between the Republic of Croatia and FRY in 1995, their rights and freedoms have been 
legally recognized by the Law on National Minorities alongwith the other national 
minority groups. For details, see, Stojkovi (2003). 
 
422
 See, Humanitarian Law Centre (1977: 9-12); cited in Briza (2000: 15). 
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C. 2. EU in Serbia, Serbia in the Process of Europeanization 
 
From 1991 to 2001 the relations between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro had 
been mostly constructed with negative expressions, such as sanctions, embargo, 
restrictions or at least the threat of the use of these tools against the Government in 
Belgrade. Indeed, the first years of this period was remembered with an evident of 
failure of the-then EC policies. After its failure in preventing the outburst of the conflict 
mostly due to its slow, weak and divided body to give a unified and coherent response, 
the EC sought to act as a mediator in peace talks first by its own, then under a joint 
initiative by UN. However, as noted in the 1994 report of the HRW, beside “the lack of 
good faith by the parties, especially by Serbian forces”, “the failure of the EC 
conference (…) lies, in part, with the EC negotiators, who were more interested in 
reconciling the various parties than in ensuring that pledges were fulfilled and that gross 
abuses were denounced and punished”423 In fact that was one of the most ‘consistent’ 
policies of the EC –and EU- during the war and peace talks: the decision to implement 
UN sanctions against Yugoslavia was repeatedly broken by some countries424 including 
member states such as Greece425, lack of strict sanctions towards Milosevic’s continuous 
economic and military support to the Bosnian Serbs despite his opposite claims since 
1993426, reluctance to deal with the human rights record or the violations of other 
                                                 
423
 See, HRW 1994 Annual Report on the former Yugoslav Republics. 
 
424
 Such as Greece, Bulgaria and Macedonia, reported by 1995 HRW Annual Report on 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 
425
 See, ibid..  
 
426
 What was more interesting is the European Unions’s peace negotiator, David Owen’s 
report to the UN in early October that “controls of borders have been adequate”, while at 
the meantime it was reported by the US and German press that “massive cross-border 
commercial traffic, including black-maket fuel and light weaponry” continues through 
the border. Cited in 1995 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See 
also, 1996 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997 HRW Annual 
Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As reported in 1996 Report,  Milosevic also 
continued his support to the Serbs in Croatia, which was reported to be “carried aout in 
the presence of UN troops mandated to demilitarize the zone, who were ordered by their 
Russian commander not to block the movement. 
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international sanctions of the Yugoslav Government for the possibility of a peace 
agreement427     
On July 20, 1994, the EC accepted that the state formed by Serbia and 
Montenegro could not be regarded as the successor state to the former Yugoslavia and 
thus required to apply to the UN and the other international bodies.428 Following the 
signing of the Dayton peace agreement in November 1995, the European Union’s 
General Affairs Council agreed on the decision that long-term economic assistance is 
conditioned on “the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, respect for human and 
minority rights, cooperation with the ICTY, and with respect to FRY at granting of a 
large degree of autonomy within it for Kosovo.”429 Subsequent to that, in late December 
1995, as a ‘reward’ to Milosevic’s role in bringing about the Dayton peace agreement, 
the UN Security Council suspended the sanction imposed by the Security Council 
Resolution 757 (1992).430  
Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the EU’s policy has mainly targeted 
at the democratization of FRY. While EU condemned the violations in human rights 
mainly during the post-election demonstrations in 1997, as soon as Milosevic 
recognized the results of the election the EU welcomed the Yugoslav government. 
Subsequent to that, in April 1997, it granted the FRY preferential trade status, by adding 
that its status “will be reviewed” if there is no progress in democratization such as 
improvement in legislative regarding media, reform of the judicial system or signs of 
improvement in Kosovo. However, in its first visit of an EU delegation to FRY, in 
October, the ongoing violations especially for the Albanians in Kosovo were witnessed, 
which led the sanctions to be remained in place throughout 1997.431  
                                                 
427
 Such as the open violations of the UN-imposed “no-fly” zone over Bosnia by the 
Serbs See, 1996 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997 Annual 
Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
428
 Cited in ibid.  
 
429
 Cited in ibid.  
 
430
 Cited in 1997 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These were 
mainly involved to cease trading in any commodity, maintaning air traffic links, 
participating in sport or cultural events with the FRY.  
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The embargo was declared to be tightened during the outburst of Kosovo crisis 
in mid-1998 and 1999, such as the banning of investment in Serbia and flights by 
Yugoslav Airlines, freezing Serbian and Yugoslav government funds abroad, oil 
embargo against Yugoslavia, and visa ban on Milosevic’s political, economic and 
military allies432 However, in general EU was still suffering similar failures of the recent 
wars. As reported in the 2000 Annual Report of HRW on Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, “the EU was slow to adopt even relatively weak measures and was 
particularly slow to implement and enforce the measures adopted.”433 For instance, the 
aforementioned measure of asset freeze could be put into force 45 days after the 
adoption of the Common Position. Similarly, the decision to stop new investment in 
Serbia was annulled at the meeting of the EU General Affairs Council on 25 May 1998, 
in light of the Milosevic-Rugova meeting in Belgrade. However, in the same week 
Belgrade launched a major offensive, by breaching international humanitarian law.434 
After the ending of the war in Kosovo following the NATO bombing in April 
1999, the EU openly applied its ‘carrot-and-stick” policy. The FRY was excluded from 
the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe as long as Milosevic remained on power. 
However, in the meantime the EU continued its support to Montenegro and Kosovo, 
both in economic and political terms. Furthermore, in September 1999, EU announced 
aid programmes to the Serbian cities run by opposition forces,435 such as “Energy for 
Democracy” through which 17.513 tons of fuel oil was delivered to 7 cities governed by 
the opposition forces and aid to media and NGOs suppressed by the Government.436 
                                                                                                                                                        
431
 Cited in 1998 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
432
 Cited in 1999 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
433
 2000 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
434
 See, 2000 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
435
 Cited in 1999 HRW Annual Report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As cited in 
the same report, Montenegro was granted aproximately a total amount of 55.7 million 
euros in 1998-1999, while the EU provide 37.4 million Euro to Serbia for humanitarian 
assistance and 137 million euro for the reconstruction of Kosovo.   
 
436
 Cited in 2001 HRW Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro. In the meantime, EU 
also continued its recent support to Montenegro.  
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This was followed by the annulment of oil embargo and ban on international flights to 
and from Yugoslavia, except the ones implemented against the allies of Milosevic437.   
 October 2000, marked by the fall of Milosevic, has been the start of the 
normalization process between Serbia and Montenegro - the then FRY- and the 
European Union. The initial progress had been the visit of FRY President Vojislav 
Koštunica to the EU Summit in Biarritz, France, in October 2000. In the same month, 
the EU provided 200 million euros to help Serbia for tackling with hard winter 
conditions such as providing electricity, heating fuel and food payments.438  The visit of 
Kostunica was responded by the visit of the President of the European Commission, 
Romano Prodi, to FRY on 25 November 2000. The product of Prodi’s visit was the 
signing of the "Framework Agreement FRY-EU", focusing on the provision of 
assistance and support by the EU to FRY was signed. The relations acquired a new 
dimension, when FRY joined the Stability and Association Process in October 2000.439 
On February 27, 2001, the EU Foreign Ministers agreed on to lift all sanctions 
imposed since 1998, except the ones on firms and individuals in cooperation with the 
Milosevic regime. On April 10, the EC allocated the first part of the aid program for 
Yugoslavia, amounts to 240 million euros. In addition to that, in July, the Council of 
Ministers invested 300 millions euros in macro financial aid for the FRY440 In October 
2001, the European Council decided to repeal the arms embargo and the prohibition 
against exports of equipment for internal political and economic repression. In addition 
to the improving political relations, an increasing economic cooperation was initiated, of 
which the EU financial support programs is at the center. The statiscal data presents the 
prominence of the financial assistance by the EU: while for the period 1991-99 of 
conflict prevention and crisis management, financial assistance by the EU was 
                                                 
437
 See, ibid.  
 
438
 Cited in 2002 HRW Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro.  
 
439
 It was initially introduced in 1999, as a new mechanism for the enhancement of 
further relations with the EU and the countries in Western Balkans. The chronology 
regarding the development of political relations between the EU and the Serbia and 
Montenegro is mainly derived from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Serbia and Monetenegro.  
 
440
 It consists of 225 million euros in loans, and 75 million euros in grants. For details, 
see 2002 HRW Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro.  
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approximately 675 millions €441, only between 2000 and 2001 which marks EU efforts 
and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation442 , it amounted to approximately 1700 
millions €443  
Following necessary preparations of European integration by the FRY, in 
cooperation with the EU Commission to discuss several topics including democracy, 
human rights, minority issues, regional cooperation and fulfillment of its international 
obligations444, a Consultative Task Force of FRY and the EU was set up.445 In its third 
meeting held on 21 February 2002, by reviewing the situation in industry, competition, 
intellectual property, enterprises, social policy and employment; The Consultative Task 
Force called for the elaboration of a “Feasibility Study” as the basis for starting 
negotiations on the Association and Stabilisation Agreement between the EU and Serbia 
and Montenegro. Within a month, the EC declared its first Annual Report on SAP. In its 
section on Serbia and Montenegro, the EC identified police reform, eradication of 
corruption, improvements in freedom of expression, and cooperation with the ICTY as 
the main issues to be addressed,446 adding that “as the pace of transition picks up in 
2002, there should be deepening structural reforms throughout the FRY.”447  To assist 
the implementation process, for 2002-2004, the EU had allocated a total amount of 
                                                 
441
 401,66 million euros allocated to the Serbian government in Belgrade and 272, 76 
million euros for Kosovo.  
 
442
 Especially under the mandate of the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
 
443
 838,94 millions euro for the Government of Belgrade and 859,04 for Kosovo. See, 
EC SAP Report 2002, Brussels, April 4, 2002, COM (2002) 163 final, p. 24; See also, 
European Commission External Relations Directorate General Directorate Western 
Balkans, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, European 
Commission, DG RELEX, pp. 39-40. 
 
444
 See, 2003 HRW Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro.  
 
445
 It is a technical working group, co-chaired by the President of the Council of the EU,  
the European Commission and representatives from the Serbia and Montenegro -the-
then FRY. It held its first meeting in Belgrade, on 23 July 2001. 
 
446
 Cited in 2003 HRW Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
447
 See, 2002 SAP Report, pp. 20-21. 
 190 
904.9 millions Euro -515 millions Euro only for Serbia, in addition to 28.2 millions 
Euro for Integrated Border Management from the CARDS Regional Programme448  
 In September 2003, Serbia and Montenegro adopted its own Action Plan.449 In 
its SAP Report in April 2004, in addition to highlighting that there was some progress, 
the EC mostly focused on the effective implementation of the official adoptions and 
international requirements beside the possible problems regarding the “lack of clarity of 
the new constitutional arrangement and a lack of coordination with the parallel 
Montenegrin institutions” 450 In this regard, following the constitutional reform in 2002-
2003 achieved through the mediation of EU’s CFSP High Representative  Javier Solana, 
in the negotiations between the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities451, the EU has 
continued its relations with Serbia, on the basis of monitoring the reform process 
outlined in the conditionality of SP, SAP and CARDS programme as a concrete form of 
this conditionality. In its European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro on adopted 
by the EU Council on June 14, 2004, it detailed a list of short- and medium-term 
priorities for further integration with the EU under the same headlines applied to the 
other countries of the SAp452. Regarding refugees, displaced persons and minorities, the 
                                                 
448
 See, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Country Strategy Paper, 2002-2006, European 
Commission, DG RELEX, Annex 3. p. 78. 
 
449
 For the analysis of the capacities of the legislative bodies of Serbia and Montenegro 
for the integration process to with the EU, see, European Movement for Serbia (2004). 
 
450
 European Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Monetengro Stabilisation 
and Association Report 2004, {COM (2004) 206 final}, Brussels, xxx, SEC (2004) 376, 
p. 11. These will be assessed in details in the following section on factual situation in 
Serbia. 
 
451
 Belgrade Agreement was signed on 14 March 2002 under the auspices of the 
mediation of Javier Solana. The Agreement laid down the framework of the State 
Union, in which the two republics were united under a loose ‘Union’ structure with a 
single international representation and a number of joint institutions such as the 
unicameral parliament, presidency, the ministerial council, court and a common market 
between them. The Agreement left the specific issues to be negotiated in a 
Constitutional Charter and an Economic Harmonization Plan, under the supervision and 
arbitration of the EU. For a detailed account on this secession conflict and the role of 
EU in its resolution, see, Noutcheva and Huysseune (2004. “Serbia and Montenegro: 1-
29). 
 
452
 These are Political Situation including Democracy and Rule of Law, Human Rights 
and Protection of Minorities, Regional and International Cooperation/Obligations; 
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priorities for the short-term were declared mainly on the settlement of “adequate 
cooperation” between the republics at the Union level, regarding “the legislative basis 
and practical protection of the rights of refugees, displaced persons, and minorities; and 
amending “legislation to repeal all discriminatory provisions”, adding that cooperation 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Pristina should be ensured regarding the 
problems of the return of refugees and displaced persons.453 
For the medium-term, it specifically underlined that both republics should 
“ensure full respect of their human rights, including access to health services, and easy 
access to personal documents; ensure right of a real choice between sustainable return 
and integration; facilitate integration for those who choose not to return”, while 
explicitly recommending the adoption of a “new legislation on refugees” and “continue 
to implement the National strategy.”454  
Regarding regional and international cooperation the priorities set down by the 
EC for the short-term were mainly on the need to “comply with the SAP requirements 
and Thessaloniki commitments” and the ratification, enforcement and the 
implementation of the relevant free trade agreements, the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the development of South East Europe Core Regional Transport 
Network, the Steering Committee and the South East Europe Transport Observatory 
and 2003 Athens Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Energy Market in 
South East Europe”, beside “full cooperation with the ICTY” and dialogue with 
Pristina455 For the medium term, the regional cooperation was required to be further 
improved, such as the deepening of regional trade liberalisation on the basis of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Economic Situation including Market Economy and Structural Reforms, Management of 
Public Finances; European Standards including Internal Market and Trade, Sector 
Policies, Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. 
 
453
 For Montenegro, it was recommended to  “abolish legal prohibition for refugees to 
work and amend restrictive provisions to allow them possibility to apply for citizenship” 
See, Proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo 
defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 
presented by the Commission, Brussels, xxx, COM (2004) yyy final, pp. 8-9.  
 
454
 Ibid, p. 15. 
 
455
 Ibid., p. 9. 
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FTAs in force, while preparing itself for an integrated regional energy market in 2005 
and implementing the MoU on the part of South East Europe Core Regional Transport 
Network.456   
On 11 October 2004, the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten 
announced that the European Commission will launch the Feasibility Report on a 
Stabilisation SAA with Serbia and Montenegro. Subsequently, on April 2005, the 
European Commission has approved the Feasibility Report assessing the potential of 
Serbian and Montenegro to start negotiations for a SAA with the EU, which would be 
the first official contractual relationship between the two based on the prospect of 
Serbia’s integration with the European Union.  
Throughout these integration processes, the issue of the implementation of the 
minority rights has been one of the key issues for accommodation with international 
norms, and thus “a major area of concern for the Council of Europe’s dialogue with the 
FRY.” (König 2001: 53). In fact, the status of national minorities in Serbia is an old, 
much-debated issue, having the legacy of Tito’s Yugoslavia. The legal framework 
regulating the freedoms and rights of national minorities is formed by a series of 
hierarchical mechanisms of judiciary, namely some of the rights are regulated by federal 
and republic laws including the recently adopted Constitutional Charter of 4 February 
2003457, some by laws of a lower rank such as decrees, decisions, regulations, municipal 
statutes, or the other specific political and legal documents such as the “Law on the 
Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities” (LPRFNM)458 and “Charter 
on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties” (CHMRCL)459.  
 
                                                 
456
 Ibid. p. 15. 
 
457
 Avavilable at http://www.cesid.org/english/zakoni/SaM/ustav.thtml 
The Constitution of the FRY was announced on April 27, 1992; the Constitution of 
Serbia on September 28, 1990; the Constitution of Montenegro on October 12, 1992; the 
Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina on June 29, 1991. 
 
458
 Adopted in February 2002. 
 
459
 On 28 February 2003, It was adopted as a component part of the Constitutional 
Charter (Part II, Article 8). Available at 
http://www.humanrights.gov.yu/files/doc/Povelja_Engleski.doc 
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As a reflection of its political will on the improvements in the conditions of 
national minorities and integration with the international community, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the FRY had already adopted a law ratifying the Framework Convention 
on 3 December 1998, although it is not a member of the Council of Europe.460 
Following the debates on this confusion, finally the FRY entered the Council of Europe 
with the status of a Special Guest to the Parliamentary Assembly on 11 May 2001. 
Drawing on this accession, the Framework Convention was accepted to enter into force 
on 1 September 2001. The following steps has been realized as follows: the first State 
Report was received on 16 October 2002, which was due to 1 September 2002; 
following its visit in Serbia during 27 September-3 October 2003, on 27 November 
2003 the AC presented its Opinion; eventually the Committee of Ministers had 
submitted its Resolution on 17  November 2004. The following section will be on the 
examination of this first cycle of the implementation process, of which Serbia and 
Montenegro has recently approached to the end. 
 
International Cooperation (Article 1) 
 
 
The Republic of Serbia and Montenegro is a party to several international 
initiatives, which are ensured to be incorporated to the internal legal order (FRY Const. 
Article 16; Constitutional Charter, Article 10.)  In Article 7 of the CHMRCL, Serbia and 
Montenegro underlines that “the human and minority rights guaranteed under generally 
accepted rules of international law, as well as by international treaties in force in the 
State Union, shall be guaranteed under this Charter and be directly applicable”. 
 
Definition of minority (Article 3) 
 
Although there has not been any definition in the Constitution, the Law on the 
Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (LPRLNM)461 proposed the 
definition of national minority as 
                                                 
460
 For the relevant discussions, see, König (2001: 53-54). 
461
 Adopted in February 2002. However, as cited in 2004 SAP Report on Serbia and 
Montenegro p. 11, it de facto applies on in Serbia, as Montenegro is preparing its own 
act.  
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“a group of citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
sufficiently representative, although in a minority position on the territory 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, belonging to an autochthonous 
group of the population with a lasting and firm connection with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and possessing some distinctive features, 
such as language, national or ethnic belonging, origin or religion, upon 
which it differs from the majority of the population, and its members 
should show their concern over preservation of their common identity, 
including culture, tradition, language or religion.”  
 
Additionally, the citizens are respected for their right to choose either to be 
treated as a member of a national minority group or not (LPRLNM Article 2, paragraph 
2; FRY Const. Article 45, paragraph 2) This is also under the guarantee of Article 48 of 
the CHMRCL, underlying that “the freedom to express ethnic affiliation shall be 
guaranteed (and) no one shall be bound to declare his/her ethnic affiliation.” 
  
General Provisions (Article 16) 
 
In Article 47 of the CHMRCL, it is stated that “the rights of members of national 
minorities shall be exercised in accordance with provisions of international law dealing 
with the protection of human and minority rights.462 Members of national minorities 
shall have individual and collective rights, rights that are exercised individually or 
together with others, in conformity with law and up to international standards.” In 
Article 56 of the same Law, it is highlighted that “the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro and the Member States shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and 
multicultural dialogue in the fields of education, culture and the media, and apply 
efficacious measures towards upgrading mutual respect and understanding and co-
operation among all people living in its territory, irrespective of their ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic or religious identity.” 
 
The equality of citizens is guaranteed by a general provision of the Constitution 
of the FRY (FRY Const Article 20, Point 1) and by the Constitution of the RS463 
(Article 13). Equality before the law is guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution of 
the FRY (Article 20, point 2); more specific guarantees of equality before the law are 
                                                 
462
 See also, Art.9 of the Constitutional Charter. 
 
463
 Republic of Serbia. 
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determined in Articles 26 and 29. The constitution of the RS explicitly ensures equal 
protection of citizens before the law in Articles 13, 22 and 24. Having guaranteed the 
freedom to express national identity (Article 48) CHMRCL stipulates the rights of the 
members of national minorities. 
 
In case of violations, it ensures prohibition against discrimination (Article 49), 
forcible assimilation (Article 50) and provoking racial, ethnic and religious hatred 
(Article 51).464 The Constitution of the FRY also includes provisions prohibiting 
discrimination (Article 50) and “activities of political, trade-union or other associations 
aimed at instigating national, racial, religious intolerance or hatred” (Article 42, point 1). 
The Constitution of the RS does not contain explicit provisions prohibiting 
discrimination, but it specifies prohibition of “activities of political, trade-union or other 
associations …aimed at instigating or perpetrating national, racial and religious 
intolerance or hatred” (Article 44, point 2) and predicts restrictions in dissemination of 
the “press and other information” if their contents “are aimed at inciting and instigating 
national, racial, or religious intolerance or hatred” (Article 46, point 6). The same 
guarantee is also explicitly stated in LPRLNM, which stipulates that “discrimination 
against persons belonging to national, ethnic, racial or linguistic minorities shall be 
prohibited” (Article 3). 
 
For the monitoring of the exercise of these rights, The Assembly of AP 
Vojvodina adopted the decision to establish the Ombudsman on 22 December 2003, 
composed of five deputies. 
 
The criminal legislation procedures ensure the punishment of the breach of the 
equality of citizens. Within this legal structure, “instigating and perpetuating of national, 
racial and religious hate, conflicts or intolerance among nations and national minorities 
living in Yugoslavia” is determined as a criminal act (The Criminal Code of FRY, 
Article 134). Article 60 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia specifies the 
provision on violation of equality of citizens as a criminal act, referring to all cases of 
violation or restriction of rights of citizens as determined by the constitution, law or 
legal regulation, or as determined by any legal act or ratified international legal 
                                                 
464
 See also Articles of 3-5. 
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document, and also refers to providing conveniences or benefits to the citizens on 
whatever legal grounds provided by legal provisions (nationality, race, religious 
affiliation, belief, ethnic background, gender, language, education or social status). 
 
Territorial Provisions (Article 16) 
 
Article 22 of the LPRLNM prohibits changing of the structure of the population 
in areas inhabited by national minorities as well as of undertaking measures aimed at 
impeding the implementation of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. 
 
Political Participation (Articles 7, 17) 
 
The citizens of the Republic of Serbia have the right to freedom of assembly and 
association (FRY Const. Article 41; Const. of Serbia, Article 44; CHMRCL, Article 53). 
In addition to that, Article 52 of the CHMRCL guarantees  
“a certain number of seats in the Assembly of the Member State 
concerned and in the Assembly of the State Union, based on the principle of 
direct representation, in accordance with the laws of the Member States; to 
be adequately represented in public services, state authorities and local self-
governance authorities; to be fully and impartially informed in their own 
language, including the right to express, receive, send and exchange 
information and ideas.” 
 
Furthermore, Article 48 of the Constitution of FRY and Article 6 of the 
LPRLNM ensures the right of the persons belonging to national minorities to establish 
and maintain free and peaceful contacts within the FRY and abroad, especially with 
persons with whom they share common ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity 
or common cultural heritage and to participate in the work of international NGOs not to 
the detriment of FRY or its member state. “Cooperation with compatriots in other 
states” is also ensured by Article 54 of the CHMRCL.   
 
Language (Articles 10, 11) 
  
The right to official use of the language and alphabet of persons belonging to 
national minorities is granted by the constitution of FRY and the provisions of 
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LPRLNM (Article 15, paragraph 2; Article 45, paragraph 1; Articles 46, 49; LPRLNM, 
Article 10). However, this does not represent a general character, that is to say, the right 
to official use of minority languages is granted “in areas of FRY inhabited by national 
minorities” (Article 15, paragraph 2), which must be exercised in “accordance with the 
law” (Article 12, paragraph 2 in fine). With general provisions, the same rights are also 
highlighted by Article 52 of the CHMRCL. These are “the rights to use their symbols at 
public places; to freely use their language and script; to proceedings being conducted by 
the authorities in the communities having a considerable minority population also in the 
language of the minority population concerned.” 
 
 The same right is also provisioned in the Constitution of the Republic of 
Serbia, which stipulates the right to official use of the mother tongue and alphabet of 
“nationalities”465 (Article 8, paragraph 2; Article 49). The constitutional guarantee, 
again, is not of general character and thus, it is not applicable uniformly throughout the 
Republic of Serbia. Namely, the right to official use of minority languages is granted 
only “in territories of the Republic of Serbia inhabited by nationalities” (Article 8, 
paragraph 2). Languages and alphabets of nationalities are in equal use alongside the 
“Serbocroat language and Cyrillic alphabet” (Article 8, paragraph 1).  
 
 The LPRLNM confirms the right to use of language and alphabet of national 
minorities in both private and public communication (Articles 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 
and 17). This is also specified in several laws, such as the right to be informed one’s 
own language in public proceedings guaranteed by Article 49 of the Constitution of 
FRY and Article 123 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. The right to use of 
language is also guaranteed by the ‘Act of Proceedings of the Parliament of the Republic 
of Serbia’ (Article 226). 
 
                                                 
465
 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia does not use the term “national minority” but 
the term “nationality”. The latter was used in the constitutional system of former SFRY, 
in 1974 Constitution. In the time of adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Serbia (1990), the Constitution of SFRY was in force in Yugoslavia. It has already been 
mentioned that the Constitution of R. Serbia has not been harmonized with the federal 
Constitution adopted in 1992, so that the difference in terminology is the consequence of 
not harmonized constitutional acts. 
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 The Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (APV) also determines 
the official use of languages of national minorities in the institutions of the APV. Along 
with the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet are Hungarian, Croat, Slovak, 
Romanian and Ruthenian languages and their alphabets are guaranteed to be in official 
use (Article 6). The exercise of this right is determined by the Law on the Official Use 
of Languages in details, such as: the official use of languages and alphabets of 
nationalities (Article 10, points 3 and 4); education (Article 13) and information (Article 
15); the right of MPs to “use the language and alphabet whose official use is determined 
by the Statute” (Article 26); and the publication of the regulations adopted by Assembly 
of APV and the Executive Council in national minorities’ languages (Article 46, 
paragraph 3). 
  
Furthermore, the ‘Law on Determining the Competencies of Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina” specifically organizes the official use of languages and 
alphabets of national minorities living in Vojvodina, including the monitoring process of 
the implementation (Article 18). The right to use of language is also guaranteed by the 
‘Act of Proceedings of Assembly of APV’ (Articles 3, 4, 51 and 160). In the local level, 
the Statutes of municipalities in the territory of APV466 also coordinate the official use 
of languages and alphabets in their local communities, which also regulates the display 
of topographical names by their provisions, in accordance with the law. 
 
Education (Articles 12, 13, 14) 
  
Persons belonging to national minorities are granted the right to education in 
their mother tongue as determined by Article 46, paragraph 1 of the ‘Constitution of 
FRY’ in accordance with the law and ‘Constitution of the Republic of Serbia’, provided 
by Article 32, paragraph 4 and Article 12. The CHMRCL also grants national minorities 
both to receive education in their language in state institutions and establish private 
educational institutional at all levels” (Article 52). As provisioned by Statute of APV 
                                                 
466
 Statutes of local self-governments were adopted in the first half of 2002, after 
passing of the Law on Local Self-Government, according to which the municipalities 
were obliged to pass their statutes determining the organization of local authorities and 
exercising the competencies of municipalities. 
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(Article 13), APs shall undertake the responsibility for the education of persons 
belonging to national minorities in their mother tongue, in accordance with the law.  
  
As determined by Article 4 of the ‘Law on Higher Education’ and Article 23 of 
the ‘Law on Universities’, education in the languages of national minorities treated as 
equal with education in any foreign languages. Instruction in minority languages in 
higher education institutions depends on an opinion provided by the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia, while at university level this depends on an assessment provided by 
the faculty and agreement by the Government of the Republic of Serbia (CMK & VHRC 
2003). It is guaranteed by the ‘Law on Elementary Education’ (Article 5, point 1) that 
instruction in minority language or bilingually, may be held if at least 15 pupils enroll in 
the first grade. As specified in paragraph 2 of the same article, such an instruction may 
be organized for a lesser number of pupils only upon agreement issued by Minister of 
Education. 
 
By the introduction of LPRLNM, the APV may regulate issues related to the 
rights of national minorities that had existed before 1992 (Statute of APV, Article 13), 
which includes the issue of the education of national minorities in their mother tongue in 
accordance with the law. As determined by the ‘LPRLNM (Article 13, paragraph 7), in 
areas where the minority language is in official use, teaching of minority languages may 
be initiated in education facilities where the instruction is in Serbian. 
 
As determined by the LPRLNM (Article 14, paragraph 3), the state is 
responsible for providing professional assistance in teacher training for instruction in the 
mother tongue of national minorities. Furthermore, as determined in paragraph 4 of the 
same article, the state is responsible to foster international co-operation with the aim of 
enabling members belonging to national minorities to study at the universities in their 
kin states and to recognize their certificates acquired there. In the subsequent article of 
the LPRLNM (Article 15), the right to the establishment and maintenance of private 
educational institutions, schools and universities in which instruction is in either 
minority languages or is bilingual, is recognized. The Law on Secondary Education and 
the Law on College and University Education respectively, grants the right to establish 
educational institutions to municipalities, provinces and republic and individuals. 
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Culture and Media (Article 9) 
  
Article 53 of the CHMRCL provides the members of national minorities the 
right “to establish educational and cultural organizations and associations, the financing 
of which is carried out voluntarily”. The previous article of the same document also 
ensures them to establish their own public media. The same rights are also guaranteed 
by Article 46, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the FRY ensures the right to receive 
information in minority languages. By the Statute of the APV, this right is applied to 
Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian languages.  Furthermore, the ‘LPRLNM’ 
as well as the law concerning radio broadcasting gives minority groups the right to 
media in their mother tongue (CMK & VHRC 2003) 
 
Religion (Article 8) 
 
Freedom of religious beliefs is guaranteed by Article 43 of the ‘Constitution of 
FRY’ and Article 41 of the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Serbia’. The Article 27 of 
the CHMRCL also ensures that the “religious communities shall have equal rights and 
be separate from the state. Religious communities shall be free to independently regulate 
their internal organisation, religious activities and religious rites. Religious communities 
shall have the right to establish religious schools and charity organizations, in 
accordance with the law..” 
 
Besides, the same provision ensures the separation of the Church and the State; 
the freedom to practice religious ceremonies and the possibility of a provision of state 
support to religious communities. Furthermore, by Article 18, point 2 of the 
‘Constitution of FRY’, all churches are recognized as equal and free to exercise their 
religious services and ceremonies. 
 
 “Law on Elementary School” provides religious instruction as an optional 
subject for traditional churches and religious communities (Article 22). 
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C. 3.  Factual Situation on the Exercise of National Minority Rights 
 
 When compared with the pre-2002 period, there has been a steady progress in 
the protection of minority rights in Serbia. In his examination of the situation of 
minorities in the FRY in 2001 regarding the implementation of the Framework 
Convention, König stated that “evaluated in the light of the standards of the Framework 
Convention, the factual situation is clearly inadequate and, in some cases, even 
alarming.”(König 2001: 52). Although the situation is still not very promising for the 
Southern Serbia, namely Sandjzak or the central Serbia, generally it may be argued that 
when compared with these regions, ethnic minorities in Vojvodina enjoy the rights to 
the greatest extent in Serbia. However, although the situation is less problematic in 
respect to the improvements, instances reflecting ethnic intolerance still occasionally 
occur, which reflects the nationalist legacy of the past decade under Milosevic’s rule. 
  
In this context there are two key documents. The first document is the “Law on 
Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities which was adopted on in February 2002 as 
one of the main preconditions of the FRY’s membership in the Council of Europe (IHF 
2002)467, which enabled the establishment of National Councils” for the minority 
groups, with the mandate of “(representing) a national minority in the fields of use of 
language, education, informing in the language of the national minority and culture, 
participates in decision-making or decides on questions belonging to those fields and 
establishes institutions working in those fields.” (LRFNM, Art. 19). These Councils 
were ordained to form the Federal Council for National Minorities468, with the mandate 
of “preserving, promoting and protecting the national, ethnic, religious, linguistic and 
cultural specificity of persons belonging to national minorities, and for the sake of 
implementing their rights” (LRFNM, Art. 18). In this context, 11 National Councils 
were established in 2002 and 2003.469 Although these marked considerable progress 
                                                 
467
 Serbia and Montenegro became a member of the Council of Europe on 3 April 2003 
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 Founded in October 2004; cited in the “Report on the preparedness of Serbia and 
montenegro to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agrement with the European 
Union” by the EU Commission Staff, published on 12.04.2002, p.15. 
 
469
 Namely, the Hungarian (constituted on 21.09.2002 and entered into the Register of 
the Ministry of Human Rights and Minority Rights on 23.12.2002), Ruthenian, 
Romanian, Croatian (constituted on 25.01.2003 and entered into the Register on 
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such as the use of minority languages470, the general economic insufficiency of the 
country also affects the funding of these Councils which were ensured to be promoted 
by the Federal Fund, proclaimed in Article 20 of the aforementioned law.    
 
The second fundamental document is the “Charter on Human and Minority 
Rights and Civil Liberties”, adopted on in February 2003, as a complementary document 
to the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro which provided comprehensive 
provisions and mechanisms for the protection of minorities. Its significance had been 
expressed by a member of the sub-committee for drafting the Constitutional Charter, 
Ferhat Dinosa: 
 
“This charter on human and minority rights would ensure protection for 
human and minority rights in line with documents and standards of Europe and 
international community. This is what we have been advocating since the very 
beginning and the third things which one should stress here is the fact that the 
issue of securing, ordering and protecting human and minority rights remains the 
issue of the member states.”471 
 
The recent legislation process, including the ratification of the European 
Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) in March 2004, and the institutional backings by 
the State Ministry for Human and Minorities Rights continues to be promising,472 
including the preparation of an Anti-Discrimination Act which led Serbian government 
to be subjected to criticisms.   
 
In this regard, although the previous reports of the international NGOs cited 
several criticisms on the exercise of the rights of national minorities such as the official 
use of language and script (Briza 2000: 9, 16; Guzina 2000: 30), education (Briza 2000: 
                                                                                                                                                        
12.02.2003), Slovakian, Bunjevac, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Roma, Bosniak and Greek 
National Councils. For details, see, 
http://www.humanrights.gov.yu/english/sektori/manjinska/nacionalnisaveti.htm 
 
470
 See, the “Report on the preparedness of Serbia and montenegro to negotiate a 
Stabilisation and Association Agrement with the European Union” by the EU 
Commission Staff, published on 12.04.2002, p.15. 
 
471
 Reported by TV Crna Gora, Podgorica, on 29 October 2002, available at, 
http://www.csees.net 
 
472
 See, the Stability and Association Report on Serbia and Montenegro 2004, pp. 11-12. 
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14-15; Guzina 2000: 30-31; IHF 2001; IHF 2002), access to media (Briza 2000: 16; 
Guzina 2000: 30; IHF 2001), representation in public administration (IHF 2001), and 
even the denial of the status of national minorities, i.e. for Croats and Muslims 
(Bosniaks) (IHF 2001), since 2002 these incidents decreased with a considerable pace, 
police abuses, particularly during the Operation Sabre, the post-assassination 
investigation of Zoran Djindjinc and the discrimination against Roma population in 
Serbia as an exception (AI, 2002, HRW 2002, IHF 2002, AI 2003, HRW 2003, AI 2004, 
HRW 2004, IHF 2004, AI 2005, HRW 2005). 
 
This was mainly due to the international pressure for resolving the status of 
national minorities, after The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) of Kostunica 
came to power. As reported in IHF 2002 Report on FRY, one of such first visits by the 
international actors, the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van 
der Stoel proposed his expectations on this issue through several meetings. This was 
responded by the Serbian government by the adoption of a draft Law on the Protection 
of The Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities and the establishment of a Federal 
Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, under the Ministry of Rasim Ljajic, who 
himself belongs to the Bosniak minority (IHF 2002)473. However, despite the progress in 
minority legislation and its positive effects on the conditions for the exercise of these 
aforementioned rights, more progress is needed to overcome the potential roots of 
tensions in the social climate. Its urgency was proved by the incidents in 2003. 
Following the victory of SRS in Serbian parliamentary elections in December 2003, the 
number of the incidents of ethnic violence strikingly increased474.  In fact, as noted in 
the 2004 Annual Report of IHF, although considerable progress was made following the 
democratic revolution in 2000, various forms of discrimination toward national 
minorities continue to be manifested on the ground (IHF 2004), in its 2005 Annual 
Report, the HRW reported that: 
“There have been dozens of incidents against ethnic minorities in 
Vojvodina since January 2004. The violence ranges from tombstone 
desecration and painting of nationalistic graffiti to confrontations involving 
young persons of different ethnicities. The government initially claimed that 
the incidents were not ethnically motivated. In the face of mounting 
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 See also http://www.humanrights.gov.yu 
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 In June, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia reported that there has 
been 40 such attacks following the elections in December 2003. Cited in AI 2005.  
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evidence that most incidents had an ethnic motivation, and European Union 
and Council of Europe condemnations of violence, the government 
eventually acknowledged there was a problem. In September, Serbian Prime 
Minister Kostunica and the Minister of Serbia and Montenegro for Human 
and Minority Rights Rasim Ljacic visited Vojvodina and vowed to end 
ethnic intolerance. By October there had been only one case in which a 
court charged perpetrators with ethnically motivated crimes. Most other 
cases have either not reached trial, or resulted in minor penalties for 
disturbing peace.” (HRW 2005)475       
 
  In 2005 Report of the AI, the report of the of the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia was reiterated that there had been 40 such attacks since the 
Serbian Radical Party won a victory in general elections in December 2003. This 
atmosphere of intolerance underlines the necessity for the implementation of measures 
promoting tolerance within the ethnic communities at the societal level, in addition to 
the finalizing the preparation of the aforementioned the Anti-Discrimination Act as 
soon as possible with a zero tolerance implementation.  
 
In this regard, in its feasibility report of April 2005, the European Commission 
noted that although improvements can be observed such as the signing of international 
agreements with countries in the region including Hungaria, the adoption of the Charter 
on Human and Minority Rights, described as providing “comprehensive guarantees and 
mechanisms for protection”, and developments in the use of minority languages, 
ethnically motivated incidents can still occur, which were described to reflect “the 
legacy of the past decade and systemic issues in the implementation of existing 
standards”. It was explicitly stated that particularly in Vojvodina and against “notably” 
ethnic Hungarians, “the situation significantly deteriorated, while it was added that “the 
reaction of the authorities was belated and insufficient”476 These events have not 
deteriorated the inter-ethnic accommodation in Serbia, but also spoiled the traditional 
good-neighbourhood between the two countries.    
 
                                                 
475
 See also, The United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 2004; Amnesty International 2005 Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro.    
 
476 Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the preparednes sof Serbia and 
Monetengro to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European 
Union, Brussels, 12. 04. 2005, SEC (2005) 478 final, p. 15. It has also been indicated 
that the establishment of National Councils has continued, but “in Serbia only and with 
occasional difficulties”, such as their financial situation.  
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C. 4. Implementation of the EU Vision of Good Neigbourhood Relations 
  
 Although there are significant gaps between Serbia and Hungary, due to the 
delayed political and hence economic developments, when the relations of Serbia with 
its neighbour are considered, the co-operation level between Serbia and Hungary is 
among the most promising ones alongside Romania and Bulgaria. There has been 
already a tradition of bilateral co-operation in the post-socialist era between the two 
countries since the 1960’s.477 The good relations between the two states were also 
confirmed with several visits exchanged by top political leaders and officials478.  These 
visits were concluded by the signing of 12 agreements targeted at mutual cooperation, 
which was also extended to the protection of minority rights to a significant extent such 
as the signing of the Free Trade Agreement on 08 March 2002479, bilateral agreement 
on the protection of the rights of national minorities on 13 May 2002480, a minority 
protection agreement on 28 December 2002481, agreement on the protection of 
minorities and the conditions of travel of Hungarian and Serbian citizens signed on 21 
October 2003482. These are expected to be followed by seven agreements in the 
negotiations.483 As publicly stated by the signatories, these agreements do not underline 
that the parties “complied with both (their) international obligations and with 
maintaining good-neighbourly relations, taking care of (their) national minority”,484 but 
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 For the agreements in cross-border cooperation, see, Cited in COE & ISIG, 2002, p. 
130; and http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Bilaterala/Hungary/agreements_e.html 
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 Reported by Hungarian Report, on 8 March 2002, available at http://www.csees.net 
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 Reported by Radio B92, on 5 May 2002, available at http://www.csees.net 
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 Signed by the State Secretary in the Prime Minister Office, Vilmoz Szabo and the 
Minister for Human and Minority Rights, Rasim Ljajic. Reported by Duna TV on 28 
December 2002, Available at http://www.csees.net. 
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 Signed by the Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy and Serbian Prime 
Minister Zoran Zivkovic. Reported by Duna TV and BKTV on 21 October 2003, 
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 See, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Bilaterala/Hungary/agreements_e.html and 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Foreinframe.htm 
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also that “it is a good message for Europe because it indicates that two neighbouring 
countries have agreed with one another over an issue which generally arouses most 
disputes, the issue of minorities.”485 This was explicitly stated by the Serbian Prime 
Minister Vojislav Kostunica that “Hungary was Serbia's traditional friend and a 
valuable ally on the Serbian voyage towards the Euro-Atlantic integration.”486 This 
perspective was reiterated by the Serbia-Montenegro Minister for Human and Minority 
Rights Rasim Ljajic, who indicated that Hungary is “one of the most important foreign 
policy partners”487   
 
 The same positive results can also be seen in the Annual Reports of the EC, of 
which regional cooperation is one of the variables of the conditionality of the SAM 
with the EU. In its 2004 SAP Report, the EC reported that:  
 
“Very good co-operation continued with Hungary, including the 
successful outcome of talks concerning the introduction of the visa regime 
by Hungary in force as of November 2003. An agreement was signed on the 
mutual protection of minorities. This is being followed by talks concerning 
the conditions of dual (i.e. Hungarian) citizenship for the Hungarian national 
community in Serbia (Vojvodina). An FTA is in force, but will be abrogated 
once Hungary accedes to the EU.”488 
  
 The variables towards bilateral cooperation is also supported by statiscal data 
revealing the cross-border cooperation: in their classification of the border zones and 
the assessment of cross-border cooperation with swot analysis according to the 
aforementioned ten dimensions, border between Serbia and Montenegro and Hungaria 
was reported by the COE and ISIG with the highest marks in three dimensions, namely 
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 Statement of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Peter Medgyessy on 21 October 2003 on 
the two agreements signed in the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic’s first official 
visit to Hungary. The two Prime Ministers also indicated that the Serb minority in 
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http://www.csees.net 
 
485
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 Reported by FoNet, on 14 September 2004. Available at http://www.csees.net 
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 Reported by B92, on 12 February 2005. Available at http://www.csees.net 
 
488
 2004 SAP Report, p. 18. 
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the incisiveness of socio-cultural obstacles, economic factors for co-operation, and 
linguistic, cultural and historical factors for co-operation.489  
 
 Furthermore, the possible obstacles have been gradually overcome by recently 
implemented projects and by the introduction of new bi-lateral and regional projects. 
Among these the Euro-region formed on the Danube-Kris-Mures-Tisza region 
(DKMT), signed on 23 May 2001 between Serbia, Hungary and Romania, has been one 
of the most important interlocutors for enhanced cooperation.490 Beside its contribution 
on the improvement of co-operation in the region, the DKMT has also significant 
importance as, for the first time, the local authorities acted autonomously on both sides, 
which would probably facilitate the overcoming of the strict administrative and political 
centralism in the region, which is one of the main obstacles for further co-operation.491 
EU has also launched several initiatives targeted at bilateral cooperation in the region 
especially in the fields of education, civil society and economy, such as the 
programmes of “Schools for Democracy”, “Cities and Schools for Democracy” and 
“Energy for Democracy”.492    
 
 In this regard, while Serbian-Hungarian relations is the most-promising case, 
when compared with the previous two cases, it also slightly represents different results 
in respect to the reference points for Serbia’s motivation for cooperation with Hungary. 
While the EU prospect is the most important reference point for the enhancement of 
bilateral cooperation in the previous cases, regarding cooperation with Serbia and 
Hungary, references to the “Serb minority in Hungary and Hungarian minority in 
                                                 
489Drawn on these statiscal variables, they recommended the strategy with the most 
promising variables, namely the strategy of international-external coalition to control 
the context, which involves the “mobilization of strengths (S) and opportunities (O) 
(which is considerable) to face the threats (T) (equally considerable); this is possible 
because the internal weaknesses (W) are basically irrelevant.” What is cited as threats 
are limitations of both countries on deficit and controls on the budgets of local bodies 
due to their subjected position to international authorities and administrative 
centralization, while the weaknesses are mainly different level and pace of 
technological development, the lack of inadequate financial resources and the high rate 
of aging of the population side due to migration. See, COE & ISIG (2002: 168, 131-2).   
 
490
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Serbia”, “Vojvodina”, and “the agreement on the protection of minority rights represent 
the most important reference points in the statements of Serbian leaders (53.8% with 7 
results out of 13), while the reality of the “traditionally good neighhbourhood” holds 
30.7 % the Hungary’s experience towards EU membership and their position as an ally 
towards  Euro-Atlantic integration holds only 15.3% with 2 entry out of 13 (see Annex 
4) 
 
In addition to that cooperative schemes on bilateral level, since the fall of 
Milosevic’s regime in October 2000, the normalization of Serbia’s relations with the 
international community has also paved the way for further cooperation within regional 
organizations in accordance with the conditionality of integration with the EU. Today, 
Serbia is a full fledged member of the following regional initiatives: Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Cooperation Initiative (SECI)493, Central 
European Initiative (CEI)494, South-Eastern Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP)495, 
Black Sea Economic and Cooperation Council496, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, and the 
Initiative for the Danube Cooperation (Austro-Romanian Initiative). Furthermore, it is a 
member of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River497 and a 
depository of the Belgrade Convention on the Free Navigation on the Danube. Regional 
cooperation in the transport and energy fields was improved with regard to the SEE 
Transport Core Network and the Regional Energy Market (signature of a revised MoU 
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 Serbia is the Chairman of the Working Group for the Danube within the SECI. For 
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 Serbia is the Co-Chairman of the Working Group for media and information and for 
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Assocation Report 2004 on Serbia and Montenegro, European Commission, Brussels, 
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on 8 December 2003). Recently, an official application has also been submitted for the 
accession to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP).498  
 
 Taking these into consideration, the statement given in the website of the 
Ministry of foreign Affairs reflects the perspective of Serbia regarding bilateral and 
regional cooperation, which clarifies its approach towards Hungaria at particular:  
 
“Multilateral regional cooperation falls within the priorities of 
foreign policy and international relations of Serbia and Montenegro as an 
instrument and substance of our cooperation with the neigbours in the region 
as well as within the context of the Serbia and Montenegro inclusion in 
European integrations, Euro-Atlantic structures and EU.”499  
 
In this context, Hungary’s membership in the European Union has been declared 
repeatedly by the top officials of Serbia and Montenegro by referring its support as “a 
valuable ally on the Serbian voyage towards the Euro-Atlantic integration”500 
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 See, http//www.mfa.gov.yu and the Stability and Assocation Report 2004 on Serbia 
and Montenegro, European Commission, Brussels, 2004, p.16. 
 
499
 See, http//www.mfa.gov.yu 
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 Statement by the Prime Minister Vojuslav Kostunica, Reported by FoNet, on 14 
September 2004. Available at http://www.csees.net  
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Chapter 3. 
Conclusion: Analysis of Europeanization as a Tool for Conflict Resolution 
in the Western Balkans 
 
Assumptions, Objectives and Instruments 
 
The European Union has been an active third party in the former Yugoslavia 
since the early 1990s. However, despite its multilateral strategy ranging from the 
economic incentives to military sanctions, it could not prevent the collapse of the federal 
Yugoslavia, and the subsequent wave of violence between 1991 and 1995. In this 
period, the mechanisms that it implemented were mainly the post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes ECHO and OBNOVA, allocated for humanitarian aid and funding 
reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives respectively, which were further 
strengthened by PHARE in 1997. Especially following the end of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the subsequent Dayton accords in November 1995, the EU has further 
strengthened its position in the region by taking the responsibility of economic and 
political post-war reconstruction. In this context, although it had the disadvantage of the 
lack of a unified, coherent strategy formulated by an effective institutional framework 
during the conflict, since then the EU formulated a more comprehensive and future-
oriented strategy, namely regional cooperation and integration with the European Union, 
particularly guided by its success in the Central Eastern Europe. 
 
By introducing the Royaumont Process and the Declaration of Regional 
Approach towards the Western Balkans in 1997, the EU formulated its strategy on the 
intensification of regional cooperation accompanied by a detailed political and economic 
conditionality guided by the premise that integration would ensure peace. During this 
period, the EU presence in the Western Balkans was mainly through the EC Monitoring 
Mission (ECMM) and the Special Representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002: 23) 
  
 This initiative was strengthened by the introduction of two fundamental 
institutional and infrastructural mechanisms in 1999, namely the Stabilisation and 
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Association Process (SAP) (May 1999) and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe 
(June 1999). By these instruments, the EU added membership conditionality alongside 
the promotion of regional cooperation within the broader framework of conflict 
prevention for the Balkans. The main reference point for the adaptation of EU’s strategy 
was explicitly stated in the first paragraph of the first Annual Report of the SAP in 2002, 
that “a policy of emergency reconstruction, containment and stabilisation was not, in 
itself, enough to bring lasting peace and stability to the Balkans: only the real prospect 
of integration into European structures would achieve that.”501 In this context, the 
European Union was presented as a “symbol of structural peace and reconciliation 
among ancient enemies”, which has to be adopted as a model until the parties reached 
the same level of ‘maturity’ to join it502 To facilitate the implementation of the required 
reforms, the EU was going to add a supplementary financial assistance programme of 
CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilisation in 
December 2000. 
 
By the Feira Council of the European Council in June 2000, the European 
Council recognized “all” the countries of the Western Balkans as “potential candidates” 
for EU membership and confirmed that “its objective remains the fullest possible 
integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of 
Europe through the Stabilisation and Association Process political dialogue, 
liberalization of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.”503. This perspective 
was strengthened in the subsequent Councils, particularly EU-Western Balkans Zagreb 
Summit on 24 November 2000, The Copenhagen European Council on 12-13 November 
2002, and the Thessaloniki Summit on 21 June 2003 in which The European Council 
emphasized the position of the SEE countries as “potential candidates”504 and 
acknowledged that “the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) will remain the 
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 Ginsberg, cited in Feldman (1999: 78).  
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 The European Council, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, V. External 
Relations, D. Western Balkans, Art. 67.  
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 Cited in EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit Declaration. 
 212 
framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries”505, while 
“rapprochement with the EU will go hand in hand with the development of regional co-
operation.”506 To sign the SAA, the conditionality principle was mainly based on three 
categories of priorities, 1) the Political Situation, including the democracy and rule of 
law, human rights and protection of minorities, regional cooperation; (2) the Economic 
Situation, including the current economic situation, existence of free-market economy 
and structural reforms and management of public finances, and (3) the Implementation 
of the Stabilisation and Association Process, including a general evaluation, internal 
market and trade, sectoral policies and cooperation in justice and home affairs. 
 
Since then the Annual Reports prepared by the Commission has been the main 
instrument that determined the course of this contractual relationship. After the 
assessment of the general situation and specific issues regarding each title and the 
relevant sub-title including the performance based on the recommendations of the 
previous Annual Report, the Commission proposes a kind of a ‘homework’ in 
accordance with the principles and priorities of the SAP by outlining further 
requirements for improvement or deficiencies to be overcome, under a specific title of 
“priority areas needing attention in the next 12 months” if needed.507 While these 
assessments and recommendations draw the road-map of the contractual relations, it also 
determines the allocation of major incentives such as funds under the CARDS 
programme and the prospect of EU membership, which has been strengthened by the 
introduction of European Partnerships in 2004 as an additional means to intensify the 
SAP.508, 
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. 
In this context, since the Zagreb Summit in 2000, the EU utilized its 
“compulsory impact” directed at the level of political leadership, which was guided by a 
‘carrot-and-stick’ policy with the final goal of the EU membership through the 
fundamental principle of conditionality.509 Furthermore, it strengthened this by using its 
“enabling impact” in the words of Diez, Stetter and Albert (2004), by introducing the 
adoption of EU’s structural framework (acquis communautaire) through the 
Stabilisation and Association Processes, in order to provide the framework which is 
hoped to lead  the resolution of aforementioned domestic and regional conflicts. 
 
In terms of CR literature, this revealed EU’s transition in its role as a third party 
actor aimed at peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction to a broader ideal of 
peacebuilding tied strongly to being a part of a general framework of a so-called 
‘security community’. In this context, rather than an active involvement in the conflicts 
between the actors of the conflict, EU presented itself as a ‘framework’ to be adopted by 
the implementation of the requirements of the SAP within the context of 
‘Europeanization’, and use mainly sanctions towards the governments, which are the 
conflicting parties in these ethno-political conflicts, for persuading them to come to an 
agreement. This put ‘Europeanization’ at the center of conflict resolution perspective of 
the EU as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding mechanism.510  
 
What the question at this point is that whether this conditionality based on the 
adoption of “European practices and standard” both at the domestic511 and regional 
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 In the Copenhagen EC Presidency Conclusions, of June 21-22, 1993, it was stated 
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level512, could facilitate the settlement of ethno-territorial cross border conflicts. In this 
context, this dissertation has been drawn on the idea that, taken the aforementioned 
specific characteristics of these conflicts, in order to regard Europeanization as an 
efficient to tool for the settlement of these conflicts, it has to meet the following 
conditions: 
 
1) It should persuade the parties to come to an agreement on a legal basis, which 
would improve the status of national minorities, when compared with the previous 
experiences, 
 
2) It should facilitate the resolution of the conflict between the host-nation and 
the external minority, 
 
3) It should foster cooperation between the kin-state and host-state, in which 
minorities have a constructive impact, in order to lead a sustainable resolution drawn on 
trust. 
 
   
Effects 
 
In the context of the first condition for the effectiveness of Europeanization, 
regarding our framework of minority protection, it can be argued that EU has succeeded 
on imposing the adoption of legal standards. In general, assessing them within the 
context of the FCNM as a general picture for the protection of minority rights, all 
governments seem to fulfill the legal requirements.  
 
For Macedonia, the EU monitored the process mainly through the full 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which has been signed under its 
                                                                                                                                                        
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the  Union.  
Membership presupposes  the  candidate's ability  to  take  on  the  obligations  of  
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.” See, the part 7 on “Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, 
A. iii., p. 13.   
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 In the same Report, in p. 11, it was stated that these countries should “demonstrate 
that they are willing and able to interact with their neigbours as EU Member States do.” 
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joint mediation by the US. In this context, Macedonia has adopted most of the required 
legislation, namely the amendments to the Constitution required by the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement in November 2001 and the relevant laws such as the Law on 
Local Self-Government in January 2002, 513 Law on Citizenship in Dec. 2003, and the 
Territorial Organization Act in August, 2004514. 
 
Following the election victory of a centre-left, pro-European coalition in January 
2000, the Croatian Sabor also amended the 1991 Constitution in May 2000 which 
reintroduced some of the suspended provisions regarding the Serbian minority and 
adopted its “Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities” on December 
2002, which was already a longstanding commitment since its accession to the Council 
of Europe in 1996. This was also under the monitor of the EU through annual SAP 
Reports.  
 
After a similar political evolution, Serbia and Montenegro also adopted two main 
legislative acts. The first document is the “Law on Rights and Freedoms of National 
Minorities, adopted in February 2002 as one of the main preconditions of the FRY’s 
membership in the Council of Europe, of which he joined in April 2003. In this context, 
it must be underlined that, as Hofmann and Friberg pointed out (2004: 141), in its 
relationship between the European Commission of the EU, the Council of Europe has 
been the “implementing partner” in planning and agenda setting in the areas of common 
concern.515 The second fundamental document is the “Charter on Human and Minority 
Rights and Civil Liberties”, adopted in February 2003, as a complementary document to 
the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro following the re-establishment of 
the fundamentals of the union between the two states under EU mediator Javier Solana, 
which provided comprehensive provisions and mechanisms for the protection of 
minorities. 
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 However, although it was passed by the Parliament, the referendum on its approval 
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adoption of the April 2001Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership.See, 
Council of Europe (2002: 4), as cited in Hofmann and Friberg (2004: 141). For a detail 
account, see, Hofmann and Friberg, (2004: 127-147.  
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To sum up, regarding the adoption of legal framework, either in the initiation or 
in its intensification, the Europeanization process seems to be successful through EU’s 
“compulsory” and “enabling impact” within the terminology of Diez and his colleagues 
(Diez, Stetter and Albert 2004).  
 
However, regarding the second level Europeanization at the domestic level, 
several poll results and the incidents reveal lack of the aimed inter-ethnic reconciliation 
and thus lack of social integration in contrary to the premise of the EU integration. 
Several incidents in all the three countries reflect how the inter-ethnic relations are still 
fragile516 For instance in Macedonia, results of the surveys conducted in May 2001, June 
2002, January 2003 indicate that people do not accept to share the same living areas 
with the members of the other ethnic community (see, Table 10). Although it may be 
argued that these results refers to the period that the effects of legal adoptions can not be 
observed, it must be noted that as presented in 2005 Early Warning Report on UNDP on 
Macedonia, over 54% of the ethnic Macedonians still perceive interethnic relations as 
very bad or a bit better than that. The same attitude is presented by 23 % of the ethnic 
Albanians.517 (2005a: 50). While the survey conducted 2 months later reported that it 
was reduced to 41.8 % for ethnic Macedonians, it increased to 25 % for the Albanians 
(UNDP 2005b: 63) (See, figure 2). Furthermore, although the legal developments have 
been initiated by the succeeding governments, especially ethnic Macedonians do not 
support these developments518 (Table 9). This highlights how inter-ethnic relations may 
be disrupted by this resentment, such as the polarization of the young population of 
ethnic communities in educational institutions. These reveal that despite the policies of 
the government, inter-ethnic reconciliation can not be observed in the societal level, 
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which is the fundamental requirement for a stable multi-ethnic Macedonia. (2005a: 25) 
In this context, accepting Stern and Druckman’s (2000: 44) the definition of success, the 
Macedonian case could not lead to “the weakening of actors opposed to the peace 
process vis-à-vis those engaged in it”. Furthermore, the bi-ethnicization of the state in 
accordance with the Ohrid Agreement and the relevant over-politicization of the overall 
politics and state administration push smaller ethnic communities to a marginalized 
position. This also dangers the multi-ethnic character of Macedonia which will foster 
inter-ethnic reconciliation, emphasized by Katerina Blazevska in the Macedonian 
newspaper Dnevnik on 14 August 2004 as follows: 
 
“(...)The same applies to the Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Romas and 
Bosniaks. They have been cheaply used in the Ohrid Agreement to cover 
item 1.3 of the Basic Principles. It notes: ‘The multiethnic character of 
Macedonian society must be preserved and reflected in public life.’ Who is 
implementing this principle and where? No one and nowhere. Not a single 
multiethnic corner has been left in the country, because the dual ethnicity 
principle has been raised high above the constitution.”519  
 
In Croatia, even the implementation process of the adopted legal acts continues 
at a slow pace, such as the repossession of property (AI 2005, HRW 2005). In this 
regard, discrimination can also be observed when compared with similar cases such as 
the former tenancy right-holders with refugee status, namely the Croats returning to 
Eastern Slavonia following the end of the mandate of UNTAES (MRG 2003: 32), 
employment discrimination (MRG 2003: 23; HRW 2004; HRW 2005; AI 2005) 
Furthermore, incidents indicating intolerance towards ethnic minorities can also be 
witnessed (IHF 2002, IHF 2003, IHF 2004).    
 
In Serbia, following the democratic revolution, since 2002 such incidents 
decreased except police abuses and discrimination against Roma population (AI, 2002, 
HRW 2002, IHF 2002, AI 2003, HRW 2003, AI 2004, HRW 2004, IHF 2004, AI 2005, 
HRW 2005). However, following the victory of nationalist Serbs in the elections, the 
incidents in 2003 and 2004 against the Hungarian population revealed how the inter-
ethnic relations still seems to be fragile (IHF 2004, AI 2005, HRW 2005).  
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published by Macedonian newspaper Dnevnik on 14 August 2004, available at 
http://www.csees.net 
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When analysed together, regarding the effects of Europeanization at the domestic 
level, all the three cases reveal that it is not as successful as the level of the adoption of 
the legal framework. This reveals the fact that although the Europeanization persuades 
the leadership through its “compulsory impact” to adopt the legal framework via its 
“enabling impact” (Diez et. al. 2004), it could not change the identity-scripts of the 
conflict parties, rather as indicated in Macedonia, further strengthened the process of the 
ethnicization of socio-political life, thus lacked its “constructive impact” on the parties 
at the societal level.  
 
While revealing contradictory results in the two levels of domestic ethnic 
politics, for the third level, the Europeanization process reflects different results. As 
mentioned above, to reach a sustainable solution build on trust, it should foster 
cooperation between the kin-state and host-state, in which minorities have a constructive 
impact. In all cases, we can witness that the Europeanization process fostered the 
intensification of bilateral and regional cooperation which was reflected in the progress 
reports of the SAP. However, when we analyze the motivations behind this, a negative 
relationship can be witnessed between the presence of a past armed conflict and the 
position of ethnic minorities as a constructive factor in the intensification of bilateral 
relations. It rather directly refers to the role of the EU integration process for the 
enhancement of bilateral relations. In Macedonia, where an armed conflict was 
experienced in 2001, the biggest motivation for bilateral cooperation is the EU and 
Euro-Atlantic integration, while similar reference points in favor of being closer to the 
EU has also the prevailed in the discourses of the Croatian leaders on cooperation with 
Serbia. In this context, Serbian case is an exception regarding the fact that there has not 
been an armed conflict between the Hungarian minority and the Serbian state and the 
Serbs as the host-nation. In the statements of the Serbian leaders on cooperation with 
Hungary, this was reflected by drawing on the fact that the two ethnic communities are 
the main motivation for fostering relations.   
 
To sum up, the Europeanization process has functionally fostered bilateral 
cooperation between the kin-states and the host-states. However, the reality that the 
main reference points for this intensification is the objective to get closer to the EU 
leads to the question that whenever the EU process is obstructed, how this would effect 
the bilateral relations regarding the positions of minority rights, taking it into 
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consideration that to a great extent, inter-ethnic reconciliation has not been owned at the 
societal level. In this regard, the call of the Bulgarian president to the different sectors of 
the Bulgarian society to facilitate on preserving social peace until Bulgaria enters the 
EU is thought provoking by reflecting the same mentality in another candidate state520 
 
 
Underlying Problems and Possible Strategies 
 
Both the adoption of the legal framework and the prospect of the EU integration 
on fostering bilateral and regional cooperation explicitly reveals that strategically the 
EU membership is the “only hope for a more positive future” (Anastasakis and Bojicic-
Dzelilovic 2002: 56). However this approach has two main failures in our cases.  
 
The first is the fact that fundamentally by proposing itself as a framework, the 
EU does not attempt to charge the difficult task to solve the problems in the region but 
rather prefers “to helping these countries help themselves”521 by providing them 
framework to copy, which is formulated to resolve their problems. However, by 
directing itself primarily to political leadership, the process seems to fail in the societal 
level when the intolerant events and perceptions in the region are taken into 
consideration, although at this level a number of NGOs522 are active within the process 
for the promotion of EU membership perspective. 
 
The second failure is on the role of EU membership on bilateral relations. The 
analysis of secondary data reveals that except the Serbian case, bilateral cooperation is 
fundamentally approached in the context of European integration rather than having a 
significance of its own or what is more important regarding our cases, not grounded on 
                                                 
520
 Reported by Anadolu Ajansı, on August 13, 2005, 
http://www.trt.net.tr/wwwtrt/hdevam.aspx?hid=129743&k=2, and 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/?hn=201873&bl=dishaberler&trh=20050814.  
 
521
 2002 SAP Report, p. 9. 
 
522
 Such as the European Movement in Serbia, available at http://www.emins.org; the 
European Movement in Macedonia, available at http://www.europeanmovement.org.mk; 
Organization of Progressive European Forces in Macedonia, available at 
http://www.opes.org.mk ; Europe House in Zagreb etc. 
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the role and position of national minorities. Indeed, this has also been criticized by the 
EU in some instances. For instance in its 2002 SAP Report, the EC criticized the 
Croatian Government as “it continues to focus too much on the headline political 
objectives of Croatia’s European policy rather than on the enormous effort that moving 
closer to European standards requires”523 
 
What is more problematic is the fact that although the policymakers in Brussels 
believes that the success story in Central Europe will repeat itself, it is not as clear as 
that whether these policy makers are aware of the fact that the risk of failure is still there 
and the costs of such a failure would be higher. Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
(2002: 57) reports that most of the academicians in the region believe that the approach 
towards the SEE is a delaying tactic of the EU. In this regard, it must be kept in mind 
that offering a one-way solution, namely the EU membership, includes the risk that 
encouraging false hopes may easily results in disappointment. In this regard, a Plan-B 
must be put on the table before offering any prospect of association.  
 
In this context, the EU has to strengthen its perspective of an integrated, long-
term approach towards the region including both strengthening its perspective of 
structural prevention within the broader perspective of conflict prevention and enriching 
it with active role of consultation in peacebuilding initiatives. The points to be focused 
can be summarized as follows:  
 
(1) A more efficient way has to be framed to guarantee the implementation process 
of the required reforms 
 
(2) The vision created in the minds of the elites has to be extended to the societal 
level to accommodate inter-ethnic relations  
 
Before all else, the first question requires to narrow the process of EU 
integration, where the candidate countries should be aware of what this stage entails. In 
this context, beside their SP membership, the three countries are at their different point 
of their pace on the way to further EUropean integration. Macedonia is the first country 
                                                 
523
 2002 SAP Report, p. 19. 
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to sign a SAA on April 2001, which entered into force on April 2004, subsequent to its 
application for EU membership on March 2004. Croatia has been the second country 
signing a SAA with the EU on October 2001, which entered into force on February 
2005. Furthermore, following Slovenia, it is the second country in the closest point to 
the EU membership. Having applied to EU membership on February 2003, Croatia 
achieved a positive Feasibility Report on April 2004 to start the negotiations. However, 
it was delayed due to the lack of cooperation with the ICTY, on March 2005. When 
compared with the previous two, Serbia is in its first steps on the way to integration. 
Having joined the SAP on October 2000, it recently achieved a positive Feasibility 
Report from the Commission to start negotiations on April 2005. In this regard, by 
establishing a direct relationship between the pace of these countries towards the EU 
membership and the increase in their positive record on the successful conflict 
prevention, one can expect that Croatia should be the best case, while Serbia is the 
weakest and Macedonia in the middle. However, it can be observed that regarding inter-
ethnic reconciliation, Serbia seems to have positive results when compared with the 
other two.524 This strengthens the idea that rather than success in the adoption of 
Europeanization process, the domestic peace, namely inter-ethnic reconciliation is due 
to the previous experiences. While the process presents more promising records in 
Serbia, where the parties had not encountered serious problems that would transform the 
conflict from an issue based conflict to a relational conflict, although achieved a more 
successful record of European integration pace, the Croatian and Macedonian 
experiences has stricter signs of weakness in the implementation process of the reforms 
and the weaker level of interethnic reconciliation. In EU’s part this may have two 
explanations; the first is that it still experiences early-warning problem, while the second 
is that it tolerates lack of efficient implementation. In this regard, the first does not seem 
to have a ground as the international NGOs have already presented their narrative 
reports on the weakness of the implementation process which was supported by statiscal 
data provided by similar institutions that reveal the weakness of the degree of inter-
ethnic reconciliation. This strengthens the second approach that it tolerates lack of full 
implementation by the governments to some extent, or to put it in a more positive frame, 
it applies a face saving strategy for the pro-European forces and avoids any strategic 
                                                 
524
 It must be undelined that this argument is valid for Vojvodina. Serbia has the same 
weakest indicators in Southern Serbia.  
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error that would ‘break the glasses’. The SAP reports also seem to support the second 
hypothesis.  
 
Indeed the 2001 Macedonian conflict itself reveals the failure of this policy. 
While avoiding the data provided by the international NGO reports revealing inter-
ethnic reconciliation in the name of not spoiling the dream of this ‘island of peace’ in 
the midst of ‘the bloody’ Balkans, the EU found itself in the midst of the latest ethno-
political conflict of the Balkans. Regarding the last experiences, this is especially 
relevant to the Croatian case. The EC reported in its 2002 SAP Report, that the 
weakness of the judiciary and the nationalistic pressures are the fundamental challenges 
on the pace of the reforms, particularly affecting the policy of the government on return 
of refuges and the adoption of relevant measures, co-operation with ICTY and 
enhancement of  regional co-operation525. It was later reflected in the 2003 SAP report 
with a frustrated stand towards Croatia’s performance, noting that ““(i)n practice there 
are still obstacles to the return of refuges and IDPs”526  These deficiencies were also 
reflected in the “priority areas needing attention in the next 12 months”. In the same 
report, Croatia was strongly urged to cooperate with ICTY (see also HRW 2003). 
Despite an evident weak record of performance, particularly regarding the rights of 
refugees and cooperation with the ICTY, in its final report, the EC stated that  
 
“Croatia is a functioning democracy, with stable institutions 
guaranteeing the rule of law. There are no major problems regarding the 
respect of fundamental rights. In April 2004, the ICTY Prosecutor stated 
that Croatia is now cooperating fully with ICTY. Croatia needs to maintain 
full cooperation and take all necessary steps to ensure that the remaining 
indictee is located and transferred to ICTY. Croatia needs to make 
additional efforts in the field of minority rights, refugee returns, judiciary 
reform, regional co-operation and the fight against corruption. On this basis, 
the Commission confirms that Croatia meets the political criteria set by the 
Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the Stabilisation and 
Association Process conditionalities established by the Council in 1997.”527  
 
 
                                                 
525
 2002 SAP Report,  p. 19.  
 
526
 Ibid. p. 10. 
 
527
 Ibid, p. 119-120. Regarding the assessment of the minority rights and refugee issues, 
which is more or less identical to the previous SAA Report, see pp. 24-30 
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However, 11 months later it annulled the decision to start negotiations for 
membership due to lack of cooperation with the ICTY. This is also applicable to the 
Serbian case. For instance, in its 2004 Annual Report on Serbia, the HRW explicitly 
stated that “the European Union has not used the Association and Stabilization Process 
to leverage improvements in Serbia’s performance” on human rights and minority 
issues.528 However, this indirect strategy based on using more carrots than sticks not to 
hamper the pro-European process, may indeed obstruct the integration process while 
constructing mirages of democracies in South Eastern Europe. In this regard, one can 
witness that the EC’s decision on Croatia strengthened the image of the indicted 
Croatian General Ante Gotovina as a national hero, while it reached the biggest decrease 
in June 2005 for supporting EU process in Croatia with 53 %against Croatia’s entry into 
the EU, while about one third (36 %) of poll participants remain in favour of joining the 
EU529. This indeed seems to prove the hypothesis that encouraging false hopes may 
easily result in disappointment. This becomes more important when it is considered that 
one can already see two basic approaches regarding the EU. While the public opinion in 
these countries represents their beliefs on the changes that EU membership will bring to 
their life, namely better standards with a considerable ratio; it is lower when the 
question is on whether EU could be trusted. It is seen that approximately half of the 
population in Macedonia and Croatia can be accepted as the supporters of the 
integration process. (Figure 3) Similar figures can also been seen in another poll held in 
2003. Accordingly, 46 % of the Macedonians reflect their confidence in the EU, while 
this is 30 in Serbia.530 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
528
 See, 2004 HRW Annual Report on Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
529
 Reported by HRT 1 TV, Zagreb on 30 June 2005, available at http://www.csees.net 
This indeed represent a continous decrease. Those supporting Croatia’ entry was 45% 
on 31 May 2005, (reported by HRTV 1). 
 
530
 The results are even lower in Montenegro with 17 % ratio. 
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Figure 4: Opinion on the EU 
Source: International Commission on the Balkans (2005). The Balkans in 
Europe’s Future, p. 52, figure. 19. 
 
 
 
In the case of Macedonia, for instance, the difference between the above 
mentioned two attitudes can clearly be observed. While 65% of the ethnic Macedonians 
and 79.1% of the ethnic Albanians believe that they will have better conditions with an 
EU membership. When the question asked is whether they regard that what EU wants is 
best for this country, 40.4% of the ethnic Macedonians disagree, while this is 15.7% for 
the ethnic Albanians. These figures also reflect a shaky ground for the policy-makers 
who may be at face with a considerable number of against the exercise of further 
reforms towards accommodation with the EU norms. 
 
These results underline the fact that the EU should utilize ‘the sticks’ properly 
and on time if it is required, which needs to be accompanied by the implementation of 
an effective communication strategy not to worsen its position in the minds of the elites 
and the people of these countries.   
 
This makes it more important to on the aforementioned second point for an 
integrated, long-term approach for the EU, namely the fact that the vision created in the 
minds of the political elites has to be extended to the societal level to accommodate 
inter-ethnic relations. This underlines that in order to facilitate the level of integration at 
the societal level, EU should strengthen its focus on the social level, that is to say, 
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beside concentrating on regime-formation for the protection of minorities as a form of 
structural prevention addressing root causes (see Table 1) through its “enabling impact” 
(Diez et al. 2000), it should actively utilize its “constructive impact” in order to 
“promote multi-ethnic structures and loyalties” within the broader framework of a 
“culture of peace” (see Table 1). This requires a more intense application of CR theory 
and practice drawing on the perspective of peacebuilding, focusing on the relational 
dimension at particular. As Lederach highlighted, with the aim of minimizing poorly 
functioning communication and maximize mutual understanding (1997: 82) this 
approach is based on fundamental instruments of reconciliation, forgiveness, trust 
building and future imagining.  
 
In this regard, followed by the principle of justice in the process of post-conflict 
reconstruction, it requires “the establishment of a new relationship based on mutual 
acceptance and reasonable trust” (Montville 1993: 112). Taking it into consideration that 
one of the main problems in the aforementioned cases is the lack of the desired societal 
basis on the vision of building sustainable peace, what are needed is more then elite 
agreements. In this context, as Lederach emphasized, what’s needed is “to alter 
relationships among groups in a society through engagement of, and the need for 
fundamental reconciliation of, middle-range and grass-roots leaders and groups of 
citizens”531 (Lederach 1997: cf. Ross 2000: 1020)  
 
For the first step, this requires the adoption of a relation-based approach of 
which could constructively transform conflicts at both the elite and grassroots level, 
through bridge-building communication channels such as “traning sessions in methods 
of communication, negotiation and mediation; the organizations of programmes of 
encounter and exchange; the initiation of bi- or multi-ethnic projects designed to 
improve shared living conditions, and so on” (Ropers 1997: 8-11). By providing such 
platforms of open communication these initiatives can build trust and increase empathy 
among the members of the ethnic communities. In this framework, three main areas 
required to be focused on are: youth, education, and media. 
 
                                                 
531
 See, the works of Project on Ethnic Relations (2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004a, 2004b) 
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Regarding integration of youth in the peace-building process, the initiatives such 
as “Youth Building the Future”, a joint initiative of local activist in Tuzla, Bosnia and 
the Schüler Helfen Leben and the Berghof Research Center, provides valuable insights. 
Similar joints projects which are not directly related to the central issues of the conflict 
but rather motivated by shared interests could provide a means of consultation between 
the young members of ethnic communities. Furthermore, by providing community work 
which is oriented to training and employment could also strengthen local ownership532. 
Furthermore, alongside training of conflict resolution skills, initiatives of future 
imagining could be applied among the youth, drawing on the fact that the conflicting 
parties could often have more common points regarding their vision of future when 
compared with their shared, and sometimes violent past (Lederach 1997: 77)533  
 
While these projects can also be adapted to the educational spaces, to overcome 
the tensions of ethno-cultural and linguistic divisions, which is a point of instability for 
the Macedonian educational system, special emphasis should be given to pre-school 
education. As experienced in the Search for Common Ground Project, such a cultural 
contact can provide them a common life space to realize and develop a more accurate 
perception of their commonality while preserving their own identity. 
 
While the two strategies focus mostly on the young population in these countries, 
taking it into consideration that media has the potential to reach the largest number of 
population, it can provide to overcome prejudices among the ethnic communities by 
helping to build trust as the first step towards sustainable peace. In this context, beside 
strengthening local media to become self-sufficient and autonomous through technical 
and educational assistance, various forms of initiatives can be held such as joint media 
projects, workshops to help defuse provocative coverage, or trainings of local journalists 
and students in the universities in conflict resolution skills534.  
 
                                                 
532
 For an introductory essay on joint projects and a list of additional resources, see, 
McMoran (2003), at http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/joint_projects.jsp 
 
533
 For envisioning as a tool for peacebuilding, see also, Dugan (2001). 
 
534
 See, Melone, Terzis and Beleli (2002)and Dusan Reljic, “The News Media and the 
Transformation of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, available at http://www.berghof-
handbook.net 
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Furthermore, while these projects could facilitate the inter-ethnic reconciliation 
in the domestic level, regarding the third level of bilateral cooperation, the projects like 
Euro-regions would also provide considerable achievements. In this regard DKMT may 
stand as a model for future programs, in which the local authorities act autonomously on 
both sides. In addition to strengthening local ownership and supporting to establish the 
aforementioned joint projects at the inter-state level by providing open communication 
channels, such initiatives would also facilitate to overcome the strict administrative and 
political centralism in the region, which stands as one of the main obstacles for further 
co-operation.  
 
To conclude, today the European Union is strongly engaged in post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilisation efforts in the Western Balkans within its integrated 
approach of conflict prevention, beside its civilian crisis management through its police 
forces in Bosnia and Macedonia. However, by pursuing this policy mainly through the 
Stability and Association Process and the European Partnership based on the principle of 
EU membership conditionality proposing a framework of structural prevention, it directs 
its efforts primarily towards the political leadership. In this context, although the 
adoption of the ‘European’ norms within the structural conflict prevention strategy at the 
domestic and inter-state level reveals that this policy is relatively successful at the 
structural level, lack of social integration drawing on interethnic reconciliation at the 
societal level535 reveals that EU should extend its one-size-fits-all strategy of structural 
conflict prevention to peacebuilding, which is yet to be fully realized. Within this 
framework, as ironically stated in the webpage of the European Commission on 
“Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management”, supplemented by a more 
improved and frequent peacebuilding initiatives, “it must be able to respond in a timely 
and tailor-made fashion, with an appropriate mix of instruments, to the specific 
situations as they arise” 536 In this context, in close cooperation with the other 
intergovernmental organizations, to foster local and regional ownership the role of the 
                                                 
535
 Which may easily create potential spoilers. 
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 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp.htm 
    
 
 228 
EU should be to support and facilitate, with an active third party involvement when 
required, rather than imposing a framework of structural prevention based on the 
formula of assistance and membership in return for reform, which currently creates 
dependency and may further continue to create an illusion of ‘SAP democracies’ in the 
Western Balkans.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Framework Convention For The Protection Of National 
Minorities 
 
 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
NATIONAL MINORITIES 
 
The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States, signatories to 
the present framework Convention,  
 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity 
between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and 
principles which are their common heritage;  
 
Considering that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the 
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
 
Wishing to follow up the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of 
the member States of the Council of Europe adopted in Vienna on 9 October 1993; 
Being resolved to protect within their respective territories the existence of national 
minorities; 
 
Considering that the upheavals of European history have shown that the 
protection of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace 
in this continent; 
 
Considering that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only 
respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to 
a national minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, 
preserve and develop this identity; 
 
Considering that the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary 
to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment 
for each society; 
 
Considering that the realisation of a tolerant and prosperous Europe does not 
depend solely on co-operation between States but also requires transfrontier co-
operation between local and regional authorities without prejudice to the constitution 
and territorial integrity of each State; 
 
Having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto; 
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Having regard to the commitments concerning the protection of national 
minorities in United Nations conventions and declarations and in the documents of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, particularly the Copenhagen 
Document of 29 June 1990; 
 
Being resolved to define the principles to be respected and the obligations which 
flow from them, in order to ensure, in the member States and such other States as may 
become Parties to the present instrument, the effective protection of national minorities 
and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities, within the rule 
of law, respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of 
States; 
 
Being determined to implement the principles set out in this framework 
Convention through national legislation and appropriate governmental policies,  
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
SECTION I 
 
ARTICLE 1 
The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons 
belonging to those minorities form an integral part of the international protection of 
human rights, and as such falls within the scope of international co-operation. 
 
ARTICLE 2 
The provisions of this framework Convention shall be applied in good faith, in a 
spirit of understanding and tolerance and in conformity with the principles of good 
neighbourliness, friendly relations and co-operation between States. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
1. Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to 
choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from 
this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice. 
2. Persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the 
freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention 
individually as well as in community with others. 
 
SECTION II 
 
ARTICLE 4 
1. The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities 
the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, 
any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 
2. The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order 
to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective 
equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the 
majority. In this respect, they shall take due account of the specific conditions of the 
persons belonging to national minorities. 
3. The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered 
to be an act of discrimination. 
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ARTICLE 5 
1. The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons 
belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve 
the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and 
cultural heritage. 
2. Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration 
policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of 
persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons 
from any action aimed at such assimilation. 
 
ARTICLE 6 
1. The Parties shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and 
take effective measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and cooperation 
among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those persons’ ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields of education, culture and the 
media. 
2. The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who 
may be subject to threats of acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
The Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging to a 
national minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish religious 
institutions, organisations an associations. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that the right to freedom of expression of 
every person belonging to a national minority includes freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas in the minority language, without interference 
by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. The Parties shall 
ensure, within the framework of their legal systems, that persons belonging to a 
national minority are not discriminated against in their access to the media.  
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Parties from requiring the licensing, without 
discrimination and based on objective criteria, of sound radio and television 
broadcasting, or cinema enterprises. 
3. The Parties shall not hinder the creation and the use of printed media by 
persons belonging to national minorities. In the legal framework of sound radio and 
television broadcasting, they shall ensure, as far as possible, and taking into account the 
provisions of paragraph 1, that persons belonging to national minorities are granted the 
possibility of creating and using their own media. 
4. In the framework of their legal systems, the Parties shall adopt adequate 
measures in order to facilitate access to the media for persons belonging to national 
minorities and in order to promote tolerance and permit cultural pluralism. 
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ARTICLE 10 
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority 
language, in private and in public, orally and in writing. 
2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or 
in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds 
to a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions 
which would make it possible to use the minority 
language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities. 
3. The Parties undertake to guarantee the right of every person belonging to a 
national minority to be informed promptly, in a language which he or she understands, 
of the reasons for his of her arrest, and of the nature and cause of any accusation against 
him or her, and to defend himself or herself in this language, if necessary with the free 
assistance of an interpreter. 
 
ARTICLE 11 
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the 
minority language and the right to official recognition of them, according to modalities 
provided for in their legal system. 
2. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to display in his or her minority language signs, inscriptions and 
other information of a private nature visible to the public. 
3. In areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of persons belonging to 
a national minority, the Parties shall endeavour, in the framework of their legal system, 
including, where appropriate, agreements with other States, and taking into account their 
specific conditions, to display traditional local names, street 
names and other topographical indications intended for the public also in the 
minority language when there is a sufficient demand for such indications.  
 
ARTICLE 12 
1. The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education 
and research to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their 
national minorities and of the majority. 
2. In this context the Parties shall inter alia provide adequate opportunities for 
teacher training and access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts among students and 
teachers of different communities. 
3. The Parties undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to education 
at all levels for persons belonging to national minorities. 
 
ARTICLE 13 
1. Within the framework of their education systems, the Parties shall recognise 
that persons belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their 
own private educational and training establishments. 
2. The exercise of this right shall not entail any fi nancial obligation for the 
Parties.  
 
ARTICLE 14 
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to learn his or her minority language.  
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2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or 
in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to 
ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that 
persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the 
minority language or for receiving instruction in this language. 
3. Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the 
learning of the official language or the teaching in this language.  
 
ARTICLE 15 
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of 
persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in 
public affairs, in particular those affecting them. 
 
ARTICLE 16 
The Parties shall refrain from measures which alter the proportions of the 
population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities and are aimed 
at restricting the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the 
present framework Convention. 
 
ARTICLE 17 
1. The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to 
national minorities to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers 
with persons lawfully staying in other States, in particular those with whom they share 
an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage. 
2. The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to 
national minorities to participate in the activities of non-governmental organisations, 
both at the national and international levels. 
 
ARTICLE 18 
1. The Parties shall endeavour to conclude, where necessary, bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with other States, in particular neighbouring States, in order to 
ensure the protection of persons belonging to the national minorities concerned. 
2. Where relevant, the Parties shall take measures to encourage transfrontier co-
operation. 
 
ARTICLE 19 
The Parties undertake to respect and implement the principles enshrined in the 
present framework Convention making, where necessary, only those limitations, 
restrictions or derogations which are provided for in international legal instruments, in 
particular the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, in so far as they are relevant to the rights and freedoms flowing from the said 
principles. 
 
SECTION III 
 
ARTICLE 20 
In the exercise of the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined 
in the present framework Convention, any person belonging to a national minority shall 
respect the national legislation and the rights of others, in particular those of persons 
belonging to the majority or to other national minorities. 
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ARTICLE 21 
Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental 
principles of international law and in particular of the sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and political independence of States. 
 
ARTICLE 22 
Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be construed as limiting or 
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be 
ensured under the laws of any Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which 
it is a Party. 
 
ARTICLE 23 
The rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present 
framework Convention, in so far as they are the subject of a corresponding provision in 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or in the 
Protocols thereto, shall be understood so as to conform to the latter provisions. 
 
SECTION IV 
 
ARTICLE 24 
1. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe shall monitor the 
implementation of this framework Convention by the Contracting Parties.  
2. The Parties which are not members of the Council of Europe shall participate 
in the implementation mechanism, according to modalities to be determined. 
 
ARTICLE 25 
1. Within a period of one year following the entry into force of this framework 
Convention in respect of a Contracting Party, the latter shall transmit to the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe full information on the legislative and other measures 
taken to give effect to the principles set out in this framework 
Convention. 
2. Thereafter, each Party shall transmit to the Secretary General on a periodical 
basis and whenever the Committee of Ministers so requests any further information of 
relevance to the implementation of this framework Convention. 
3. The Secretary general shall forward to the Committee of Ministers the 
information transmitted under the terms of this Article. 
 
ARTICLE 26 
1. In evaluating the adequacy of the measures taken by the Parties to give effect 
to the principles set out in this framework Convention the Committee of Ministers shall 
be assisted by an advisory committee, the members of which shall have recognised 
expertise in the field of the protection of national minorities. 
2. The composition of this advisory committee and its procedure shall be 
determined by the Committee of Ministers within a period of one year following entry 
into force of this framework Convention. 
 
SECTION V 
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ARTICLE 27 
This framework Convention shall be open for signature by the member States of 
the Council if Europe. Up until the date when the Convention enters into force, it shall 
also be open for signature by any other State so invited by the Committee of Ministers. 
It is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments 
of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe. 
 
ARTICLE 28 
1. This framework Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month 
following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on which twelve 
member States of the Council of Europe have expressed their consent to be bound by the 
Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article 27. 
2. In respect of any member State which subsequently expresses its consent to be 
bound by it, the framework Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the 
month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of the deposit 
of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval. 
 
ARTICLE 29 
1. After the entry into force of this framework Convention and after consulting 
the Contracting States, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe may invite 
to accede to the Convention, by a decision taken by the majority provided for in Article 
20.d of the Statute of the Council of Europe, any non-member State of the Council of 
Europe which, invited to sign in accordance with the provisions of Article 27, has not 
yet done so, and any other non-member State. 
2. In respect of any acceding State, the framework Convention shall enter into 
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months 
after the date of the deposit of the instrument of accession with the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe. 
 
ARTICLE 30 
1. Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, specify the territory or territories for 
whose international relations it is responsible to which this framework Convention shall 
apply. 
2. Any State may at any later date, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe, extend the application of this framework Convention 
to any other territory specified in the declaration. In respect of such territory the 
framework Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the 
expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of such declaration by the 
Secretary General. 
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs may, in respect of 
any territory specified in such declaration, be withdrawn by a notification addressed to 
the Secretary General. The withdrawal shall become effective on the first day of the 
month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of 
such notification by the Secretary general. 
 
ARTICLE 31 
1. Any Party may at any time renounce this framework Convention by means of 
a notification addressed to the Secretary general of the Council of Europe.  
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2. Such renunciation shall become effective on the first day of the month 
following the expiration of a period of six months after the date of receipt of the 
notification by the Secretary General. 
 
ARTICLE 32 
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States 
of the Council, other signatory States and any State which has acceded to this 
framework Convention, of: 
(a) any signature 
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession 
(c) the date of entry into force of this framework Convention in accordance with 
Articles 28, 29 and 30 
(d) any other act, notification or communication relating to this framework 
Convention. 
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Appendix 2. Statement of Macedonian Leaders on Bilateral Relations and 
Cooperation with Albania 
 
18 
April 
2002 
ATA 
news 
agency, 
Tirana 
PM, 
Ljubco 
Georgevsk
i 
“the big problems that Albania and Macedonia are left behind and 
now they are oriented towards common interest, integration into 
Europe” 
18 June 
2003 
MIA 
news 
agency, 
Skopje 
Spokesma
n of 
Defense 
Min, 
Marjan 
Gjurovski 
“The security situation at the border with Albania is stabile and the 
intensive contacts between the defence and interior ministries are 
positively reflected on the stabilization of the situation in the 
region” 
18 June 
2003 
ATA 
news 
agency, 
Tirana 
Deputy 
Premier, 
Musa 
Xhaferri 
“We are on the stage of opening concrete cooperation with 
Albania, that has to do with a better and more liberal 
communication in the interest of the two countries”.  
 
11 July 
2003 
MIA 
news 
agency, 
Skopje 
Defense 
Min, 
Vlado 
Buckovski 
“With our activities we are building a mini-collective defence 
system i the region”, adding that Macedonia and Albania would be 
promoters of successful regional cooperation in the future in order 
to get closer to NATO.” 
11 July 
2003 
MIA 
news 
agency, 
Skopje 
Defense 
Min. 
Vlado 
Buckovski 
“the ongoing cooperation … could be used as a model of regional 
cooperation”  
1 April 
2004 
A1 TV, 
Skopje 
Head of 
Border 
Crossing 
Dept., the 
Interior 
Min., 
Vangel 
Dimkov 
“... as a step forward in promoting not only bilateral, but also 
regional cooperation in general. This will be an impetus for more 
rapid EU integration. Vangel Dimkov, head of the border crossings 
department at the Macedonian Interior Ministry, said that this 
would contribute to preventing illegal crossings and other negative 
phenomena. 
19 
April 
2004 
Albania
n Radio, 
Tirana 
Deputy 
Min. for 
European 
Integ, 
Radmila 
Sekerinsk
a 
Support of the Macedonian government and the willingness to 
strengthen cooperation in the (EU) integration processes. 
   the Albanian community in Macedonia and the Macedonian 
minority in Albania are another reason for the strengthening of the 
friendly and neighbourly relations between the two countries. 
   the cooperation in the framework of the integration processes in 
NATO continues to be one of the main areas of cooperation 
17 May 
2004 
MIA 
news 
agency, 
Pr., 
B.Crvensk
ovki 
“Macedonia and Albania have mutual interests and goals, they 
urge to accomplish their strategic determinations for EU and 
NATO membership and have many opportunities for cooperation” 
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Skopje 
   “Successful regional cooperation is one of the key criteria for 
sooner integration of our countries in EU and NATO. We are 
neighbours and the excellent cooperation between Albania and 
Macedonia is a successful example for the other countries in the 
region,” 
18 May 
2004 
Macedo
nian 
Radio, 
Skopje 
Pr, B. 
Crvenskov
ki 
“In any event I am convinced that our countries’ cooperation in the 
coming period will be at the highest possible level. We have 
numerous common interests and goals. We aspire to the 
achievement of common strategic objectives, that is, joining the EU 
and NATO, which certainly offer a vast space for mutual 
cooperation.” 
   “I would only add that successful regional cooperation is one of the 
key requirements for our countries' accelerated integration in the 
EU and NATO. In this sense, we are being directed to each other. I 
therefore believe that the cooperation between Macedonia and 
Albania is a really successful model for all other countries in the 
region.”  
3 
August 
2004 
Macedo
nian 
Radio, 
Skopje 
Foreign 
Min. 
Ilinka 
Mitreva 
Relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of 
Albania are at a very high level. We both strive for our countries' 
strategic integration in the European Union and NATO. By 
cooperating between ourselves and encouraging dynamic regional 
cooperation, we are moving closer to our strategic goals. 
   A lot of work awaits us in the realm of EU integration. We are 
prepared to cooperate in this respect.  
8 Sept. 
2004 
MTV 1, 
Skopje  
Pr.B. 
Crvenkovs
ki 
“Today Macedonia has better relations with all its neighbours than 
at any other time in the past” (...) “Good regional cooperation 
creates a better climate for taking care of Macedonians living in 
the neighbouring countries. And finally, the European orientation 
shared by all countries in the region is in fact the most powerful 
weapon in protecting minority rights. These countries have to do 
this for the sake of their own interests and realization of their own 
objectives, rather than as a result of pressure from neighbouring 
countries” 
23 Sept. 
2004 
ATA 
news 
agency, 
Tirana 
Min. Of 
Justice, 
Ixhet 
Memeti 
“There should be collaboration in expert level between such organs 
as police, customs and organs of justice, in order to make as 
efficient as possible the state fight against organized crime”. 
22 
April 
2005 
Fakti Pr. B. 
Crvenkosv
ki 
“... the cooperation between the two countries in fulfilling the 
obligations that stem from the Adriatic Charter, which will help 
both countries join the Euro-Atlantic structures” 
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Appendix 3. Statements of Croatian Leaders on Bilateral Relations and 
Cooperation with Serbia 
 
18 May 2002 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Prime Minister 
Ivo Sanader 
“Relations between Croatia and Serbia are 
of great importance to Central and 
Southeast Europe” 
   Sanader said that a free trade agreement 
would take effect on 1 July and that it would 
further encourage economic cooperation 
with Serbia. 
11 June 2003 Croatian 
Radio, Zagreb 
European 
Integration 
Minister, Neven 
Mimica 
It is in our interest to intensify the reforms 
which we have initiated and they can be 
intensified by implementing the reform 
process based on the EU model resolutely 
and jointly, through joint cooperation. 
 
16 December 
2003 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Premier-
Designate 
The new Croatian government will advocate 
full normalization of relations with Serbia-
Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina as 
there will be no united Europe without those 
countries 
   Asked how important was the exchange of 
apologies which the two presidents - 
Croatia's Stjepan Mesic and Serbia-
Montenegro's Svetozar Marovic - had 
extended, the Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ) leader said “with or without it, the 
normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations 
has no alternative”. 
23 December 
2003 
Croatian 
Radio, Zagreb 
Prime Minister-
designate Ivo 
Sanader 
We are prepared to resolve the remaining 
disputed issues with Serbia and Montenegro 
in the interest of further development of the 
mutual relations between the states and the 
peoples 
14 January 
2004 
FoNet news 
agency, 
Belgrade 
Prime Minister 
Ivo Sanader 
“We all wish that this will be a pro-
European government, a pro-democratic 
government, and on behalf of the Croatian 
government I am prepared to support such a 
trend as far as a normalization of relations 
between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro is 
concerned," Sanader said. 
22 January 
2004 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Prime Minister 
Ivo Sanader 
“We want the normalization of relations 
with Serbia-Montenegro, we want a stable 
neighbourhood” 
27 January 
2004 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Prime Minister 
Ivo Sanader 
Sanader stressed that “normalization of 
relations with Serbia and Montenegro has 
no alternative”(...) 
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   “We want normal relations, and the aim of 
this decision is to encourage pro-European 
and pro-reform forces in Serbia and 
Montenegro to form a government without 
the Radicals,  he said. 
 
2 March 2004 Radio B92, 
Belgrade 
Prime Minister, 
Ivo Sanader 
“I believe that there is no other way but the 
way we are taking, there is no alternative in 
Croatia. Finally, we have been neighbours 
for hundreds of years, Serbs live in Croatia 
and Croats live in Serbia, I am certain that 
we rely on each others. Besides, both 
countries have European ambitions. 
   Nevertheless, normalization of relations 
between Serbia and Croatia has no 
alternative. 
   We have to follow the path of a full 
normalization of our relations. We are 
neighbours. 
07 May 2004 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
President, 
Stjepan Mesic 
Croatia's relations with Serbia should 
follow the example set by Germany and 
France, he said adding that one should, 
however, be cautious as in Serbia power is 
now in hands of those who advocate the 
border along Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag 
line (namely the western border of a Greater 
Serbia). 
20 May 2004 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
President 
Stjepan Mesic 
Croatian President Stjepan Mesic said in an 
interview for Serbia-Montenegro's media 
(...) that relations between the two countries 
were good, adding that the remaining 
outstanding issues must be solved as soon 
as possible in order to improve those 
relations even more. 
24 May 2004 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
President 
Stjepan Mesic 
After meeting in private, the presidents held 
a joint press conference, saying that the 
protocol (on cooperation in European 
integration processes) would encourage and 
materialise cooperation between the two 
countries in their efforts to draw closer to 
the European Union. 
   “As far as Croatia is concerned, there are 
no obstacles to cooperation on European 
subjects. I believe the protocol that has 
been signed today will encourage and 
materialise that cooperation,” 
   The two presidents also agreed that their 
countries had a continuity of good relations 
and that they could serve as an example to 
other countries in the region. 
 287 
   Asked about the return of refugees, Mesic 
said they agreed that the return of refugees 
should be facilitated and accelerated, 
adding that this was in Croatia's national 
interest because it wanted to reaffirm itself 
as a mature democracy. 
2 June 2004 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Foreign Min. 
Miomir Zuzul 
After a meeting in Belgrade, Croatia's 
Foreign Minister Miomir Zuzul and Serbia-
Montenegro's Foreign Minister Vuk 
Draskovic agreed that good neighbourly 
relations were the main task on a way 
towards the EU and that all past open 
questions between the two states would be 
solved in line with the EU future 
  PM, Ivo 
Sanader 
The premier voiced hope the Serb 
representatives’ announcement would not 
lead to big arguments and stressed there was 
no alternative to the normalisation of 
relations with Serbia-Montenegro 
   Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader sent a 
message to Serbs “to be aware of the fact 
that the war wounds in Croatia have not 
healed yet” and added that the Croatian 
government will give full rights to national 
minorities in line with European standards, 
and it will ask for the same rights for Croats 
in Serbia-Montenegro 
8 June 2004 Croatian 
Daily, 
Nacional 
Croatian 
Defence 
Minister, 
Berislav 
Roncevic 
A recent meeting of Croatian Defence 
Minister Berislav Roncevic and Serbia-
Montenegro Defence Minister Prvoslav 
Davinic was not informal and courteous but 
quite concrete and devoted to the talks on 
the future cooperation with far-reaching 
consequences for the stability of 
southeastern Europe. 
11 October 
2004 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
President 
Stjepan Mesic 
Speaking of Croatia's relations with Serbia 
and Montenegro, Mesic said a big step 
forward had been made and that bilateral 
contacts had intensified, which he added 
was a strong message to citizens that the 
two countries could solve their issues alone. 
21 October 
2004 
Croatian 
Radio, Zagreb 
Prime Minister, 
Ivo Sanader 
Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was 
more concrete, saying that dialogue between 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia was 
the only means of survival and that Croatia 
has turned a new leaf by cooperating with 
the Orthodox Church and the Serb 
community in Croatia. We are applying 
European standards in our relations, he 
said. 
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31 October 
2004 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Deputy Prime 
Minister and 
Veterans 
Minister, 
Jadranka Kosor 
Kosor said she advocated “the full truth 
about the Homeland War" as well as “the 
normalization of relations with Serbia and 
Montenegro on the principle of mutual 
recognition, respect and clear European 
prospects”. 
11 November 
2004 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Prime Minister, 
Ivo Sanader 
“Croatia is developing as a multicultural 
society into which national minorities are 
fully integrated. National minorities are 
valuable, not a problem, they are bridges 
which connect and not separate,” said 
Sanader. 
   He thanked national minorities for their 
contribution to Croatia's process of 
integration with the European Union. “We 
want to enter the EU because we share the 
same values and not because we think it's an 
elite club.” 
 
   Sanader said an agreement on the 
protection of ethnic minorities would be 
signed during his visit to Belgrade next 
week, adding it would be a big step in the 
further normalisation of Croatia's relations 
with Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
   “There is no alternative to the 
normalization of relations between Croatia 
and Serbia-Montenegro. The wounds from 
the past have to be healed. We must turn to 
the future, without forgetting the past,” 
Sanader said in Thessaloniki last month, 
where he held talks with the Serbian PM 
and announced his first official visit to 
Belgrade. 
 
15 November 
2004 
HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb  
Prime Minister, 
Ivo Sanader 
He said that the restitution of property to 
Serb refugees was not a political, but a 
technical and financial issue, and announced 
that all property would be given back by the 
year’s end in accordance with an agreement 
between the Croatian government and Serb 
minority representatives in the Croatian 
parliament. 
 
   The two prime ministers underlined the 
historic significance of the agreement on the 
protection of national minorities in the two 
countries, which was signed earlier today. 
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   Sanader said he was optimistic about the 
development of good relations between 
Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, adding 
that both countries wanted to join the 
European Union and transnational 
integration processes. 
   “Relations between Croatia and Serbia-
Montenegro are the key to peace and 
lasting political stability in this part of 
Europe, and after 14 years of war and 
clashes, the citizens of our countries deserve 
that” 
7 May 2005 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Former Foreign 
Minister, 
Miomir Zuzul 
Miomir Zuzul said the crucial questions 
arising now were why the European Union 
was so important for the process of 
stabilisation and reconciliation in the 
region and why the process of EU 
enlargement had to continue.  
“If there is no reconciliation, there is no 
stability, and if there is no stability, there is 
no progress,” Zuzul said.  
 
18 May 2005 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Prime Minister, 
Ivo Sanader 
The Croatian government strongly 
condemns and rejects attempts to 
rehabilitate the Ravna Gora Chetnik 
Movement, but will continue to maintain 
bilateral relations with Serbia-Montenegro 
because “we believe that there are forces in 
that country that look at that movement as 
we do”,  
“If we can help those forces to win, it is 
worth trying to maintain bilateral relations 
and continue ensuring the stability of the 
entire region” 
6 July 2005 BKTV, 
Belgrade 
President 
Stjepan Mesic 
[Reporter] The return of Serb refugees to 
Croatia is a national and state issue of great 
importance, the Croatian president said. If 
Serbs, citizens of the Republic of Croatia, 
return to Croatia, that defines Croatia as a 
safe country and a country which fulfils the 
conditions for joining the EU, Mesic said 
4 August 2005 HINA news 
agency, 
Zagreb 
Government 
statement 
The Croatian government reiterates that it is 
committed to the development of good 
neighbourly relations with Serbia-
Montenegro as well as to the promotion of 
the efficient regional cooperation 
particularly for the purpose of realization of 
the European perspectives of southeastern 
Europe. 
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Appendix 4. Statements of Serbian Leaders on Bilateral Relations and Cooperation with 
Hungary 
 
03 June 
2003 
Tanjug news agency, 
Belgrade 
P.M. Zoran Zivkovic “Hungarian and Serbian minorities 
are the catalysts of the already 
good relations between the two 
neighbouring countries and this 
fact should be kept in mind in 
future relations” 
 
21 October 
2003 
BKTV, Belgrade P.M. Z. Zivkovic Medgyessy and Zivkovic stated 
that the Serb minority in Hungary 
and the Hungarian minority in 
Serbia were factors which 
improved the relations between 
Belgrade and Budapest. 
   “I believe that their status is very 
good, but that there is room for 
improvement. An agreement on 
dual citizenship can be a part of the 
mechanism for improving the status 
of both minorities.” 
28 May 
2004 
Kossuth Radio Serbian Presidential 
Candidate, Chairman 
of the Democratic 
Party of Serbia, Boris 
Tadic 
He said that Vojvodina was bridge 
between the two countries. 
11 July 
2004 
FoNet, Belgrade PM Vojislav 
Kostunica 
He said that Serbia-Montenegro 
and Hungary had traditionally 
good-neighbourly relations, which 
contributed to successful 
cooperation in all areas. 
   It was jointly assessed that 
improving the status of the 
Hungarian minority in Serbia and 
the Serb minority in Hungary was 
extremely important, and would 
contribute to more diversified 
cooperation in the spirit of good-
neighbourly relations. 
   It was also jointly assessed that 
every attempt to upset good 
relations should be prevented 
through joint efforts, in the spirit of 
tradition of good relations, the 
statement concluded. 
14 
september 
FoNet, Belgrade PM Vojislav 
Kostunica 
“The agreement on the protection 
of minority rights is the best way 
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2004 for solving all conflicts.” 
   The premier said that Hungary was 
Serbia's traditional friend and a 
valuable ally on the Serbian voyage 
towards the Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 
26 
September 
2004 
Radio Belgrade Democrat Party 
Leader Boris Tadic 
“The Vojvodina issue is of vital 
importance to Serbia, but also for 
regional stability and security, 
keeping in mind the attitude 
towards minorities” 
20 October 
2004 
FoNet, Belgrade Serbian Speaker 
Predrag Markovic 
Markovic said in Belgrade today 
that a new chapter in the relations 
between Serbia and Hungary had 
begun. 
   Markovic told a news conference 
that he would do everything for 
economic relations and the 
investment of Hungarian capital 
into Serbia to improve, adding that 
the internalization of the Hungarian 
minority in Vojvodina's problems 
had slowed down investments. 
12 
February 
2005 
Radio B92, Belgrade Min. For Human and 
Minority Rights, 
Rasim Ljajic 
Serbia-Montenegro Minister for 
Human and Minority Rights Rasim 
Ljajic has said that the agreement 
creates a more favourable social 
and political climate in relations 
between Budapest and Belgrade. 
“The agreement transcends the 
importance it has for the minorities 
as it is of great significance for the 
promotion of overall bilateral 
relations between the two 
countries. Hungary is one of our 
most important foreign policy 
partners,” Ljajic said. 
   Ljajic added that the agreement's 
implementation lay ahead, which 
should significantly improve the 
position of minorities. “We do not 
want this to be a list of nice wishes, 
the minorities must feel the 
concrete advantage of the signing 
of such an accord,” he said. 
12 April 
2005 
FoNet, Belgrade President Svetozar 
Marovic 
Marovic and Somogyi assessed 
relations between Serbia-
Montenegro and Hungary as very 
good, expressing the readiness for 
their further improvement, 
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especially in the field of trade. 
 
26 May 
2005 
FoNet, Belgrade SAM President 
Svetozar Marovic 
Hungary will offer every support to 
Serbia-Montenegro during its 
journey towards the EU 
association, but there are certain 
preconditions for that, Serbia-
Montenegro President Svetozar 
Marovic and Hungarian Prime 
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany agreed 
today. 
   Speaking about the position of the 
Hungarian minority in Serbia and 
vice-versa, he said that individual 
incidents could not and must not 
endanger the good relations and 
European future of the two 
countries. 
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Appendix 5. Map of Macedonia 
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Appendix 6. Map of Eastern Croatia 
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Appendix 7. Map of Serbia and Montenegro 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
